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A B S T R A C T
This thesis contains three essays on the linkages between financial
markets and business cycles.
The first chapter introduces a method to embed learning about
asset prices (relying on past observation to predict future prices) into
business cycle models in a way that retains a maximum of rationality
and parsimony. This method is applied to a real business cycle model
and a search model of unemployment. In the RBC model, learning
about stock prices leads to counterfactual correlations between con-
sumption, employment and investment. By contrast, the search model
augmented by learning can generate realistic business cycle fluctu-
ations. The volatility of unemployment in the data can be replicated
without the need to rely on a high degree of wage rigidity.
The second chapter examines the implications of a learning-based
asset pricing theory for a model of firm financial frictions. Learning
greatly improves asset price properties such as return volatility and
predictability. In combination with financial frictions, a powerful feed-
back loop emerges between beliefs, stock prices and real activity, lead-
ing to substantial amplification of shocks. The model-implied subject-
ive expectations are found to be consistent with patterns of forecast
error predictability in survey data. A reaction of monetary policy to
asset prices stabilises expectations and substantially improves wel-
fare, which is not the case under rational expectations.
The third chapter is concerned with the inefficiencies caused by in-
complete national and international financial markets. Specifically, it
examines the optimal design of an unemployment insurance scheme
that operates across multiple countries in the presence of such ineffi-
ciencies. Using a two-country business cycle model with labour mar-
ket search frictions, it is found that a supranational unemployment
insurance scheme can be used to achieve transfers across countries
without changing unemployment levels; and that the optimal unem-
ployment insurance policy prescribes a countercyclical replacement
rate due in the presence of cross-country transfers.
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T H E E F F E C T O F L E A R N I N G A B O U T F I R M VA L U E
I N R B C A N D L A B O U R S E A R C H M O D E L S
1.1 introduction
Asset prices are hard to predict, but they are not just random walks.
At least since Fama and French (1988) wrote about the negative cor-
relation of stock prices with future returns, we know that asset prices
exhibit some degree of mean reversion. But we know much less about
why this is so. Proponents of the efficient market hypothesis tend to
say that high asset prices are a manifestation of low required returns
(e.g. Cochrane, 2011). When investors only require low returns to
hold assets (for example because of an increased desire to save or
increased risk appetite), asset prices rise today and expectedly fall
back in the future. However, an alternative view holds that high
asset prices are instead a manifestation of high expected returns (e.g.
Adam et al., 2013). When investors are optimistic about the future,
they buy assets at high prices in the expectation of even further
price appreciation. Mean reversion in prices is then unexpected by
investors. Survey data on actual investor expectations seem to favour
this alternative view (Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014). However, it is
not without trouble, because it goes against the rational expectations
hypothesis: investors must repeatedly and systematically ignore avail-
able evidence on return predictability, instead forming some sort of
extrapolative expectations or learning behaviour.
In this chapter, I take the extrapolative expectations approach to
asset pricing at face value. Suppose that agents in the economy really
do form expectations about asset prices through a learning mechan-
ism. How does this affect our understanding of business cycles?
Most of the models used to understand business cycles have ra-
tional expectations as a fundamental building block. They are also
not very good at asset pricing since the marginal investor has time-
separable preferences with low coefficients of relative risk aversion.
By adding asset price learning, could we improve the asset pricing
properties of those models and at the same time learn something
new about real fluctuations?
I analyse two of the most commonly used business cycle models:
a RBC model and a labour search and matching model. For the RBC
model, I find that learning does improve some asset price proper-
ties, but also leads to counterfactual negative comovement between
consumption, output and stock prices. The reason for this is that
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stock prices have no allocative role in the RBC model other than
determining the tradeoff between consumption and investment. A
stock price boom will lead to a corresponding boom in consumption
at the expense of investment and also employment through a wealth
effect. This comovement problem is in fact well known from the
literature on news shocks (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009).
In the search and matching model of unemployment, the comove-
ment problem can be overcome. Here, learning about firm value leads
to additional amplification of productivity shocks to all main mac-
roeconomic aggregates. The business cycle properties are as good as
under rational expectations, while the asset price properties improve.
Moreover, the model with learning substantially reduces the need
to rely on wage rigidity to match the observed volatility of unem-
ployment fluctuations. It has been argued previously that the stand-
ard search model can only produce realistic unemployment volatility
when firm profits are very volatile (Shimer, 2005; Hagedorn and Man-
ovskii, 2008). This chapter shows that the problem is rather the low
volatility of firm value.
Abandoning rational expectations in a business cycle model is not
without problems. Rational expectations have the advantage that the
modeller does not have to worry about how to specify an expectations
formation process. Without them, many degrees of freedom need to
be filled, and the existing attempts in the learning literature to do
so (e.g. Milani, 2011) often become intransparent. To address this
problem, I build on the concept of internal rationality developed by
Adam and Marcet (2011). An internally rational equilibrium is one
in which agents do make choices by maximising an intertemporal
objective function with coherent and time-consistent beliefs about the
variables affecting their decisions, but their beliefs do not necessarily
have to coincide with the actual probability distributions of those
variables. This concept still leaves many degrees of freedom: In a
business cycle model, for example, households could still entertain
arbitrary beliefs about future wages and firm profits, and firms could
entertain arbitrary beliefs about required returns (discount factors). I
therefore develop a refinement of their equilibrium concept, which I
call “conditonally model-consistent expectations” (CMCE).
With CMCE, agents can entertain arbitrary beliefs about one relat-
ive price in the economy (which will be the price of stocks in this
chapter), but their beliefs about any other variable must be consistent
with optimal choices of other agents and market clearing in all but
two markets. Spelling out a belief system for stock prices and then
imposing conditionally model-consistent expectations is all that is
needed to obtain a unique dynamic equilibrium for the models stud-
ied in this chapter. What’s more, when agents with CMCE evaluate
their forecast errors, they find that their forecasting rules cannot be
improved upon as long as they hold on to the original subjective
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belief about stock prices. In this sense, this equilibrium refinement
represents a minimal departure from rational expectations.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2
reviews the concept of internal rationality and introduces the refine-
ment of conditionally model-consistent expectations. Section 1.3 illus-
trates this concept by applying it to a simple endowment economy
with stock price learning in two different ways. Only one of them is
suitable for a solution via perturbation methods, the other has to be
solved with global methods because of the non-linearities involved.
Section 1.4 applies the analysis to the RBC model, while Section 1.5
deals with the search and matching model. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 conditionally model-consistent expectations
The purpose of this section is to define the equilibrium concept used
in this chapter. I build on the concept of “internal rationality” intro-
duced by Adam and Marcet (2011). An internally rational equilibrium
relaxes rational expectations and allows for the construction of an
equilibrium when agents have arbitrary beliefs about variables that
they take as external and given in their decision problem. While
intuitive, internal rationality leads to many degrees of freedom when
specifying beliefs. I develop a particular specification of expectations
that allows for arbitrary beliefs in one, and only one, relative price
that agents can learn about, and otherwise stay as close as possible
to rational expectations. I call this “conditionally model-consistent
expectations”. It will be shown that rational expectations are nes-
ted in this concept as a special case, and that agents endowed with
conditionally model-consistent expectations make the best possible
forecasts for all other model variables, conditional on the relative
price they are learning about.
1.2.1 General formulation
I consider a macroeconomic model of fairly general form. Time is
discrete at periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The economy consists of a number
of agents, indexed by i ∈ I. Agents can trade various commodities
in competitive spot markets, such as consumption goods, labour, fin-
ancial assets etc. These goods are indexed by j ∈ J. The economy is
stochastic through a number of exogenous variables, collected in the
joint stochastic process u = (ut)
∞
t=0, defined over a probability space
(Ωu, σu,Pu). In particular, the probability measure Pu describes the
actual and objective distribution of shocks.
We are interested in determining the endogenous model variables.
These fall into two categories. The first category are choices made
by agents as a result of some optimisation problem. Let the choices
made by agent i be yi = (yit)
∞
t=0. The second category are market-
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clearing prices. Each good j ∈ J trades at the price pjt in period t. All
endogenous model variables are collected in the stochastic process
y = (yt)
∞
t=0 =
(
(yit)i∈I ,
(
pjt
)
j∈J
)∞
t=0
.
Choices made by agents are the outcome of optimisation problems.
I will describe them in a fairly abstract form. Each agent i ∈ I ob-
serves a set of model variables relevant to his decision problem. These
“inputs” into the decision problem are denoted by xi = (xit)
∞
t=0. The
agent chooses y∗i by solving an optimisation problem of the following
general form:
y∗i ∈ arg maxyi∈Gi
∫
Fi (yi, xi)Pi (dxi)
Here, the functional Fi is a path-wise objective function. For a house-
hold, this might be the present discounted sum of period utility evalu-
ated in expectation at time zero. The probability measure Pi is the sub-
jective belief of agent i about the stochastic distribution of the decision
inputs xi.1 Importantly, this belief Pi can (for now) be arbitrary and is
not restricted to satisfy rational expectations. The set Gi describes the
admissible solutions. This set can incorporate all kinds of constraints
on the optimisation problem, such as budget constraints or boundary
conditions. Also, Gi needs to restrict the solutions to be adapted with
respect to xi. This simply means that in any period t, the solution yit
can only depend on the information contained in (xi0, . . . , xit) but not
on future realisations xit+1, xit+2, . . . . The solution to this problem is
really a mapping from inputs to choices, and I will therefore denote
it by a function xi 7→ y∗i (xi).
As for the determination of prices, I require that equilibrium prices
clear markets. In the most general form, market clearing of commod-
ity j ∈ J in every period will require that Hj (y) = 0 for some function
Hj.
We now have the notation in place to define internal rationality, ra-
tional expectations, and conditionally model-consistent expectations.
Agents are internally rational, in the words of Adam and Marcet
(2011), when they “make fully optimal decisions given a well-defined
system of subjective probability beliefs about payoff relevant variables
that are beyond their control or ‘external’, including prices”. These
beliefs, however, need not coincide with the actual probability distri-
bution of external variables in equilibrium. Using the notation above,
this can be formalised as follows.
Definition 1.1. A collection of beliefs (Pi)i∈I and a mapping g : u 7→
y is called an internally rational equilibrium if
1. g (u) = (yt)
∞
t=0 is an adapted process with respect to u, so that
yt depends only on (u0, . . . , ut);
1 For example, if xit ∈ R then xi ∈ RN, and Pi is a probability measure defined on
RN with its corresponding Borel sigma-algebra.
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2. for every agent i ∈ I, there exists a solution xi 7→ y∗i (xi) to the
agent’s optimisation problem with belief Pi such that gyi (u) =
y∗i (gxi (u)) Pu-almost surely;
3. the allocations defined by g clear all markets: For all j ∈ J:
Hj (g (u)) = 0 Pu-almost surely.
Condition 1 states that equilibrium outcomes at time t can only
depend on information available in the economy up to time t. Con-
dition 2 requires that the equilibrium outcomes are consistent with
each agent’s optimisation problem, solved under the subjective belief
Pi. Condition 3 imposes market clearing.
This sounds similar to the familiar and standard definition of a
rational expectations equilibrium, but there is an important differ-
ence: The subjective beliefs Pi and the actual distribution of equilib-
rium outcomes (defined by Pu and g) need not coincide. A rational
expectations equilibrium is a special case of an internally rational
equilibrium.
Definition 1.2. A rational expectations equilibrium is an internally ra-
tional equilibrium with the additional property that, for every agent i,
beliefs about the distribution of xi under Pi coincide with equilibrium
outcomes under Pu: xi | Pi d= gxi (u) | Pu.
Rational expectations (RE) have the advantage that they leave no
degrees of freedom for specifying agents’ beliefs about their environ-
ment. They are the solution to an elegant fixed-point problem: Beliefs
have to coincide with the equilibrium distribution of model outcomes,
and model outcomes have to coincide with optimal choices given be-
liefs. But even when the rational expectations equilibrium of a model
is unique, the number of internally rational equilibria is usually very
large, as there are no constraints on the subjective beliefs Pi. In Adam
et al. (2014), there is only one agent (the representative investor) and
only one external decision input (the stock price), so spelling out a
belief system is still manageable. But particularly for larger business
cycle models, filling the degrees of freedom is a difficult task. To
allow for some departure from rational expectations while keeping
the degrees of freedom as small as possible, I introduce conditionally
model-consistent expectations (CMCE).
Under RE, beliefs Pi are pinned down by the actual distribution of
exogenous variables Pu and the equilibrium mapping g : u 7→ (y, u)
to all model variables. With just internal rationality, the beliefs Pi
can in principle be completely arbitrary. Under CMCE, we start by
picking one competitively traded good j0 ∈ J , and we can specify an
arbitrary belief for its relative price. Formally, define a distribution P˜
over the joint process
(
u, pj0
)
of exogenous variables and the relative
price of the j0-good as the basis of the belief system. Conditionally
model-consistent expectations then pin down the expectations of all
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other model variables and a mapping h :
(
u, pj0
) 7→ y. This mapping
has to satisfy a number of criteria. I will first spell out the formal
definition.
Definition 1.3. An internally rational equilibrium
(
g, (Pi)i∈I
)
has con-
ditionally model-consistent expectations with respect to pj0 if there exists a
probability measure P˜ over (u, pj0) and a mapping h : (u, pj0) 7→ y
such that:
1. for every agent i ∈ I, the subjective belief is defined by P˜ and
h: xi | Pi ∼ hxi
(
u, pj0
) | P ;
2. h
(
u, pj0
)
is an adapted process with respect to
(
u, pj0
)
under P˜ ,
so that yt depends only on
(
u0, pj00, . . . , ut, pj0t
)
;
3. for every agent i ∈ I, there exists a solution xi 7→ y∗i (xi) to his
optimisation problem with belief Pi such that: y∗i
(
hxi
(
u, pj0
))
=
hyi
(
u, pj0
) P˜-almost surely;
4. the allocations defined by h clear all markets except the market
for j0 and one other market: there exists a j1 ∈ J such that
Hj
(
h
(
u, pj0
))
= 0 P˜-almost surely for all j ∈ J \ {j0, j1};
5. beliefs about exogenous variables are correct: u | P˜ d= u | Pu;
6. subjective beliefs are consistent with equilibrium outcomes on
the equilibrium path: h
(
u, gpj0 (u)
)
= g (u) Pu-almost surely.
Condition 1 states that the subjective beliefs Pi entering the de-
cision problems of the agents are defined by some joint belief about
exogenous variables u and the price pj0 and a deterministic mapping
from those to all other model variables. Condition 2 states that agents
believe that the state of the economy at time t can only depend on
the realisation of exogenous variables and the stock price up to time
t. Condition 3 states that beliefs are consistent with the choices of
agents. In practice, this means that whenever the choices of one agent
enter the decision problem of another agent, the beliefs of the other
agent about those choices have to be consistent with what the first
agent would choose, for any realisation of fundamentals u and prices
pj0 . Condition 4 says that beliefs have to be consistent with market
clearing. In practice, this means that whenever a competitive market
price enters the decision problem of an agent, the beliefs of that agent
need to be market-clearing prices. This has to hold for any market
j ∈ J with the exception of j0 and one other market j1.2 Condition
2 Why not impose that only the market for j0 does not clear? Since the mapping h
is consistent with optimal choices, Walras law applies to it and the clearing of all
markets except one implies clearing of all markets already. But a mapping h that
is consistent with total market clearing and optimal choices under beliefs induced
by h is necessarily a rational expectations mapping (see the previous definition).
Therefore, to allow from departures from rational expectations, two markets have to
be in disequilibrium in the subjective belief system.
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5 imposes that agents know the true distribution of the exogenous
variables u. Finally, Condition 6 states that agents’ beliefs (defined
by the function h) coincide with model outcomes (defined by the
function g) when stock prices are in equilibrium.
Intuitively, CMCE impose a similar fixed-point logic onto beliefs
as RE, but exclude the relative price pj0 from it. Choices have to be
optimal given beliefs, and beliefs have to be consistent with choices
and clearing of all markets excluding the market for j0 and one more
market. Removing this market clearing condition leaves one degree
of freedom which can be filled by a subjective belief for pj0 . This
belief and the other equilibrium conditions pin down the subjective
policy function h. The actual model outcomes g are then found by
imposing the remaining market clearing condition, which imposes
an equilibrium price in good j0.
This definition retains many elements of a rational expectations
equilibrium. RE are also model-consistent expectations, and as the
name suggests, they are a special case of CMCE.
Proposition 1.4. Any rational expectations equilibrium
(
g, (Pi)i∈I
)
has
conditionally model-consistent expectations with respect to pj0 for any j0 ∈
J.
Proof. Define the subjective probability measure by P˜ ((u, pj0) ∈ A) =
Pu
(
ϕj0 (g (u)) ∈ A
)
. Define the mapping h by h
(
u, pj0
)
= g (u).
By the properties of a rational expectations equilibrium, we have
xi | Pi d= gxi (u) | Pu. From the construction of P˜ and h it follows
that xi | Pi ∼ hxi
(
u, pj0
) | P˜ . This establishes the first property in the
definition of CMCE. The second, third and fourth property follow
from the definition of internal rationality and the fact that h
(
u, pj0
) |
P˜ ∼ g (u) | Pu. The fifth property is established by the fact that
P˜ (u ∈ B) = P˜
((
u, pj0
) ∈ B ×Ωpj0) = Pu (ϕj0 (g (u)) ∈ B ×Ωpj0) =
Pu (u ∈ B) (where Ωpj0 is the range of pj0). Finally the sixth prop-
erty, h
(
u, gpj0 (u)
)
= g (u), follows directly from the construction of
h.
Another way to characterise conditionally model-consistent expect-
ations is through forecast errors. Would an agent with such expecta-
tions have reason to revise his predictions after observing the realised
model outcomes? The answer is that, conditional on observations of
the prices pj0 , he would not, as his forecasts are perfectly consistent
with his observations.
Proposition 1.5. For an internally rational equilibrium that has condi-
tionally model-consistent expectations with respect to pj0 , let
(
pj0t
)∞
t=0 =
gpj0 (u) and (xit)
∞
t=0 = gxi (u) be equilibrium model outcomes. Then for all
agents i ∈ I and t, s ≥ 0, it holds that
∀i ∈ I ∀t, s ≥ 0 : EPit−s
[
xit | ut−s, pjot−s, . . . , ut, pjot
]− xit = 0Pu-a.s.
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Proof. Using the defining properties, we obtain:
E
Pi
t−s
[
xit | ut−s, pjot−s, . . . , ut, pjot
]
= EPt−s
[
hxit
(
u, pj0
) | ut−s, pjot−s, . . . , ut, pjot]
= EP
[
hxit
(
u, pj0
) | u0, pjo , . . . , ut, pjot]
= hxit
(
u, pj0
)
= hxit
(
u, gpj0 (u)
)
= gxit (u)
= xit.
The above proposition effectively says that if the agent maintains
his belief P˜ about the exogenous variables u and prices pj0 , his fore-
casts cannot be further improved. They are the best possible model
forecasts given P˜ , since they produce zero forecast errors when
conditioned on
(
u, pj0
)
. This is a strong property of conditionally
model-consistent expectations.
1.2.2 Recursive formulation
In practice, macroeconomic models often take a recursive form, which
greatly facilitates their solution. It is therefore instructive to rephrase
the notion of CMCE in a recursive form as well.
A macroeconomic model can often be brought into the following re-
cursive form. The exogenous shocks are a white noise process (ut)
∞
t=0
where ut ∈ Rp are independent and identically distributed, with
mean zero, variance σ2Σu and distribution F. The endogenous model
variables form a stochastic process (yt)
∞
t=0 where yt ∈ Rn. A solution
of the model takes the form of a policy function:
yt = g (yt−1, ut, σ)
Under rational expectations, this policy function is the solution to a
system of n recursive equilibrium conditions as follows:
0 = EPut [ f (yt+1, yt, yt−1, ut)]
=
∫
Rp
f
(
g
(
g (y, u, σ) , u′, σ
)
, g (y, u, σ) , y, u
)
F
(
du′
)
where f : Rn×n×n×p → Rn. These n conditions contain the optimal-
ity conditions of all agents as well as the market-clearing conditions.3
Note that the optimality conditions for any one agent in this formula-
tion are evaluated using the true distribution of shocks and all other
equilibrium conditions: That is the essence of rational expectations.
3 When there are J competitive markets, the equation system will include J− 1 market
clearing conditions, as one is redundant by Walras law.
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This formulation can be extended to solve for internally rational
equilibria with conditionally model-consistent expectations. Before
solving the actual law of motion of the economy, one has to solve for
its perceived law of motion under subjective beliefs. Subjective beliefs
are determined by a belief P about the evolution of the price pj0t, and
a mapping h from exogenous shocks ut and the price pj0t, where h
is consistent with optimal choice and market clearing in all but two
markets.
We can freely specify a belief about pj0t by a system of equations of
the form:
0 = ψ (yt, yt−1, ut, zt)
where ψ : Rn×n×p×1 → R and (zt)∞t=0 is an additional white noise
process. The zt ∈ R are independent and identically distributed,
with mean zero, variance σ2Σz and distribution function G. In the
applications of this chapter, they will correspond to agents’ subject-
ive forecast errors on the price pj0t. The goal is to get a recursive
representation of the perceived law of motion under CMCE of the
form:
yt = h (yt−1, ut, zt, σ)
Under conditionally model-consistent expectations, the mapping h
must be consistent with all the equilibrium conditions in f except for
the clearing condition of market j0. Collect these n − 1 equilibrium
conditions in the function f−j0 : R
n×n×n×p → Rn−1 and the j0-market
clearing condition in the function φ : Rn×n×n×p → R. A recursive
system of equations describing the subjective belief is given by:
0 =
(
ψ (yt, yt−1, ut, zt)
EPt
[
f−j0 (yt+1, yt, yt−1, ut)
] )
=
∫
Rp
∫
R
 ψ (h (y, u, z, σ) , y, u, z)f−j0
(
h (h (y, u, z, σ) , u′, z′, σ) ,
h (y, u, z, σ) , y, u
) G (dz′) F (du′)
This is a system of n equations which can be solved for the subjective
policy function h.
In a second step, one has to find the actual law of motion g of
the economy. This is done by imposing clearing of market j0. Mar-
ket clearing will determine an equilibrium path for the price pj0t or,
alternatively, for the subjective forecast errors zt. It is convenient to
solve for a policy function that determines zt as follows:
zt = r (yt−1, ut, σ)
This can be solved using the remaining market clearing condition φ:
0 = EPt φ (yt+1, yt, yt−1, ut)
=
∫
Rp
∫
R
φ
(
h (h (y, u, r (y, u, σ) , σ) , u′, z′, σ) ,
h (y, u, r (y, u, σ) , σ) , y, u
)
G
(
dz′
)
F
(
du′
)
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The actual law of motion can now be written as:
yt = g (yt−1, ut, σ) = h (yt−1, ut, r (yt−1, ut, σ) , σ)
The difference between what agents think will happen and what
actually happens lies in the forecast error zt of the price pj0t. Agents
think that zt is a random variable with a distribution, but actually it
is a deterministic function of the state variables and the other exo-
genous shocks. Agents never understand that zt does not follow the
distribution they believe in. But they understand perfectly well how
the economy behaves for a given value of zt.
Standard numerical methods can be applied to solve for an intern-
ally rational equilibrium with CMCE in this form. In Appendix A.1, I
describe how standard perturbation methods can be used to compute
second order approximations to the policy functions in practice.
1.3 endowment economy
This section applies the concept of conditionally model-consistent
expectations (CMCE) to a simple endowment economy without pro-
duction and with learning about stock prices as in Adam et al. (2014).
This serves primarily to make the concept more familiar to the reader.
I offer two ways to introduce CMCE. The first way leads to learning
dynamics identical to those in Adam et al.. However, it is unsuitable
for low-order approximation by perturbation methods, which makes
it problematic to embed this approach into larger business cycle mod-
els. The second way is more suitable for perturbation methods and
will be used for the business cycle models in this chapter.
1.3.1 Model setup
Time is discrete at periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . There are two consumption
goods. The first consumption good is a “regular” consumption good.
Flows of this good come from two assets. The first asset delivers a
constant endowment Wt = W¯ which is paid every period. The second
is a Lucas tree that delivers a stochastic endowment At, where
log At = ρ log At−1 + εt (1.1)
and εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
is a white noise process. Both assets are in unitary
supply. There is no production, so in equilibrium total consumption
has to equal At + W¯.
I call the second consumption good the “zero-good”. This good is
in zero net supply, hence the choice of name. Regular consumption
goods and zero-goods cannot be transformed into each other. The
presence of this good will only matter in the absence of rational
expectations, as will become clear shortly.
1.3 endowment economy 11
The economy is populated by a representative household, an in-
vestment agency and a firm. The household receives the constant en-
dowment W¯ and also receives profits pit from the investment agency.
The household only values regular consumption goods. It maximises
utility as follows:
max
(Ct)
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
βt
C1−γt
1− γ
s.t. Ct ≤ Wt + pit.
The investment agency acts on behalf of the household and can
purchase shares in the firm at price Pt, each share entitling it to a
dividend payment Dt. It solves the following problem:
max
(St,pit,C0t )
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
Q0,t
(
pit + C0t
)
s.t. pit + C0t + PtSt ≤ (Pt + Dt) St−1
St ∈ [0, S¯]
where the household’s discount factor is Qt,s = βs−t (Cs/Ct)−γ. Stock
holdings of the agency are bounded from below by zero (no short-
selling) and from above by a threshold S¯ > 1.4 The agency’s objective
includes the present discounted value of profits paid to the house-
hold, discounted at the household rate, and also consumption goods
C0t of the zero-good purchased in the market and transferred to the
household.
This objective function is not consistent with the household’s utility
function, as the zero good C0t provides no value to the household.
Note though that in any equilibrium, it has to be the case that C0t = 0
since the zero good is in zero net supply. The zero-good will only
play a role if the investment agency expects non-zero future values of
C0t in the future in the absence of rational expectations. In any event,
the first order condition of the investment agency is given by:
St = 0 if Pt > EPt [Qt,t+1 (Pt+1 + Dt+1)] , (1.2)
St ∈ [0, S¯] if Pt = EPt [Qt,t+1 (Pt+1 + Dt+1)] , (1.3)
St = S¯ if Pt < EPt [Qt,t+1 (Pt+1 + Dt+1)] . (1.4)
Finally, the firm is simply administering the Lucas tree. It can not
issue new shares or buy back old ones, and the supply of shares
is fixed at St = 1. The firm maximises dividend payments to the
household, using the latter’s discount factor:
max
(Dt)
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
Q0,tDt
4 This guarantees the existence of a solution with finite stock holdings under arbitrary
beliefs. In equilibrium these constraints are never binding.
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s.t. Dt ≤ At.
Clearly, the firm will choose Dt = At.
The purpose of this model is to discuss the properties of the asset
price Pt under different informational assumptions. The model setup
might at first seem peculiar. Why do we need to separate out a firm
and an investment agency in an endowment economy? Why do we
need to introduce a “zero-good”? Indeed, under rational expectations,
all these modelling choices are superfluous. But the distinction will
serve to clarify the concept of conditionally model-consistent expect-
ations.
1.3.2 Rational expectations equilibrium
Any equilibrium with market clearing must satisfy St = 1 and C0t = 0.
Since both firm and household want to exhaust their budget con-
straint, it also has to be the case that Dt = At and Ct = W¯ + At. This
completely determines allocations. The only interesting question is
which price process Pt prevails in equilibrium. Under rational expect-
ations, the answer is easy. Using the equilibrium conditions, the price
Pt solves
Pt = Et [Qt,t+1 (Pt+1 + Dt+1)]
= Et
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
]
= Et
[
β
(
Wt+1 + Dt+1
Wt + Dt
)−γ
(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
]
= Et
[
β
(
W¯ + At+1
W¯ + At
)−γ
(Pt+1 + At+1)
]
= E
[
∞
∑
s=1
βs
(
W¯ + At+s
W¯ + At
)−γ
At+s
]
. (1.5)
The first equality must always hold as long as the investment agency
takes decisions optimally and the stock market is in equilibrium. But
all the remaining equalities make use of rational expectations. The
second equality holds because the investment agency knows the equi-
librium distribution of the discount factor. The third equality holds
because the household expects St = 1 to be his optimal choice at all
times (since prices must be such that St = 1 and the household’s ex-
pectation of prices is consistent with this). The fourth equality holds
because the household knows perfectly well that the endowment
asset delivers a constant flow of consumption goods Wt = W¯, and
he also knows that the firm will optimally choose Dt = At. The fifth
equality holds by forward iteration of the optimality condition and
repeated application of the previous equalities.
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1.3.3 Learning equilibrium
An internally rational equilibrium needs to specify beliefs about vari-
ables external to every agent’s decision problem, respectively. There
are three agents, the household, the investment agency and the firm.
The inputs xi into the household’s decision problems are the evolu-
tion of the endowment Wt and the profits pit received by the invest-
ment agency. The household’s choices yi consist in consumption Ct.
The inputs xi into the investment agency’s decision problem are the
dividends Dt received from the firm; the stock price Pt; and the house-
hold discount factor Qt,t+1. The agency’s choices yi are stockholdings
St, profits pit and transfers C0t of zero-goods. The inputs xi into the
firm’s problem are the stochastic endowment At, and the decision yi
is the dividend payment Dt.
I could specify an internally rational equilibrium for a variety of
beliefs about all these decision inputs, so the number of degrees of
freedom is rather large even in this simple example. The concept of
conditionally model-consistent expectations (CMCE) greatly reduces
these degrees of freedom.
The good j0 will be shares in the firm, and the price will be the
stock price Pt. I specify that agents believe the stock price to follow
the process
log Pt − log Pt−1 = µt + ηt (1.6)
µt = µt−1 + νt (1.7)
where
(
ηt
νt
)
∼ N
(
−1
2
(
σ2η
σ2ν
)
,
(
σ2η 0
0 σ2ν
))
iid,
and where all elements of this system except Pt itself are unobserved,
as in Adam et al. (2013). When agents use Bayesian updating for their
belief µˆt about µt, this system can be recast in a pure observable form
as follows:
log Pt − log Pt−1 = µˆt−1 − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt (1.8)
µˆt = µˆt−1 − g
2
2
σ2z + gzt (1.9)
where zt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
iid.
The disturbance zt is the forecast error on prices. The learning gain
g and the variance of the forecast error σ2z are functions of σ2η and σ2ν .
The equations above define the stochastic law of motion of Pt under
the subjective belief P . CMCE will completely determine all remain-
ing expectations under this subjective belief; the only choice left is
which market j1 in Definition 1.3 they do not expect to clear. Here,
there are two markets besides the stock market: that for regular con-
sumption goods and that for the zero-good. Choosing to relax the
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expectation of market clearing in either one of these markets will
lead to a different belief system and equilibrium stock price process.
I will discuss the equilibrium in each case.
1.3.3.1 Relaxing expectations of consumption goods market clearing
The first way to introduce CMCE is by relaxing expectations of regu-
lar consumption goods market clearing. This way recovers the equi-
librium dynamics studied in Adam et al. (2014).
How do conditionally model-consistent expectations determine the
beliefs about endogenous model variables? Definition 1.3 requires
that the law of motion for exogenous variables u be correct, i.e. agents
know how to forecast At and Wt. Beliefs about everything else have
to be consistent with optimal choice (so the household understands
Dt = At) and market clearing in all markets except for the asset
market and the market for consumption goods. In particular, agents
expect the market for zero-goods to clear, i.e. they expect C0t = 0 at
all times. The decision rules of agents and the corresponding beliefs
have to be determined simultaneously in the following problem:
Pt = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Pt+1 + At+1)
]
(1.10)
Ct = Wt + pit (1.11)
pit = (Pt + At) St−1 − PtSt (1.12)
C0t = 0 (1.13)
Wt = W¯ (1.14)
log At = ρ log At−1 + εt εt
P∼ N (0, σ2ε ) (1.15)
log Pt = log Pt−1 + µˆt−1 − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt (1.16)
µˆt = µˆt−1 − g
2
2
σ2z + gzt, zt
P∼ N (0, σ2z ) (1.17)
Thus, we recover the same equations as in Adam et al..5 What is the
difference between this subjective model and the rational expectations
equilibrium? It is the fact that the market clearing condition St = 1 is
absent. Instead, we are given an (exogenous) subjective law of motion
for Pt and operate in a kind of partial equilibrium. The solution is a
subjective policy function
(St, Pt, µˆt, At) = h (Pt−1, µˆt−1, St−1, At−1, εt, zt)
We then solve for the equilibrium by imposing market clearing. This
requires the price Pt to be such that St = 1. Through equation (1.16),
there exists a one-to-one mapping between the price Pt and the sub-
jective forecast error zt. We are effectively looking for a function
5 There is in fact a difference in that here, the wage and dividend process are station-
ary.
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Figure 1.1: Approximation of the equilibrium asset price with learning, 1st
approach.
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Equilibrium stock price at At = 1. Black dotted line indicates non-stochastic steady
state.
zt = r (Pt−1, At−1, µˆt−1, εt) for which St = 1 always. This pins down
the evolution of the state variables (Pt, µˆt, At) in equilibrium.
So while agents think that zt is normally distributed white noise,
in reality it is a deterministic function of the state variables and the
exogenous shock εt. It is in this sense that agents’ expectations are not
rational expectations. However, conditional on believing in zt being
white noise, agents’ expectations are consistent with all equilibrium
relations.
In practice, the policy functions can be solved with standard nu-
merical methods. The problem here is that low-order perturbation
methods lead to bad approximations. This is problematic because it
becomes difficult to embed this type of learning into a larger business
cycle model for which the computational costs of global solution
methods are very high. Figure 1.1 shows the policy function for the
equilibrium price Pt for various values of µˆt at Dt = 1 using differ-
ent solution methods.6 The blue solid line shows the price function
obtained using a global projection method.7 The equilibrium price is
an increasing function of the price growth belief µˆt, but the relation-
ship is non-linear. In particular, it is relatively flat around the non-
stochastic steady state (where µˆt = 0). When the model is linearised
around this steady state, the solution is in fact completely independ-
ent of the price growth belief (red dashed line). This is clearly a bad
approximation, as the goal of introducing learning is to get more
6 The parameters chosen are β = .99, γ = 2, W¯ = 20, ρ = .95, σε = .01, σz = .01.
7 I use time iteration on the household’s Euler equation. The policy function is com-
puted on a grid with 18,360 nodes and linearly interpolated. The expectation is
approximated using quadrature methods and 3 Chebyshev nodes.
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volatility in prices.8 Resorting to a second order approximation does
not help either. The green dash-dotted line shows the policy function
of the equilibrium price approximated to second order around the
non-stochastic steady-state. The quadratic coefficient on µˆt is large
and negative. This, again, is a bad approximation to the true policy
function.
1.3.3.2 Relaxing expectations of zero-good market clearing
The second possibility to introduce CMCE is to relax expectations of
market clearing in the market for the zero-good. This approach also
generates a price which is increasing in the price growth belief and
has the advantage that first and second order perturbation methods
have better accuracy.
As before, start with the subjective belief (1.8)-(1.9) about Pt; then
find expectations and actions that are consistent with optimal choice
and market clearing in all markets except that for stock and the zero-
good.
The household has to form beliefs about the profits pit it receives
from the investment agency. Since these beliefs must be consistent
with clearing of the market for consumption goods, the household
must hold beliefs such that he expects his choice to be Ct = W¯ + At
at all times, i.e. pit = At. The firm still chooses Dt = At and all
agents must have beliefs consistent with this choice. The investment
agency therefore believes that Dt = At at all times. For any level
of stockholdings, it is always indifferent between paying out profits
pit or transferring zero-goods C0t for the household. But since ex-
pectations and optimal choice must be consistent and the household
believes pit = At, the investment agency must choose pit = At for
Definition 1.3 to hold. It will have the correct belief about household
consumption Ct = At + W¯.
The only variables that remain to be solved for are the investment
agency’s stock holdings St and choice of C0t . Under conditionally
model-consistent expectations, we can write the investment agency’s
first order conditions as
C0t = (Pt + Dt) St−1 − PtSt − At (1.18)
St

= 0
∈ [0, S¯]
= S¯
if Pt T EPt [Qt,t+1 (Pt+1 + At+1)] (1.19)
8 It can be shown that the independence of the price holds for any process for
dividends At and non-dividend income Wt, even when they contain a unit root.
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Figure 1.2: Approximation of the equilibrium asset price with learning, 2nd
approach.
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Equilibrium stock price at At = 1. Black dotted line indicates non-stochastic steady
state.
Imposing St = 1 implies C0t = 0, so all markets clear. The equilibrium
asset price now has a closed-form solution:
Pt = EPt [Qt,t+1 (Pt+1 + At+1)]
= EPt
[
Qt,t+1
(
Pt exp
(
µˆt − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt+1
)
+ At+1
)]
=
βEt
[(
W¯+At+1
W¯+At
)−γ
At+1
]
1− βEt
[(
W¯+At+1
W¯+At
)−γ]
exp
(
µˆt +
g−g2
2 σ
2
z
) . (1.20)
Using the same perceived law of motion for the price Pt, and a
slightly modified version of the model with identical rational expect-
ations solution, we have thus arrived at a different learning equilib-
rium. The stock price is now globally increasing in the price growth
belief µˆt. As before, we can compare different approximation methods
to this solution. Figure 1.2 shows the values for the equilibrium price
Pt at At = 1 for different values of the price growth belief µˆt. The
price is increasing in agents’ beliefs (the blue dashed line showing a
global solution method), but the slope at the non-stochastic steady-
state µˆt = 0 is now large and positive. A first order linearisation (red
dashed line) therefore preserves the general behaviour of the pricing
function, and a second order approximation (green dash-dotted line)
provides an even better approximation, at least for positive values of
µˆt.
The combination of the equilibrium pricing functions can be com-
bined with the evolution of beliefs µˆt to examine the asset pricing
properties of this simple model. However, the focus of this chapter
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is on applications of asset price learning to business cycle models. I
will therefore move on directly to the study of the first business cycle
model. In doing so, I will discuss in turn each of the two approaches
developed in this section.
1.4 rbc model
Adam et al. (2013) show that models of stock price learning such
as the one described above can replicate several key properties of
stock prices, including return volatility and predictability, without
the need for complex preferences or high degrees of risk aversion. In
this section, I will examine what a learning-based asset pricing theory
implies for the real business cycle model.
1.4.1 Model description
The model is a standard RBC model and can be thought of as an
extension of the model of the last section to an economy with pro-
duction. The economy is populated by a representative household, a
representative firm and an investment agency. There are three phys-
ical goods: a regular consumption/investment good that serves as the
numéraire, labour which trades in a competitive spot market at the
wage wt, and a “zero-good” in zero net supply. There is no technology
to convert zero goods into other goods or vice-versa.
The household likes consumption and dislikes working. As before,
it does not value the zero-good. It receives wage payments from
selling labour and also receives profits from the investment agency.
It maximises utility as follows:
max
(Ct,Lt)
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−γt
1− γ − η
L1+φt
1+ φ
)
s.t. Ct = wtLt + pit.
Its first order condition is:
wt = ηC
γ
t L
φ
t . (1.21)
The investment agency solves the following problem:
max
(St,pit,C0t )
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
Q0,t
(
pit + C0t
)
s.t. pit + C0t + PtSt ≤ (Pt + Dt) St−1
St ∈ [0, S¯] .
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where the household discount factor is defined as Qt,s = βs−t (Cs/Ct)−γ
for s, t ≥ 0. Again, the investment agency has the option to either pay
out profits pit to the household or transfer zero-goods C0t to it. In
equilibrium it has to be C0t = 0 but the investment agency may not
be aware of this. The first order conditions of the investment agency
are the same as in the last section.
The representative firm owns the capital stock Kt−1 at the begin-
ning of the period. It combines this capital with labour Lt to produce
output using a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the process of
production, the capital stock depreciates at the rate δ. The firm then
decides on next period’s capital stock Kt. Any remaining earnings
are paid out as dividends to shareholders. The firm maximises the
discounted sum of its dividend payments, discounted at the house-
hold rate:
max
(Kt,Lt,Dt)
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
Q0,tDt
s.t. Dt = Yt − wtLt − Kt + (1− δ)Kt−1
Yt = AtKαt L
1−α
t
where total factor productivity At is a stochastic exogenous process
with the law of motion
log At = (1− ρ) A¯ + ρAt−1 + εt. (1.22)
and where εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
is an iid white noise process. The first
order conditions of the firm are:
1 = EPt
[
Qt,t+1
(
αAt+1
(
Lt+1
Kt
)1−α
+ 1− δ
)]
(1.23)
wt = (1− α) At
(
Kt−1
Lt
)α
(1.24)
The model description is completed with the market clearing condi-
tions. The number of shares owned by the household has to be St = 1
(no share issuance or buybacks). Total output has to equal the sum of
consumption and investment: Yt = Ct + Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1.
1.4.2 Learning equilibrium
I will now add learning about stock prices Pt to the model with con-
ditionally model-consistent expectations. As in the previous section,
agents believe the price Pt to evolve according to the following law of
motion:
log Pt − log Pt−1 = µˆt−1 − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt (1.25)
µˆt = µˆt−1 − g
2
2
σ2z + gzt (1.26)
where zt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
iid.
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I then impose conditionally model-consistent expectations with re-
spect to Pt, which are consistent with clearing of all markets except
the market for stocks and one other market. Again, choosing a dif-
ferent market which agents do not expect to clear leads to different
equilibrium outcomes. I will discuss both approaches from the last
section in turn: relaxing expectations of consumption goods market
clearing, and relaxing expectations of zero-good market clearing.
1.4.2.1 Relaxing expectations of consumption goods market clearing
Given the law of motion of productivity and the subjective beliefs
about stock prices, I need to solve for a complete system of expecta-
tions that are consistent with optimal choice and market clearing in
all markets except that for stocks and the regular consumption good.
This amounts to solving a recursive model comprising the following
equations:
Pt = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
]
(1.27)
Ct = wtLt + pit (1.28)
wt = ηC
γ
t L
φ
t (1.29)
pit = (Pt + Dt) St−1 − PtSt (1.30)
C0t = 0 (1.31)
wt = (1− α) At
(
Kt−1
Lt
)α
(1.32)
Dt = αAtKαt−1L
1−α
t − wtLt + (1− δ)Kt−1 − Kt (1.33)
1 = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ(
αAt+1
(
Lt+1
Kt
)1−α
+ 1− δ
)]
(1.34)
log At = (1− ρ) A¯ + ρ log At−1 + εt, εt P∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
(1.35)
log Pt = log Pt−1 + µˆt−1 − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt (1.36)
µˆt = µˆt−1 − g
2
2
σ2z + gzt, zt
P∼ N (0, σ2z ) (1.37)
In this formulation, the only equilibrium condition that is missing
is the market clearing condition for regular consumption/investment
goods. It is instead replaced with the exogenous price process for Pt.
Where the rational expectations solution has two state variables (At−1
and Kt−1) and one shock (εt), the perceived policy function has five
state variables (At−1, Kt−1, St−1, Pt−1 and µˆt) and two shocks (εt and
zt). The subjective policy function takes the form
(At, Kt, St, Pt, µˆt) = h (At−1, Kt−1, St−1, Pt−1, µˆt−1, εt, zt) .
As before, I can solve for the equilibrium by imposing market clearing
St = 1 (the goods market then automatically clears by Walras’ law).
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Table 1.1: Calibration of the RBC model.
parameter value parameter value
α capital factor share 0.33 γ intertemporal
elasticity of
substitution
1
δ depreciation rate 0.025 φ inverse Frisch
elasticity
0.33
ρ persistence of
productivity shock
0.95 η utility weight on
leisure
0.876
β discount factor 0.99 g learning gain 0.009
σε std. deviation of
productivity shock
0.007 σz perceived std.
deviation of stock
prices
0.001
That is, I am looking for a function zt = r (At−1, Kt−1, St−1, Pt−1, µˆt−1, εt)
for which St = 1 always holds. This then leads to the actual policy
function.
It has been demonstrated in the last section that perturbation meth-
ods (at least of a low order) are poor approximations to the model
solution under learning. This is of course in contrast to the rational
expectations version of the RBC model for which a first order ap-
proximation is already very accurate. Here, I have to solve the model
using global projection methods.9
1.4.2.2 Calibration and results
Table 1.1 summarises the calibration of the model, which follows the
standard RBC calibration. The only parameters specific to learning
are the learning gain g and the perceived volatility of stock prices
σz. I chose a combination for those two parameters for which the
volatility of stock returns is broadly similar to the data.
Figure 1.3 shows impulse responses after a one-standard deviation
technology shock (increase of A0 by 0.7%). The red solid line is the
impulse response under learning while the blue-dashed line is the
response of the rational expectations version of the model. Output,
investment, consumption and employment all rise after the shock.
However, at impact, consumption initially rises by less under learning
9 Again, I use time iteration on the household’s Euler equation and the firm’s invest-
ment equation. The policy function h is computed on a grid with 35,937 nodes and
linearly interpolated. The expectation is approximated using quadrature methods
and 3 Chebyshev nodes.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to a productivity shock in the RBC model.
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than under rational expectations. Since this expands labour supply,
employment and output are higher, allowing for a larger rise in invest-
ment. Because of larger costs of investment, dividends fall by more
than under rational expectations. Over time, however, agents’ price
growth beliefs µˆt increase and the equilibrium stock price rises. This
rise (and expectations of further rising prices) acts as a positive wealth
effect on households. They increase consumption and decrease labour
supply at the expense of output and investment by firms. Intuit-
ively, households expect higher returns from stocks. Firms can deliver
higher marginal returns by cutting down on investment, increasing
the marginal product of capital. Lower investment increases dividend
payments, allowing households to consume more and reduce their
labour supply. They are happy for firms to invest less because they
expect to expand their consumption in the future through their asset
income (failing to realise that in general equilibrium, the price of
those assets is determined by a fixed supply). Therefore, the response
of output, investment and employment fall below their rational ex-
pectations counterpart, while the opposite holds for consumption.
An increase in the stock price Pt and/or the price growth belief µˆt
acts like a “news shock”, essentially an expectation of future higher
income. It is well known (Beaudry and Portier, 2007) that the real
business cycle model cannot produce comovement of output, con-
sumption and employment in response to news shocks. The learning
model also suffers from this comovement problem.
Table 2.4 compares second moments across quarterly U.S. data,
the rational expectations version of the model (Column 1) and the
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learning version, for two values of the learning gain (Column 2). The
learning model using the second approach (relaxing expectations of
market clearing for zero-goods, Column 3) will be described further
below.
The rational expectations RBC model is known to match relative
volatilities of business cycle aggregates and their correlation with
output well. But asset prices are too smooth relative to the data: the
standard deviation of stock returns in the data is 33.5%, but less
than a fraction of a percent in the RE model. This is despite the
fact that dividends are twice as volatile as in the data. They are also
countercyclical: When firms in the RBC model increase investment
after a positive productivity shock, this directly reduces the dividends
they pay. Variation in the price-dividend ratio therefore comes almost
entirely from movements in dividends. The RBC model also does not
capture return predictability adequately. At the four quarter horizon,
the P/D-ratio positively predicts future returns, at odds with the data.
At the 20-quarter horizon, the prediction reverses. But this predictab-
ility comes mostly from the mean reversion in dividends.
The model with learning improves the asset price moments, but at
the expense of a worse fit on business cycle moments. The volatility
of returns and the P/D-ratio is much higher, and predictability at
the 4-quarter horizon is in line with the data (although at the 20-
quarter horizon it disappears). The problem is that consumption, in-
vestment and employment are now excessively volatile relative to out-
put. What’s more, consumption is negatively correlated with output.
This is the comovement problem described earlier on.
Overall, the model properties are not very appealing. Could a slight
modification of the model solve the comovement issue and at the
same time preserve the asset price properties? My tentative answer
is no. The literature on news shocks has pointed out that friction-
less neoclassical models can only generate positive comovement in
response to expectational shifts with rather unusual modifications.
An exception is Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009): They use a combina-
tion of adjustment costs, variable capacity utilisation and Greenwood-
Hercowitz-Huffman preferences. But in their model, positive comove-
ment rests on firms which expect higher productivity in the future to
frontload investment in order to avoid adjustment costs. With learn-
ing about stock prices however, a change in expectations about stock
prices does not do anything to firms’ expectations about productivity.
Therefore, it is not to be expected that the comovement problem can
be solved here without introducing additional frictions. This leads me
to consider models with search frictions in the labour market in the
next section.
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Table 1.2: Moments in the data and across RBC model specifications.
(1) (2) (3)
moment data RE learn I learn II
output volatility σhp (Yt) 1.43% 1.50% 3.85% 1.50%
relative volatility
σhp (Ct) /σhp (Yt) 0.60 0.27 0.97 0.27
σhp (It) /σhp (Yt) 2.90 3.54 4.76 3.54
σhp (Dt) /σhp (Yt) 2.99 5.53 5.39 5.53
cross-correlation
ρhp (Ct, Yt) 0.94 0.84 -0.82 0.84
ρhp (It, Yt) 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.99
asset price volatility
σhp
(
Pt
Dt
)
11.4% 8.56% 14.2% 7.72%
σ
(
Pt
Dt
)
40.8% 14.1% 22.0% 14.1%
σ
(
Rstockt,t+1
)
33.5% 0.38% 25.3% 42.6%
return predictability
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+4
)
-0.22 0.38 -0.19 -0.62
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+20
)
-0.44 -0.26 0.09 -0.66
Quarterly US data 1962Q1-2012Q4. Consumption Ct consists of of services and non-
durable private consumption. Investment It consists of private non-residential fixed
investment and durable consumption. Output Yt is the sum of consumption and
investment. Dividends Dt are four-quarter moving averages of S&P 500 dividends.
The stock price index Pt is the S&P500. All variables deflated by the GDP deflator.
Returns Rstockt are annualised real quarterly stock returns including dividends. The
subscript “hp” indicates application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing
parameter 1600.
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1.4.2.3 Relaxing expectations of zero-good market clearing
I will now discuss the solution of the model using the second ap-
proach. Here, expectations are required to be consistent with market
clearing for regular consumption/investment goods, but instead do
not need to be consistent with clearing of the market for the zero-
good. The system of equations governing the subjective expectations
and policy functions then reads as follows:
Ct = AtKαt−1L
1−α
t (1.38)
wt = ηC
γ
t L
φ
t (1.39)
wt = (1− α) At
(
Kt−1
Lt
)α
(1.40)
Dt = αAtKαt−1L
1−α
t − wtLt + (1− δ)Kt−1 − Kt (1.41)
1 = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ(
αAt+1
(
Lt+1
Kt
)1−α
+ 1− δ
)]
(1.42)
log At = (1− ρ) A¯ + ρ log At−1 + εt, εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
(1.43)
log Pt = log Pt−1 + µˆt−1 − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt (1.44)
µˆt = µˆt−1 − g
2
2
σ2z + gzt, zt ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
(1.45)
It turns out that the allocations produced by this approach to learning
are identical to those under rational expectations. The first four equa-
tions together with the correct law of motion for At define exactly the
same choices for investment, employment and consumption as under
rational expectations. The realisation of the stock price Pt appears
in none of the optimality conditions. This is because CMCE requires
consistency of expectations with optimal choices and market clearing,
and since I have kept market clearing for consumption/investment
goods, agents actually hold rational expectations with respect to real
variables. They do not hold rational expectations only with respect
to stock prices. The investment agency also expects to buy non-zero
quantities of C0t when prices Pt do not follow the rational expectations
path.
In equilibrium C0t = 0 has to hold every period. This amounts to
imposing the Euler equation of the investment agency:
Pt = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
]
(1.46)
=
βEPt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
Dt+1
]
1− βEPt
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ]
exp
(
µˆt +
g−g2
2 σ
2
z
) (1.47)
and solving this for the equilibrium forecast error zt.
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Figure 1.4: Dividend and price response to a productivity shock in the RBC
model.
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The impact of stock price learning in this version of the model
is therefore entirely one-sided: While allocations affect stock prices,
stock prices do not feed back into allocations. Figure 1.4 plots im-
pulse response functions for dividends and stock prices. Dividends
fall initially after a positive technology shock, but under rational ex-
pectations, the stock price still rises slightly in anticipation of higher
dividends further in the future. By contrast, with this version of learn-
ing, the stock price reacts much more and falls substantially.
The last column of Table 2.4 shows the second moments of this
second version of the learning model. By construction, the business
cycle moments are identical to the rational expectations version. Re-
turn volatility and predictability are much closer to the data. However,
stock prices are countercyclical in this version of the model.
So while the good business cycle properties of the RBC model are
preserved with this way of learning, and stock prices are volatile as
in the data, this still doesn’t seem to be a good description of the joint
behaviour of stock prices and business cycles.
1.5 search model
From the previous discussion, it should have become clear that the
RBC model augmented with learning suffers from counterfactual co-
movement of key variables, and that the comovement problems are
related to similar difficulties encountered in the literature on news
shocks. I now turn to the search and matching model of unemploy-
ment. This model has become a standard tool to study business cycles
with more realistic labour markets. More importantly, it is known to
generate the right comovement in response to news shocks (den Haan
and Kaltenbrunner, 2009).
It will turn out that positive comovement is possible in response to
fluctuations in beliefs of learning investors as well. Adding learning
1.5 search model 27
improves the asset price properties of the model and amplifies pro-
ductivity shocks with positive comovement. What’s more, learning
will also address the “Shimer puzzle”: The observation by Shimer
(2005) that the search model is not able to generate sufficient volatility
in unemployment unless substantial wage rigidity is assumed. I show
that the degree of wage rigidity necessary to get the right volatility of
unemployment decreases substantially when one allows for learning
in the stock market.
1.5.1 Model description
The model is a standard search and matching model in discrete time.
The economy is populated by workers, entrepreneurs, and an in-
vestment agency. All agents can perfectly insure idiosyncratic risk,
as at the end of each period they pool their net revenue within a
representative household. There are three physical goods: labour, a
consumption/investment good which serves as the numéraire, and a
zero-good as in the previous section. Additionally, there is a rental
market for capital and a market for shares in operating firms. All
markets are competitive except for the labour market, which is subject
to search frictions.
1.5.1.1 Firms and entrepreneurs
At each point in time, there are nt firms operating in the economy.
Each firm employs one worker, so nt is also the level of employment.
A firm rents kt units of capital in a competitive market at the price rt.
Its production function is
yt = a1−αt k
α
t (1.48)
log at = ρat−1 + (1− ρ) a¯ + εt (1.49)
where at is the level of productivity common to all firms, which
evolves according to an AR(1) process in logarithms with iid innova-
tions εt ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
. The firm and the worker share the surplus from
production:
Ωt = max
kt
yt − rtkt = (1− α) yt (1.50)
according to the formula in den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009):
wt = (1− η) ((1−ω)Ωt +ωΩ¯) . (1.51)
where Ω¯ = EP [Ωt] is the unconditional expectation of the surplus.
The parameter ω governs the amount of wage stickiness. When ω =
1, the wage is completely acyclical, while it comoves perfectly with
labour productivity when ω = 0. The parameter η governs the share
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of the surplus that accrues to firms. The firm pays it out as dividends
to shareholders:
dt = Ωt − wt
= ηΩt +ω (1− η) (Ωt − Ω¯) (1.52)
Firms and workers separate at the exogenous rate s. There is no
endogenous job destruction.
Each period, entrepreneurs decide how many firms to create. Cre-
ating a firm entails finding a worker by posting a vacancy, which
entails paying a cost κ. With probability qt, a worker is matched and
the firm immediately starts production. Ownership in the firm can be
sold in the form of a unit mass of shares in the stock market.10 The
market value of a firm is denoted pt. Free entry implies that the cost
and expected gain from starting a project have to be equal:
κ = qt pt (1.53)
1.5.1.2 Household
The representative household consists of a unit mass of workers who
always participate in the labour market. It takes the aggregate em-
ployment level nt as given. It chooses consumption Ct and capital Kt
to solve the following maximisation problem:
max
Ct,Kt
EP
∞
∑
t=0
C1−γt
1− γ
s.t. Ct + Kt = ntwt + (1− δ)Kt−1 + rtKt−1 + pit
The capital stock of the last period is rented out to firms at the rental
rate rt and depreciates at the rate δ. Additionally, the household
receives payments pit from the investment agency which it owns. The
first order condition for the household problem is
1 = EPt [Qt,t+1 (rt+1 + 1− δ)] (1.54)
where the household discount factor is defined as Qt,s = βs−t (Cs/Ct)−γ.
1.5.1.3 Investment agency
The investment agency trades shares of firms in the stock market.
At the beginning of each period, it owns a number St−1 of shares
in firms. A fraction s of firms exit at random and thus their shares
become worthless. The remaining shares each trade at the price pt.
The agency can then buy a number St of new shares at the price
pt and immediately receives dividend payments Dt on those shares.
10 It is inconsequential whether entrepreneurs sell off ownership in operating firms to
the household or keep the shares, since all income is pooled at the end of a period.
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Thus, pt is the cum-dividend share price. The investment agency
solves the following maximisation problem:
max
St,pit,xt
EP
∞
∑
t=0
Q0,t
(
pit + C0t
)
s.t. pit + C0t + ptSt = (1− s) ptSt−1 + dtSt
St ∈ [0, S¯]
Here, pit are the profits it pays to the household. Profits are discoun-
ted at the household rate Qt,t+1. In addition, the agency also values
transferring C0t of the zero-good to the household. Paying profits
to the household and transferring the zero-good are perfectly sub-
stitutable activities in the optimisation problem. Holdings of shares
are limited from below by zero (no short-selling) and from above by
some constant S¯ > 1. As before, this constraint will not be binding
in equilibrium but guarantees the existence of an equilibrium for
arbitrary beliefs about the stock price pt.
The first order condition of the investment agency is
St = 0 if pt + dt > (1− s)EPt [Qt,t+1 pt+1] , (1.55)
St ∈ [0, S¯] if pt + dt = (1− s)EPt [Qt,t+1 pt+1] , (1.56)
St = S¯ if pt + dt < (1− s)EPt [Qt,t+1 pt+1] . (1.57)
1.5.1.4 Matching and market clearing
Each period, the number of matches between vacancies and workers
is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function:
mt = νu
µ
t v
1−µ
t (1.58)
where vt is the number of vacancies and ut is the number of unem-
ployed workers. Consequently, the probability that an unemployed
worker becomes employed is given by ft = mt/ut, and the probab-
ility that a vacancy is filled with a worker is given by qt = mt/vt.
Aggregate employment consists in workers who were employed last
period, minus separations, plus newly matched workers:
nt = (1− s) nt−1 + ftut (1.59)
ut = 1− nt−1 (1.60)
The remaining markets are competitive. The zero-good, as the name
says, is in zero net supply. The number of shares owned by the
investment agency has to equal the number of firms in operation.
The aggregate demand for capital by firms has to equal the capital
stock owned by the household. Finally, total output has to equal the
sum of consumption, investment and vacancy creation costs. In sum,
the market clearing conditions of the model are given by:
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xt = 0 (1.61)
St = nt (1.62)
Kt−1 = ktnt (1.63)
ytnt = Ct + Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 + κvt (1.64)
1.5.2 Learning equilibrium
I now add learning about firm value pt into the model. I directly use
the second approach of the previous sections, requiring conditionally
model-consistent expectations in which agents do not expect market
clearing for stocks and the zero-good. In contrast to the RBC model,
learning done in this way will have an effect on allocations, since
variations in stock prices influence the incentives of entrepreneurs to
create firms.
I impose the same perceived law of motion for the stock price pt
and solve for an internally rational equilibrium with conditionally
model-consistent expectations, removing the market clearing condi-
tions for the stock market and the zero-good. The system of equations
governing the subjective expectations reads as follows:
ytnt = Ct + Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 + κvθtut (1.65)
yt = atkαt (1.66)
rtkt = αyt (1.67)
Ωt = (1− α) yt (1.68)
wt = (1− η) (ωΩt + (1−ω) Ω¯) (1.69)
dt = Ωt − wt (1.70)
κv = qtPt (1.71)
Kt−1 = ktnt (1.72)
1 = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(rt+1 + 1− δ)
]
(1.73)
nt = (1− s) nt−1 + ftut (1.74)
ut = 1− nt−1 (1.75)
qt = κmθ−µ (1.76)
ft = θtqt (1.77)
log at = (1− ρ) a¯ + ρ log at−1 + εt, εt P∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
(1.78)
log pt = log pt−1 + µˆt−1 − 1− g + g
2
2
σ2z + zt (1.79)
µˆt = µˆt−1 − g
2
2
σ2z + gzt, zt
P∼ N (0, σ2z ) (1.80)
In this formulation, the only equilibrium condition that is missing
is the market clearing condition for the zero good and the stock
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Table 1.3: Calibrated parameters of the search model.
parameter value parameter value
α capital factor share 0.33 µ matching fn.
elasticity
0.5
δ depreciation rate 0.0087 s separation rate 0.0274
A¯ steady state
productivity level
0.0379 κm scaling of matching
fn.
1
ρ persistence of
productivity shock
0.98 κv vacancy costs 0.042
β discount factor 0.997 η entrepreneur surplus
share
0.0255
γ intertemporal
elasticity of
substitution
1.5 σz perceived std.
deviation of stock
prices
0.001
market (where St = nt must hold in equilibrium). This is instead
replaced with the exogenous price process for pt. This price has an
impact on allocations through the job creation condition. Where the
rational expectations solution has three state variables (at−1, Kt−1 and
nt−1) and one shock (εt), the perceived policy function has five state
variables (at−1, Kt−1, nt, pt−1 and µˆt) and two shocks (εt and zt). The
subjective policy function takes the form
(at, Kt, nt, pt, µˆt) = h (at−1, Kt−1, nt−1, pt−1, µˆt−1, εt, zt) .
I can solve for the equilibrium by imposing market clearing in the
stock market. The investment agency will hold a quantity of stocks
St = nt if its Euler equation holds with equality:
pt + dt = (1− s)EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
pt+1
]
That is, I solve for a function zt = r (at−1, Kt−1, nt−1, pt−1, µˆt−1, εt)
for which the above equation always holds when substituting in the
policy function h and the equilibrium relations above.
1.5.3 Choice of parameters
The first set of parameters is set to standard values, summarised in
Table 1.3. The model is cast at monthly frequency. The factor share of
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capital is set to α = 0.33. The depreciation rate δ = 0.0087 corresponds
to an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent. The steady state pro-
ductivity level A¯ is a scaling parameter and is set such that the steady
state capital level equals one. The persistence of the productivity
shock is set to ρ = 0.98. When the productivity process is aggregated
up to quarterly frequency, its first autocorrelation is then equal to the
standard value 0.95. The discount factor β = 0.997 implies an annual
steady state discount rate of 4 percent. The intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is set to γ = 1.5. This value mainly determines how a per-
sistent increase in output is split between investment and consump-
tion over time. For the chosen value, consumption and investment
both rise after a positive change in stock price expectations.
The matching elasticity is set to µ = 0.5, taken from Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001). The parameter κm is a scaling parameter and I
normalise it to one. The separation rate s and the vacancy cost κv are
then chosen such that the monthly job finding rate equals 45.4% as es-
timated by Shimer (2005) and the average unemployment rate is 5.7%.
The entrepreneurial share of labour productivity is set to η = 0.0255,
which is the value estimated by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). This
value is far from the Hosios (1990) efficiency condition: the entrepren-
eur’s share is far smaller than the elasticity of the matching function
with respect to vacancies (which is one half). It implies that average
job creation is inefficiently low, and this is what allows the model to
exhibit positive comovement of output, investment and consumption
in response to expectational shocks. Finally, the perceived variance of
stock price shocks is set to σz = 0.001.
The remaining parameters are the standard deviation of the pro-
ductivity shock σa, the degree of wage stickiness ω and the learn-
ing gain g. I set these parameters to directly match certain second
moments in U.S. data. The parameters are estimated by simulated
method of moments to match the standard deviation of output and
employment; and additionally under learning the standard deviation
of the price-dividend ratio. Table 1.4 presents the estimation results.
The standard deviation of the productivity shock is estimated at the
same magnitude both under learning and rational expectations and
corresponds to a value at quarterly aggregation of 0.008. The estim-
ated value for the wage rigidity parameter is ω = 0.134 under learn-
ing, but ω = 0.592 under rational expectations. Under learning, the
gain g is estimated at g = 0.0244 which is in line with results in Adam
et al. (2014).
1.5.4 Results
1.5.4.1 Moments
Table 1.5 compares second moments of U.S. data with the model
under learning and under rational expectations. By construction, the
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Table 1.4: Estimated parameters of the search model.
parameter σa ω g
learning 0.0048 0.134 0.0244
(5.91·10−4) (0.040) (0.0021)
RE 0.0048 0.592 -
(6.07·10−4) (0.100) -
Parameters as estimated by simulated method of moments. Asymptotic standard
errors in parentheses. Targets of the moment matching are the standard deviation
of the HP-filtered output and unemployment series as described in Table 1.5; and
additionally under learning, the standard deviation of the HP-filtered price-dividend
ratio.
model matches the volatility of detrended output and unemployment
and, additionally under learning, the detrended price/dividend-ratio.
Under learning however, much less wage rigidity is needed to achieve
the volatility of unemployment in the data. The larger wage rigidity
under rational expectations translates directly into a lower volatility
of wages and a higher volatility of dividends (see the panel “relative
volatility” in the table). The standard deviations as well as the correl-
ations with output of consumption and investment are in line with
the data in both cases.
The asset price moments in the bottom half of Table 1.5 reveal
large differences between the learning and the rational expectations
version of the model. In both both cases, stock returns are actually
more volatile than in the data, even though the price dividend ratio
itself is less volatile. This indicates that, although prices move a lot,
dividends move together with prices more than in the data, stabil-
ising the price dividend ratio. This is the case both under learning
and under rational expectations. Note that the rational expectations
version generates more than enough return volatility on its own, but
that this is achieved through counterfactually large dividend volat-
ility. Turning to return predictability, the learning model does better
than rational expectations: while predictability by the P/D ratio is not
as strong as in the data, it has at least the right sign. Under rational
expectations, high stock prices tend to be followed by high returns, at
odds with the data.
1.5.4.2 Impulse response functions
Figure 1.5 plots the impulse responses of the model economy after
a positive productivity shock. The shock has a size of one standard
deviation (i.e. productivity at increases by 0.48% on impact). The red
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Table 1.5: Moments in the data and across search model specifications.
(1) (2)
moment data learning RE
output volatility σhp (Yt) 1.52% 1.52%† 1.52%†
unemployment volatility σhp (ut) 0.77% 0.77%† 0.77%†
relative volatility
σhp (Ct) /σhp (Yt) 0.55 0.39 0.30
σhp (It) /σhp (Yt) 2.70 2.40 2.66
σhp (wt) /σhp (Yt) 0.59 0.46 0.20
σhp (Dt) /σhp (Yt) 4.15 3.57 12.71
correlation with output
ρhp (ut, Yt) -0.88 -0.94 -0.99
ρhp (Ct, Yt) 0.85 0.94 0.95
ρhp (It, Yt) 0.91 0.99 0.99
asset price volatility
σhp
(
Pt
Dt
)
11.2% 11.2%† 4.19%
σ
(
Pt
Dt
)
40.8% 13.3% 14.2%
σ
(
Rstockt,t+1
)
33.5% 42.8% 54.1%
return predictability
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+4
)
-0.22 -0.07 0.57
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+20
)
-0.44 -0.18 0.84
Quarterly US data 1962Q1-2012Q4. Output Yt is GDP. Consumption Ct consists of
of services and non-durable private consumption. Investment It consists of private
non-residential fixed investment and durable consumption. Wages are total com-
pensation divided by total hours worked. Dividends Dt are four-quarter moving
averages of S&P 500 dividends. The stock price index Pt is the S&P500. All variables
up to here are deflated by the GDP deflator. Unemployment ut is the civilian unem-
ployment rate. Returns Rstockt are annualised real quarterly stock returns including
dividends. The subscript “hp” indicates application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with smoothing parameter 1600. Model values are calculated using simulated model
data aggregated up to quarterly frequency. † indicates moments targeted by SMM.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to a productivity shock in the search model.
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Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation innovation in εt. Output Yt, stock
prices Pt, consumption Ct, investment It, and dividends Dt are in 100*log deviations
from steady state. The unemployment rate ut is in percentage point deviations from
steady state. All responses are at monthly frequency. The RE responses are evaluated
at the parameter values for σa, η estimated under learning.
solid lines trace responses for the model under learning, while the
blue dashed lines trace responses under rational expectations, but
at the same parameter values as estimated under learning (i.e. with
a low degree of wage rigidity that does not match the volatility of
unemployment). This way, the incremental effect of learning should
become clearer. The impact response in the first period after the shock
is identical under learning and under rational expectations, but after
that, stock prices increase markedly under learning due to investors
adjusting their beliefs upwards. This leads to an increase in firm
value and raises the incentives for entrepreneurs to start new firms
and create jobs. The unemployment rate therefore falls by more than
under rational expectations. This illustrates why the learning model
can replicate the unemployment volatility in the data without relying
on a high degree of wage rigidity. By consequence, the response of
output is also amplified. Consumption and investment both rise per-
sistently and their response is amplified as well compared to rational
expectations.
The response of dividends, however, is smaller under learning than
under rational expectations. This can be understood as follows. The
expression for dividends is simply
dt = ω (1− η) (1− α) (atkαt − y¯) + η (1− α) y¯ (1.81)
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where y¯ = EP [yt] is the unconditional expectation of yt. This expres-
sion is increasing in the level of capital per firm. At the same time,
the optimality condition for the choice of capital can be written as:
1 = EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (
at+1kα−1t+1 + 1− δ
)]
(1.82)
Up to first order, the level of capital per firm kt and dividends dt are
therefore inversely related to expected consumption growth. Under
learning, a shock which raises stock prices will raise job creation and
therefore increase expected consumption growth. The capital stock
per firm will fall as a result, even though the total capital stock of all
firms may rise.
This means that the behaviour of dividends dampens rather than
reinforces the learning dynamics. The equilibrium stock price is
pt =
dt
1− (1− s)EPt
[
β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ]
exp
(
µˆt +
g−g2
2 σ
2
z
) (1.83)
which is increasing in the price growth belief µˆt and increasing in
the per-firm dividend dt. When beliefs µˆt rise, dividends dt fall over
time as a result of decreased capital per firm. Therefore, the amount
of amplification in the stock price is lower than if dividends were
exogenous.
1.5.4.3 Wage rigidity and the “Shimer puzzle”
Table also 1.4 documents that learning reduces the need to rely on
wage rigidity to generate the right magnitude of unemployment fluc-
tuations. The estimated value for the wage rigidity parameter is ω =
0.134 under learning, but ω = 0.592 under rational expectations. This
means that the amount of wage rigidity required to match the volat-
ility of unemployment is less than four times smaller when learning
about stock prices is introduced into the learning. Thus, learning can
successfully address the Shimer puzzle successfully while at the same
time improving the asset price properties of the search model.
Certainly, the surplus share η of entrepreneurs is still assumed
to be very small, and this helps the model generate unemployment
volatility as pointed out by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). But it
is not possible to match unemployment volatility with a low surplus
share alone. Figure 1.6 illustrates this. I run the moment matching
procedure described above for several values of η both under rational
expectations and learning and plot the resulting values of the wage
rigidity parameters ω. It is evident that the required value for ω is
always substantially lower under learning than under rational expect-
ations. In fact, for values for η above 4%, it is impossible to match
unemployment volatility under rational expectations, whereas this is
still possible under learning for a value of η up to about 14%.
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Figure 1.6: Required degree of wage stickiness.
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Estimated wage stickiness ω required to match volatility of unemployment, as a
function of the surplus share of entrepreneurs η. Values for which moments could
not be matched are plotted as ω = 1. Calibration value η = 2.255% marked by black
dotted vertical line.
1.6 conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the consequences of learning about
firm value in two widely used models of the business cycle: the real
business cycle model and the labour search and matching model. In
doing so, I developed a particular concept of expectation formation
called conditionally model-consistent expectations (CMCE), which
allow for a subjective belief about one relative price (the stock) price
while pinning down the beliefs about all other model variables by re-
quiring a maximum of consistency with model outcomes. This keeps
a model as close as possible to rational expectations while still al-
lowing to study the effects of extrapolative expectations about stock
prices as in Adam et al. (2013).
It was found that the real business cycle model produces counter-
factual results when learning is added. Because a stock price boom
mainly causes a large wealth effect, consumption, employment and
output tend to move in opposite directions.
By contrast, adding learning to the search and matching model
improved the asset price properties of the model while generating
positive comovement in all macroeconomic aggregates in response
to changes in stock price expectations. What’s more, learning sub-
stantially reduced the need to rely on wage rigidity to match the
magnitude of unemployment fluctuations seen in the data.
The main shortcoming of the analysis in this chapter is that it was
not possible to identify a two-sided feedback channel between prices
under learning and economic fundamentals. In the RBC model, a
stock price boom entailed a surge in dividends but a fall in aggregate
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output, while in the search model output rose but dividends fell. Are
there plausible mechanisms for which the behaviour of dividends and
economic activity reinforce belief dynamics under learning? I revisit
this question in the next chapter.
The concept of expectations developed in this chapter has many
potential applications beyond stock price learning. It allows to study
the impact of deviations from rational expectations in one variable
while keeping other expectations model-consistent, in virtually any
kind of forward-looking model. It would be possible, for example, to
apply it to inflation expectations in New Keynesian models, expecta-
tions about house prices in models of the housing market, and so on.
These applications open up potential avenues for future research.
2
T H E R O L E O F L E A R N I N G F O R A S S E T P R I C E S ,
B U S I N E S S C Y C L E S , A N D M O N E TA RY P O L I C Y
2.1 introduction
I think financial factors in general, and asset prices in particular, play
a more central role in explaining the dynamics of the economy than is
typically reflected in macro-economic models, even after the experience
of the crisis.
- Andrew Haldane, 30 April 2014
The above statement by the Chief Economist of the Bank of England at
a parliamentary hearing may provoke disbelief among macroeconom-
ists. After all, a wealth of research in the last fifteen years has been
dedicated precisely to the links between the financial sector and the
real economy. Financial frictions are now seen as a central mechanism
by which asset prices interact with macroeconomic dynamics.
Still, our understanding of this interaction remains incomplete, in
part due to the inherent difficulty of modelling asset prices.
The typical business cycle model employs an asset pricing theory
based on time-separable preferences with moderate degrees of risk
aversion and rational expectations. Such an asset pricing theory is
well known to be inadequate for many empirical regularities such
as return volatility (Shiller, 1981) and return predictability (Fama
and French, 1988). This is not problematic when asset prices are
disconnected from the real economy, since asset pricing and business
cycle dynamics can then be separated.1 In the presence of financial
frictions however, the prices of assets used as collateral affect borrow-
ing constraints and hence the dynamics of the economy. A failure to
generate realistic endogenous asset price dynamics can then become
a potentially important source of model misspecification.
This chapter examines the business cycle implications of a learning-
based asset pricing theory in the presence of financial constraints. I
construct a model of firm credit frictions in which agents are unable
to form rational expectations about the price of equities in the stock
market, and instead have to learn from past observation to form
subjective beliefs. The learning-based approach to stock pricing has
1 For the real business cycle model with recursive preferences, Tallarini Jr. (2000)
showed that business cycle properties are driven almost entirely by the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, while asset price properties are almost entirely governed
by the degree of risk aversion.
39
40 asset prices , business cycles , and monetary policy
been shown to perform surprisingly well in endowment econom-
ies, without the need to rely on non-separable preferences or habit
(Adam, Marcet and Nicolini, 2013; Adam, Beutel and Marcet, 2014).
The interpretation of price dynamics under learning is quite different
from rational expectations. With learning, stock prices fluctuate not
because of variations in the discounting of prices and returns, but
because of variations in subjective beliefs about the prices and returns
themselves. The deviation of these subjective beliefs from rational
expectations is a natural measure of “price misalignments”, “over-”
and “undervaluation”. These notions are often present in informal
arguments about financial markets, but absent in most asset pricing
theories.2
A second model ingredient is that firms are subject to credit con-
straints, the tightness of which depends on firm market value. This
type of constraint emerges from a limited commitment problem in
which defaulting firms can be restructured and resold (similar to
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code) as opposed to being liquid-
ated. It provides a mechanism by which high stock market valu-
ations translate into easier access to credit. The model has a “financial
accelerator” mechanism similar to Bernanke et al. (1999), with the
strength and properties of this mechanism crucially depending on
the endogenous dynamics of stock prices.
The analysis of the model yields three results. First, a positive
feedback loop emerges between beliefs, asset prices and the produc-
tion side of the economy, which leads to considerable amplification
and propagation of business cycle shocks. When investor beliefs are
more optimistic, their demand for stocks increases. This increases
firm valuations and relaxes credit conditions. This in turn allows
firms to move closer to their profit optimum. Provided counteracting
general equilibrium forces are not too strong, they will also be able
to pay higher dividends to their shareholders, raising stock prices
further and propagating investor optimism even more. The financial
accelerator mechanism becomes much more powerful than under ra-
tional expectations. At the same time, the learning mechanism greatly
improves asset price properties such as price and return volatility
and predictability without the need to impose complex preferences or
high degrees of risk aversion. This result suggests that the relatively
weak quantitative strength of the financial accelerator effect in many
existing models (Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004) is at least in part due to
low endogenous asset price volatility.
Second, while agents’ subjective expectations are not rational ex-
pectations, they are consistent in a number of ways with data ob-
tained from surveys. I document that forecast errors on several mac-
roeconomic aggregates (from the US Survey of Professional Fore-
2 For example, in October 2014, the IMF warned of “highly correlated mispricing [..]
across assets“ in its Global Financial Stability Report (p. 6).
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casters) as well as on stock returns (from the Duke-Fuqua CFO Sur-
vey) can be predicted by the price/dividend ratio as well as forecast
revisions. This is also true in the model, despite the fact that learning
only adds one free parameter to the model and agents have con-
ditionally model-consistent expectations for all relevant prices and
outcomes. When they are over-predicting asset prices, they also over-
predict credit limits depending on those prices and therefore aggreg-
ate activity, just like in the data.
Third, I show that the model has important normative implications.
A recurring question in monetary economics is whether policy should
react to asset price “misalignments”. Gali (2014) writes that justifying
such a reaction requires “the presumption that an increase in interest
rates will reduce the size of an asset price bubble” for which “no
empirical or theoretical support seems to have been provided”. This
chapter is a first step towards filling this gap. Indeed, I find that under
learning, the welfare-maximising monetary policy within a class of
interest rate rules reacts strongly to asset price growth. By raising
interest rates when stock prices are rising, policy is able to curb the
endogenous build-up of over-optimistic investor beliefs. Such a reac-
tion reduces both asset price volatility and business cycle volatility.
In contrast, under rational expectations, a policy reaction to asset
prices does not improve welfare, in line with earlier findings in the
literature.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2
reviews the related literature. Section 2.3 provides several empirical
facts relating to the macroeconomic effects and properties of stock
prices as well as discrepancies of measured expectations from rational
expectations. Section 2.4 presents a highly stylised version of the
model that permits an analytic solution. It shows that credit frictions
or asset price learning alone does not generate either amplification of
shocks or interesting asset price dynamics, while their combination
does. The full model which can be used for quantitative analysis is
then presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains the quantitative
results. Section 2.7 contains the monetary policy analysis. Section 2.8
concludes.
2.2 related literature
This chapter starts from learning-based asset pricing developed in
a series of papers by Klaus Adam and Albert Marcet (Adam and
Marcet, 2011; Adam et al., 2013, 2014). They show that parsimonious
models of learning about stock prices succeed in explaining key as-
pects of observed stock price data such as the excess volatility, equity
premium, and return predictability puzzles. They also show consist-
ency with investor expectations, which are hard to reconcile with
rational expectations. Recent work by Barberis et al. (2015) goes in
42 asset prices , business cycles , and monetary policy
a similar direction. While these papers study endowment economies,
I take their approach to an economy with production. This allows
to look at the interactions between financial markets and the real
economy, as well as policy implications.
There exist other approaches to asset pricing in production econom-
ies. For models with financial frictions in particular, it is popular to
simply include exogenous shocks to explain the observed fluctuations
in asset prices. Iacoviello (2005) and Liu et al. (2013), for example, set
up economies in which exogenous shocks to housing demand drive
house prices which in turn affect credit constraints, and study the
financial accelerator mechanism. Xu et al. (2013) have a model with a
credit friction in which borrowing limits also depend on stock market
valuations similar to that in my model. They prove the existence of
rational liquidity bubbles and introduce a shock that governs the size
of this bubble, thus enabling them to match the stock prices seen in
the data. In all of these models, the simple preferences and rational
expectations would not allow realistic asset price dynamics in the
absence of asset price shocks, and the structural interpretation of
these shocks is often not clear.3 In order to advance our understand-
ing of the interaction between asset prices and the real economy, I
believe that it is necessary to have macroeconomic models that can
endogenise asset price fluctuations. This chapter is a step in this
direction.
The macro-finance literature has two main, rational expectations-
based propositions to obtain realistic asset price dynamics. The first
one is due to Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and relies on a non-
linear form of habit formation combined with high risk aversion. The
second, so-called “long-run risk” approach due to Bansal and Yaron
(2004), introduces small, predictable and observable components to
long-run consumption and dividend growth combined with Epstein-
Zin preferences. There are some papers that try to embed these al-
ternative approaches in production economies: Boldrin et al. (2001)
for habit formation, Tallarini Jr. (2000) and Croce (2014) for long-run
risk. These papers consider real business cycle models and are mainly
concerned with endogenising consumption and dividend streams in
a production economy while preserving the asset price implications.
To my knowledge, there are no studies which take either approach to
larger business cycle models with financial frictions, possibly because
they are computationally quite demanding. They also require the use
of preferences which have some rather counter-intuitive properties
(shown by Lettau and Uhlig (2000) for habit and Epstein et al. (2013)
for long-run risk). In my view, learning-based asset pricing is a prom-
ising alternative. It is intuitively appealing to think that asset prices
3 Even the disaster-risk model of Gourio (2012) can be interpreted as such a model
in which exogenous shocks to discount factors drive asset prices, even though
quantities are not affected by financial frictions but by the changes in discount factors
themselves.
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are to some degree driven by self-amplifying waves of over- and
under-confidence, and such a view is supported by survey evidence.
Importantly, it also has implications for policy, as this chapter shows.
The chapter also makes a contribution to the literature on adaptive
learning in business cycles. A number of papers in this area have stud-
ied learning in combination with financial frictions (Caputo, Medina
and Soto, 2010; Milani, 2011; Gelain, Lansing and Mendicino, 2013).
The conventional approach taken in this literature consists of two
steps: first, derive the linearised equilibrium conditions of the eco-
nomy under rational expectations; second, replace all terms involving
expectations with parametrised forecast functions, and update the
parameters using recursive least squares every period. Such models
certainly produce very rich dynamics, but they are problematic on
several grounds. First, it is not clear that first-order conditions para-
metrised in this way correspond in a meaningful sense to intertem-
poral optimisation problems.4 Second, these models are often very
complex and intransparent. The need to parametrise every expect-
ation in the first-order conditions requires a large number of para-
meters. In all but the simplest models, it then becomes prohibitively
difficult to analyse equilibrium dynamics. In this chapter, I make
use of a more transparent and parsimonious approach. Beliefs are
restricted to be model-consistent as under rational expectations (with
the only exception being the beliefs about stock prices) and agents
make optimal choices given this set of beliefs. Even in a medium-
sized DSGE model, the introduction of learning then adds only one
parameter and one state variable to the model.
Finally, the chapter also relates to the debate on whether mon-
etary policy should react to asset price “misalignments”. Bernanke
and Gertler (2001) found in a financial frictions model with rational
exogenous asset price bubbles that the answer is “no”. This view, al-
though not unchallenged (Filardo, 2001; Cecchetti et al., 2002), forms
the consensus opinion and indeed the practice of most central banks.
It has also recently been reinforced by Gali (2014), who argues that
since rational bubbles are predicted to grow at the rate of interest, the
optimal policy to deflate a bubble might even be to lower interest rates
when asset prices are rising too fast. Without incorporating bubbles,
Faia and Monacelli (2007) find a similar result, and conclude that a
strong exclusive anti-inflationary stance remains welfare-maximising.
This chapter shows that such policy recommendations depend critic-
ally on the underlying asset price theory. In a world of less than fully
rational expectations, raising interest rates in an asset price boom can
be effective in curbing exuberant investor expectations and mitigate
4 In any model with an Euler equation, for example, some version of the stochastic
discount factor needs to be learned by the agents, an object which depends on their
own choices. It is unclear how an agent would be able to select a choice based on
an intertemporal first-order condition and at the same time not understand how he
makes choices when forming expectations.
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a surge (and subsequent reversal) in real activity due to high asset
prices and easy access to credit.
2.3 empirical evidence
The purpose of this section is to document three sets of facts. First,
movements in the aggregate stock market have sizeable effects on
investment and credit constraints, consistent with the credit friction
in my model. Second, stock prices exhibit high volatility and return
predictability. Third, measures of expectations from survey data, both
for stock prices and macro variables, reveal systematic deviations
from rational expectations. Some but not all of these observations
have been documented previously in the literature.
2.3.1 Effect of the stock market on investment and credit constraints
One of the oldest documented links between financial markets and
the real economy is that the stock market predicts investment (Barro,
1990). Of course, prediction does not imply causation. It is plausible
that new information about improved economic fundamentals causes
both stock prices and investment to rise, with stock prices respond-
ing faster. This view is taken by Beaudry and Portier (2006) who
show that in an estimated vector error correction model, innovations
in stock prices orthogonal to current changes in TFP predict a sub-
stantial portion of long-run TFP variation. This suggests that stock
price fluctuations are in fact “news shocks” about future productivity.
However, it is also conceivable that stock market movements have
a direct effect on investment even when they do not reflect chan-
ging expectations about the economic fundamentals. Blanchard et al.
(1993) construct a measure of expected fundamentals and find that
stock prices retain their predictive power even when controlling for
fundamentals. In general though, it is hard to come to any definitive
conclusions about causality without spelling out a structural model.
In the model of this chapter, higher stock prices affect investment
because of financial frictions: Firms with higher market value have
easier access to external finance and can therefore increase invest-
ment. Is this consistent with the data? It is, at least when looking
at aggregate time series. I estimate a VAR using quarterly US data.
The VAR includes six variables: investment, total factor productivity,
dividends, the Federal Funds rate, a corporate credit spread, and the
aggregate price/dividend-ratio.5
5 Investment is real private non-residential fixed investment. Productivity is adjusted
for capacity utilisation as in Kimball et al. (2006). Dividends are four-quarter moving
averages from the S&P Composite index. The corporate credit spread is Moody’s baa-
aaa corporate bond spread, serving as a proxy for credit market conditions. The P/D
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Figure 2.1: Stock price shock in a VAR.
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In order to isolate movements in stock prices that are unrelated to
contemporaneous productivity, monetary, or other shocks, I examine
the effects of a “stock price shock”, identified as having an immediate
effect on the P/D ratio but no contemporaneous effect on any other
variables.6 This shock alone accounts for more than two thirds of the
forecast error variance of the P/D ratio at all horizons.
Figure 2.1 plots the estimated impulse response functions. The shock
leads to a persistent rise in the P/D ratio. It also significantly increases
investment and dividends while reducing credit spreads. The effect
on TFP is insignificant throughout and initially negative. This casts
doubt on the view that most stock price movements are a reflection
of news about future productivity. They also do not seem to reflect
news about interest rates, since the response of the Federal Funds
rate, too, is flat and insignificant.
ratio is again from the S&P composite index. The lag length is set to two as per the
Bayesian Information Criterion.
6 This ordering is chosen on the premise that financial markets adjust faster to shocks
than either real variables or monetary policy. As for the ordering among the financial
variables, the results are robust to inverting the order of the P/D ratio and the credit
spread.
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Table 2.1: Stock market statistics.
statistic value
excess volatility σ (hp (log Pt)) /σ (hp (log Dt)) 2.63
(.350)
σ
(
log PtDt
)
.408
(.017)
σ
(
log Rstockt,t+1
)
.335
(.022)
return predictability ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+4
)
-.216
(.065)
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+20
)
-.439
(.049)
Quarterly data 1949Q1-2012Q4. Stock price and aggregate dividend data for the
S&P Composite Index from Robert Shiller’s website. Standard errors in parentheses.
2.3.2 Asset price “puzzles”
Asset prices in general, and stock prices in particular, are known to
exhibit a number of characteristics that are difficult to reconcile with
a basic consumption-based asset pricing model (by which I mean a
representative investor with time-separable power utility and rational
expectations). Here, I document two of them: excess volatility and
return predictability.7 These are summarised in Table 2.1 for quarterly
aggregate US data.
The first row shows the ratio of the standard deviation of the cyc-
lical components of stock prices and dividends. By this measure prices
are 2.63 times more volatile than dividends. The log price/dividend
ratio (second row) and log stock returns (third row) are also highly
volatile. Shiller (1981) showed that this amount of volatility cannot be
accommodated in an asset pricing theory based on rational expecta-
tions and constant discount rates. If one starts from the premise that
asset prices equal discounted cash flows, then this implies that either
discount rates must vary a lot, or expectations are not rational (or
both).
The fourth and fifth rows of the table document return predict-
ability at the one- and five-year horizon, respectively. A high P/D
ratio reliably predicts low future returns at these horizons, even if
short-run stock returns are almost unpredictable. Cochrane (1992)
7 Another equally famous fact due to Mehra and Prescott (1985) is the size of the
equity premium. Adam et al. (2013) show that learning models are able to generate
sizeable equity premia, but in this chapter, I only focus on volatility and return
predictability.
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shows that the variance of the P/D ratio can be decomposed into
its covariance with future returns and future dividend growth. Since
dividend growth is not very volatile, not well predicted by the P/D
ratio, and the P/D ratio itself is volatile, it follows that returns must
be predictable. Assuming rational expectations, Cochrane identifies
the predictable component of returns with a time-varying discount
rate. Again, the alternative is that expectations used to price assets
are distinct from rational expectations. In the model of this chapter,
a high P/D ratio is not a result of low required returns, but of high
expected returns - where the subjective expectation is distinct from
the statistical prediction.
2.3.3 Survey data on expectations
The rational expectations hypothesis is a fundamental building block
of modern macroeconomics. Sometimes, it is criticised as an unreal-
istic modelling device which asserts that agents are hyper-rational,
endowed with infinite computing power and knowledge of the struc-
tural shocks and relationships of the economy. But in fact, it makes
no such claim. In the words of Sargent (2008), it simply asserts that
“outcomes do not differ systematically [...] from what people expect
them to be”. Put differently, any agent’s forecast error should not be
predictable by information available to the agent at the time of the
forecast.
The rational expectations hypothesis is testable based on survey
measures of expectations. It is almost always rejected. Here, I docu-
ment some of these tests, and characterise some of the predictability
patterns of forecast errors.
Expectations of returns are positively correlated with past returns
and the P/D-ratio, whereas the best statistical prediction would call
for a negative correlation. The difference is strong enough to be stat-
istically rejected. This pattern is observable across many different
sources of survey data (Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014). I illustrate
it with data from the CFO survey by John Graham and Campbell
Harvey at Duke University. The survey respondents are CFOs of ma-
jor US corporations, which are likely to possess good knowledge of
financial markets. Since 2000, the survey includes a question on stock
market return expectations (“Over the next year, I expect the average
annual S&P 500 return will be ...”). Figure 2.2 compares the survey ex-
pectations with realised returns. The left panel plots the mean survey
response against the value of the P/D ratio in the month preceding
the survey. The correlation is strongly positive: return expectations
are more optimistic when stock valuations are high. However, high
stock valuations actually predict low future returns, as documented
above and illustrated again in the right panel of the figure. Such a
pattern cannot be reconciled with rational expectations, as it implies
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Figure 2.2: Return expectations and expected returns.
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that agents’ forecast errors are predictable by the P/D ratio, a publicly
observable statistic.8
Of course, survey data are only an imperfect measure of expect-
ations. When answering questions on a survey, respondents might
wilfully misstate their true expectations, answer carelessly, or misun-
derstand the question. When being asked for a point estimate, they
might report a statistic other than the mean of their belief distribution.
Still, survey data are the best available test for the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis.
Tests of forecast error predictability can be applied to other vari-
ables of macroeconomic significance. Table 2.2 describes tests using
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as well
as the CFO survey data. Each row and column corresponds to a
correlation of a mean forecast error with a variable that is observable
by respondents at the time the survey is conducted. Under the null
of rational expectations, the true correlation coefficients should all be
zero.
The first column shows that the P/D ratio negatively predicts with
forecast errors. When stock prices are high, people systematically
under-predict economic outcomes. This holds in particular for stock
returns, as was already shown in the scatter plot above. But it also
holds true for macroeconomic aggregates, albeit at lower levels of sig-
nificance. The second column shows that the change in the P/D ratio
8 To be precise, one can test the hypothesis that the univariate regression coefficient
of the P/D ratio on expected (survey) returns is the same as that on realised returns,
e.g. using the SUR estimator. The hypothesis is rejected at the 0.1% level. The survey
asks for a return estimate of a 12-month period starting at varyind days of the month,
whereas the realised return measure is taken at the beginning of the month. But the
results are robust to taking realised returns at the end of the month.
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Table 2.2: Forecast error predictability: Correlation coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
forecast variable log PDt ∆ log PDt forecast revision
Rstockt,t+4 -.44*** .06 n/a
(-3.42) (.41)
Yt+3 -.21* .22** .29***
(-1.78) (2.42) (3.83)
It+3 -.20* .25*** .31***
(-1.74) (2.88) (3.79)
Ct+3 -.19* .21** .23***
(-1.85) (2.37) (2.67)
ut+3 .05 -.27*** .43***
(.12) (-3.07) (6.07)
Correlation coefficients for mean forecast errors on one-year ahead nominal stock
returns (Graham-Harvey survey) and three-quarter ahead real output growth, invest-
ment growth, consumption growth and the unemployment rate (SPF). t-statistics for
the null of zero correlation in parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks correspond
to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Regressors: Column (1) is the S&P 500
P/D ratio and Column (2) is its first difference. Column (3) is the forecast revision
as in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010). Data from Graham-Harvey covers 2000Q3-
2012Q4. Data for the SPF covers 1981Q1-2012Q4.
is a better predictor of forecast errors, strongly rejecting the rational
expectations hypothesis, but in the opposite direction. At times when
stock prices are rising, people systematically under-predict economic
outcomes. Since the stock market itself positively predicts economic
activity (as shown above), this suggests that agents’ expectations are
too cautious and under-predict an expansion in its beginning, but
then overshoot and over-predict it when it is about to end. Such a
pattern emerges naturally in the model of this chapter under learning.
The third column reports the results of a particular test of rational
expectations devised by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010). Since
for any variable xt, the SPF asks for forecasts at one- through four-
quarter horizon, it is possible to construct a measure of agent’s revi-
sion of the change in xt as Eˆt [xt+3 − xt] − Eˆt−1 [xt+3 − xt]. Forecast
errors are positively predicted by this revision measure. Coibion and
Gorodnichenko take this as evidence for sticky information models
in which information sets are gradually updated over time. As I will
show later, it is also consistent with the learning model developed in
this chapter.
50 asset prices , business cycles , and monetary policy
2.4 understanding the mechanism
In this section, I construct a simplified version of the model which
illustrates the interaction between asset prices and credit frictions
under learning. I impose several strong assumptions permitting a
closed-form solution. Quantitative analysis will require a richer model,
the development of which is relegated to the next section. The main
message of this section is that financial frictions alone do not generate
either sizeable amplification of business cycle shocks or asset price
volatility, but in combination with learning they do.
2.4.1 Model setup
Time is discrete at t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The model economy consists of a
representative household and a representative firm. The representat-
ive household is risk-neutral and inelastically supplies one unit of
labour. Its utility maximisation programme is as follows:
max
(Ct,St,Bt)
∞
t=0
EP
∞
∑
t=0
βtCt
s.t. Ct + StPt + Bt = wt + St−1 (Pt + Dt) + Rt−1Bt−1
St ∈ [0, S¯] , S−1, B−1
Ct is the amount of non-durable consumption goods purchased by
the household in period t. The consumption good is traded in a com-
petitive spot market and serves as the numÈraire. wt is the real wage
rate. Labour is also traded in a competitive spot market, so that the
wage wt is taken as given by the household. Moreover, the household
can trade two financial assets, again in competitive spot markets: one-
period bonds, denoted by Bt and paying gross real interest Rt in the
next period; and stocks St which trade at price Pt and entitle their
holder to dividend payments Dt. The household cannot short-sell
stocks and his maximum stock holdings are capped at some S¯ > 1.9
The household maximises the expectation of discounted future con-
sumption under the probability measure P . This measure is the sub-
jective belief system held by agents in the model economy at time t,
which will be discussed in detail further below. The first order condi-
tions describing the household’s optimal plan under an arbitrary P
are
Rt = R = β−1 (2.1)
9 The constraint on St is necessary to guarantee existence of the learning equilibrium,
although it never binds along the equilibrium path.
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St

= 0 if Pt > βEPt [Pt+1 + Dt+1]
∈ [0, S¯] if Pt = βEPt [Pt+1 + Dt+1]
= S¯ if Pt < βEPt [Pt+1 + Dt+1]
. (2.2)
Let us now turn to the firm. It engages in the production of a good
which can be used both for consumption and investment. It is pro-
duced using capital Kt−1, which the firm owns, and labour Lt accord-
ing to the constant returns to scale technology
Yt = Kαt−1 (AtLt)
1−α (2.3)
where At is its productivity. Here, I only allow for permanent
shocks to productivity:
log At = log G + log At−1 + εt, εt ∼ N
(
−σ
2
2
, σ2
)
iid (2.4)
In particular, the expected growth rate of productivity is constant at
Et At+1/At ≡ G. The capital stock is predetermined and owned by
the firm. It depreciates at the rate δ at the end of each period. The
firm can also issue shares and bonds as described above. Thus, its
period budget constraint reads as follows:
Yt + (1− δ)Kt−1 + Bt + StPt = wtLt + Kt + St−1 (Pt + Dt) + RBt−1
(2.5)
Before describing the equilibrium, it is useful to introduce the mar-
ginal return on capital:
Rkt =
∂Yt
∂Kt−1
+ 1− δ (2.6)
2.4.2 Frictionless equilibrium
In the absence of financial constraints, the Modigliani-Miller theorem
will render the composition of firm financing redundant and the
model collapses to a standard stochastic growth model. In particu-
lar, the optimal choice of the capital stock (under rational expect-
ations) equates the marginal return on capital with the inverse of
the discount factor: EtRkt+1 = β
−1. Whatever one assumes about the
financial structure of the firm, its total value will equal the size of
the capital stock. The capital stock and firm value co-moves perfectly
with productivity:
Kt/At = K˜t = K∗ (2.7)
Pt + Bt
At
= K˜t = K∗ (2.8)
where K∗ = G
(
α
β−1−1+δ
)1/(1−α)
e−ασ2/2.
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2.4.3 Rational expectations equilibrium with financial frictions
In introducing financial frictions, I impose constraints on both the
equity and debt instruments. On the equity side, the firm is not
allowed to change the quantity of shares outstanding, fixed at St = 1.
Further, it is not allowed to use retained earnings to finance invest-
ment. Instead, all earnings net of interest and depreciation have to be
paid out to shareholders:
Dt = Yt − wtLt − δKt−1 − (R− 1) Bt−1 (2.9)
Combined with equation (2.5), this assumption implies that the firm’s
capital stock must be entirely debt-financed: Kt = Bt at all t.10 In
other words, the firm’s book value of equity after dividend payouts is
constrained to be zero. This does not mean, however, that the market
value of equity is also zero as long as the firm’s expected dividend
payouts are strictly positive.
On the debt side, the level of debt that can be acquired by the firm
is limited to a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the total market value of its assets,
i.e. the sum of debt and equity:
Bt ≤ ξ (Bt + Pt)
⇔ Kt ≤ ξ1− ξ Pt (2.10)
Equation (2.10) is a simple constraint on leverage, i.e. debt divided by
value of total assets. I depart from the standard assumption that total
assets enter with their liquidation value (in this case Kt, the book
value) and instead let them enter with their market value (in this
case Bt + Pt). This captures the idea that a firm which is more highly
valued by financial markets will have easier access to credit. This
could be because high market value acts as a signal to lenders for
the firm’s ability to repay, or because the amount lenders can recover
in the event of default depends on the price at which a firm can be
resold to other financial market participants. In the full version of
the model in the next section, I formally derive (2.10) from a limited
commitment problem.
The firm maximises the presented discounted sum of future di-
vidends, using the household discount factor:
max
(Kt,Lt,Dt)
∞
t=0
E
∞
∑
t=0
βtDt
s.t. Dt = Yt − wtLt + (1− δ− R)Kt−1
Kt ≤ ξ1− ξ Pt
Kt ≥ 0, K−1
10 This holds under the suitable initial condition K−1 = B−1, e.g. the firm starts with
zero book value of equity on its balance sheet. This assumption is relaxed in the full
model.
2.4 understanding the mechanism 53
In particular, it makes its decisions under the same belief system Pt
as the household. Due to constant returns to scale in production, we
can write dividends at the optimum as follows:
max
Lt
Dt =
(
Rkt − R
)
Kt−1 (2.11)
The optimal choice of capital is to exhaust borrowing limits as long
as the expected internal return on capital exceeds the external return
paid to creditors:
Kt

= 0 if EtRkt+1 < R
∈
[
0, ξ1−ξ Pt
]
if EtRkt+1 = R
= ξ1−ξ Pt if EtR
k
t+1 > R
(2.12)
When solving for the equilibrium, market clearing needs to be
imposed. The market clearing condition for bonds is just R = β−1.
That for equity is St = 1, which means the Euler equation (2.2) has to
hold with equality:
Pt = βEt [Pt+1 + Dt+1] (2.13)
Goods market clearing requires
Yt + Kt = C + (1− δ)Kt−1 (2.14)
and labour market clearing requires Lt = 1.
The equilibrium under rational expectations admits a closed-form
solution. First, note that the equilibrium return on capital depends on
the aggregate capital stock due to decreasing returns to scale at the
aggregate level:
Rkt = R
k (K˜t−1, εt) = α( GeεtK˜t−1
)1−α
+ 1− δ (2.15)
This dependency comes about through a general equilibrium effect:
A higher level of the capital stock increases labour demand, which
increases real wages and therefore lowers the return on capital. Next,
one can write expected dividends as a function of the capital stock:
D˜
(
k˜t, K˜t
)
= Et
[
Dt+1
At
]
=
(
EtRk
(
K˜t, εt+1
)− R) k˜t (2.16)
Here, I have made a distinction between the capital choice k˜t of the
representative firm that takes future wages as given, and the aggreg-
ate capital stock K˜t which determines wages and the return on capital
in general equilibrium. Of course, in equilibrium the two are equal.
Finally, the effective stock price under rational expectations is simply
the discounted sum of future dividends:
P˜t =
Pt
At
= βEt
∞
∑
s=0
βs
At+s
At
D˜
(
K˜t+s, K˜t+s
)
(2.17)
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Figure 2.3: Rational expectations equilibrium.
k˜t, K˜t
1−ξ
ξ K˜t
D˜(K˜t,K˜t)
R−G
K¯ K∗
P¯
0
A
P˜t
D˜(k˜t, K¯) +
GP¯
R
First, let us consider the case ξ = 1. In this case, K˜t is constant
across time and states in equilibrium and is at its efficient level K∗
such that EtRk (K∗, εt+1) = R. By consequence, expected dividends
and the market value of equity are zero: D˜ (K∗, K∗) = 0 and Pt = 0.
Intuitively, when the firm can borrow up to the total amount of its
market value, it faces no financial friction. Book and market value of
the firm coincide. The expected return on capital equals the interest
rate due to risk neutrality of households, and since all capital is
financed by debt and the production function has constant returns
to scale, in expectation all profits are paid out as interest payments to
debt holders. The residual equity claims trade at a price of zero. This
result is the expectation version of the zero-profit condition under
constant returns to scale.
Next, let us turn to the case in which ξ is strictly smaller than one.
The equilibrium effective capital stock K˜t and stock price P˜t turn out
to be constant here as well. The equilibrium is characterised by two
equations:
P¯ =
D˜ (K¯, K¯)
R− G (2.18)
K¯ =
ξ
1− ξ P¯ (2.19)
The first equation pins down the stock market value of the firm as a
function of its capital stock, while the second determines the capital
stock that can be reached by exhausting the borrowing constraint that
depends on the stock market value. In particular, the internal rate of
return is always greater than the return on debt and so the borrowing
constraint is always binding. The equilibrium is depicted graphically
in Figure 2.3. Equation (2.19) is represented by a straight line of slope
(1− ξ) /ξ, while the market value of equity (2.18) is a hump-shaped
curve. The equilibrium lies at the intersection (Point A). Firms pay
2.4 understanding the mechanism 55
positive dividends (in expectation) and the market value of equity is
positive. The capital stock K¯ remains inefficiently low: K¯ < K∗. In
addition, Figure 2.3 plots as a dotted line firm value as a function
of the current choice of capital k˜t. From the firm perspective (taking
factor prices as given), the value function is increasing everywhere,
so it always wants to exhaust the borrowing constraint.
While the capital stock and expected output are an increasing func-
tion of maximum leverage ξ, expected dividends are non-monotonous
and hump-shaped. Why is that so? There are two opposing forces
affecting expected dividends, as can be seen from the following de-
composition:
d
dξ
D˜ (K¯, K¯) =
EtRk (K¯, εt+1)− R︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+Et
dRk
dK˜
(K¯, εt+1) K¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 dK¯dξ︸︷︷︸
>0
(2.20)
The first term in brackets captures a partial equilibrium effect, which
is internalised by the firm. When a firm is financially constrained, its
internal rate of return is higher than the return it has to pay to debt
holders. By borrowing more, it can increase its scale of production
and make more profit. The second term, however, captures a general
equilibrium effect: Higher investment lowers the marginal product of
capital, which in practice is realised through an increase in the equi-
librium wage wt+1. When ξ is small (financial frictions are severe) the
partial equilibrium effect dominates, while for a large ξ the general
equilibrium effect dominates.
Most importantly however, financial frictions do not lead to any
amplification or propagation of shocks in the rational expectations
equilibrium. They have a level effect on output, capital, etc., but the
dynamics of the model are identical for any value of ξ. This can be
seen by looking at the variances of log stock price and output growth
which do not depend on ξ:
Var [∆ log Pt] = σ2 (2.21)
Var [∆ log Yt] =
(
1− 2α+ 2α2) σ2 (2.22)
Intuitively, with financial frictions, a shock to productivity raises asset
prices just as much as to allow the firm to instantly adjust the capital
stock proportionately.
At the same time, the model cannot replicate many of the stylised
facts on stock price data. Up to a first-order approximation, the relat-
ive volatility of asset price growth with respect to dividend growth is
bounded from below:
σ (∆ log Pt)
σ (∆ log Dt)
<
(
1− 2α+ 2α2)1/2 ≤ √2 (2.23)
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The asset price volatility observed in the data can therefore not be
matched. The volatility of the price/dividend ratio can also not be
matched: in fact, the forward P/D ratio is even constant:
PDt =
Pt
EtDt+1
≡ 1
R− G (2.24)
Furthermore, excess returns are unpredictable:Et [(Pt+1 + Dt+1) /Pt]−
R = 0. Finally, by definition of rational expectations, forecast errors
are unpredictable, again at odds with the data.
2.4.4 Learning equilibrium
I now describe the equilibrium under learning. Qualitatively, this al-
teration to the expectation formation process can address many of the
issues encountered in the last section: it will increase the volatility of
stock prices, account for return and forecast error predictability, and
most importantly, induce endogenous amplification and propagation
on the production side of the model economy. The only departure
from rational expectations will be that agents do not understand the
pricing function that maps fundamentals into an equilibrium stock
price. Instead, they form subjective beliefs about the law of motion of
prices and update them using realised price observations.
More specifically, agents continue to make optimal choices for a
consistent belief system governed by the measure P . The equilibrium
therefore satisfies “internal rationality” as formalised by Adam and
Marcet (2011) and used in Eusepi and Preston (2011). I impose the
following restrictions to beliefs. Under P ,
1. agents observe the exogenous productivity shock εt;
2. agents believe that Pt evolves according to
log Pt − log Pt−1 = µt + ηt (2.25)
µt = µt−1 + νt (2.26)
where
(
ηt
νt
)
∼ N
(
−1
2
(
σ2η
σ2ν
)
,
(
σ2η 0
0 σ2ν
))
iid,(2.27)
the variable µt and the disturbances ηt and νt are unobserved
and the prior about µt in period 0 is given by
µ0 | F0 ∼ N
(
µˆ0, σ2µ
)
where σ2µ =
−σ2ν +
√
σ4ν + 4σ2νσ2η
2
; (2.28)
3. agents update their beliefs about µt after making their choices
and observing equilibrium prices in period t;
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4. for any variable xt other than the stock price, any future date t+
τ, and any sequence of exogenous productivity shocks εt, . . . , εt+τ
and stock prices Pt, . . . , Pt+τ which is on the equilibrium path:,
EPt [xt+τ | εt, Pt, . . . , εt+τ, Pt+τ] = Et [xt+τ | εt, Pt, . . . , εt+τ, Pt+τ]
i.e. agents’ beliefs coincide with the best statistical prediction of
xt conditional on the realisation of stock prices and fundament-
als.
The first assumption implies that agents have as much information
about the fundamental shocks of the economy as under rational ex-
pectations. The second assumption amounts to saying that agents be-
lieve stock prices to be a random walk. This random walk is believed
to have a small, unobservable, and time-varying drift µt. Learning
about this drift is going to be the key driver of asset price dynamics.
The third assumption imposes that forecasts of stock prices are up-
dated after equilibrium prices are determined, so as to avoid possible
multiple equilibria in price and forecast determination.11 The final
assumption amounts to imposing conditionally model-consistent ex-
pectations (CMCE) developed in Chapter 1.
Despite such relatively accurate beliefs, agents are still left with the
important problem of making a good guess about the unobservable
drift µt of stock prices. Optimal Bayesian belief updating amounts
to Kalman filtering in this case, since (2.25)-(2.28) is a linear state-
space system. Under P , agents’ beliefs about µt at time t are normally
distributed with stationary variance σ2µ and mean µˆt−1. This belief
about the mean of µt, which I will usually just call “the belief”,
evolves according to the updating equation:
µˆt = µˆt−1 − σ
2
ν
2
+ g
(
log Pt − log Pt−1 +
σ2η + σ
2
ν
2
− µˆt−1
)
(2.29)
In this equation, Pt and Pt−1 are observed, realised stock prices. These
are determined in equilibrium under the actual law of motion of the
economy and do not follow the perceived law of motion described by
(2.25)-(2.28). The parameter g is called the “learning gain”. It governs
the speed with which agents move their prior in the direction of
the last forecast error.12 When g is high, agents are confident that
observed changes in the growth rate of asset prices are due to changes
in the trend µt rather than the noise ηt. The gain is not decreasing
11 This “lagged belief updating” is common in the learning literature. It makes all
feedback between forecasts and prices inter- rather than intramporal. For further
discussion see Adam et al. (2014).
12 The gain is related to the variances of the disturbances by the formula g =(
1+ 2
(
σ2ν
σ2η
+
√
σ4ν
σ4η
+ 4 σ
2
ν
σ2η
)−1)−1
, and is strictly increasing in the signal-to-noise
ratio σ2ν/σ2η .
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in time: Agents believe that the drift in asset prices is itself time-
varying, so that even after a long period of time it remains difficult
to forecast it. A consequence of this is that beliefs never converge:
Agents always entertain the possibility of some structural change to
the law of motion of asset prices, so that even an infinite number of
observations is not completely informative about the future.
It is important to keep in mind that the disturbances ηt and νt are
objects that exist only in the subjective belief system P . The actual
equilibrium under learning does not contain any shock process other
than the productivity shock εt. Instead, the equilibrium still contains
the actual market clearing conditions (2.13) and (2.14), even if they
are unknown to the agents. By Walras’ law, it is sufficient to impose
stock market clearing. Under P , (2.13) reads as follows:
Pt =
EPt Pt+1 +EPt Dt+1
R
(2.30)
=
Pt exp
(
µˆt−1 + 12σ
2
µ
)
+ AtD˜
(
K˜t, K˜t
)
R
(2.31)
= At
D˜
(
K˜t, K˜t
)
R− exp
(
µˆt−1 + 12σ2µ
) (2.32)
The second line is obtained by substituting in agents’ beliefs about
the evolution of the future stock price EtPt+1 and dividends EtDt+1.
Under P , agents forecast future dividends accurately conditional on
their belief about stock prices. Therefore, their expectations about
dividends depend on the current capital stock in the same way as
under rational expectations.
In sum, the learning equilibrium is the solution to the following:
P˜t =
D˜
(
K˜t, K˜t
)
R− exp
(
µˆt−1 + 12σ2µ
) (2.33)
K˜t =
ξ
1− ξ P˜t (2.34)
µˆt+1 = µˆt − σ
2
ν
2
+ g
(
log
P˜t
P˜t−1
+ log G + εt − µˆt +
σ2η + σ
2
ν
2
)
(2.35)
The first two equations are static and the third is dynamic. The
third equation also depends on the productivity innovation εt, and as
such P˜t and K˜t are not constant any more. The resulting stock price
dynamics after a positive innovation at t = 1 are depicted in Figure
2.4.13 The initial shock at t = 1 raises stock prices proportional to
productivity. In the rational expectations equilibrium, this would be
all that happens. But learning investors are not sure whether the rise
13 The figure depicts the case in which beliefs start at their rational expectations value
µˆt = log G and subjective uncertainty is vanishing in the sense that σ2ν , σ2η → 0 while
g remains constant.
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Figure 2.4: Stock price dynamics under learning.
t
logPt − logP0
∆ logPt
µˆt
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
in P1 is indicative of a transitive or permanent increase in the growth
rate of stock prices. They therefore revise their beliefs upwards. In
t = 2 then, demand for stocks is higher and stock prices need to
rise further to clear the market. Beliefs continue to rise as long as
observed asset price growth (dashed black line in Figure 2.4) is higher
than the current belief µˆt (solid red line). The differences between
observed and expected price growth are the forecast errors (dotted
red lines). In the figure, the increase in prices and beliefs ends at t = 3,
when the forecast error is zero. There is no need for a further belief
revision. Now, by equations (2.33)-(2.34), in the absence of subsequent
shocks, Pt just co-moves with beliefs µˆt−1, so when there is no belief
revision at t = 4, realised asset price growth is also zero. This triggers
an endogenous reversal in prices, as investors observe stalling asset
prices at the peak of their optimism. They subsequently revise their
beliefs µˆt downwards, pushing the stock price down until it returns
to its steady-state level.
Figure 2.4 can be used to illustrate the key properties of beliefs and
prices under learning. First, the described dynamics do not depend
on time: The system of K˜t, P˜t, and µˆt is stationary. Second, asset prices
are more volatile than under rational expectations. Third, (excess)
returns are predictable even though agents are risk-neutral and the
discount factor is constant. To see this, it is again convenient to look
at the forward P/D ratio:
PDt =
1
R− exp
(
µˆt−1 + 12σ2µ
)
The forward P/D ratio is directly related to the belief µˆt. A high P/D
ratio is realised at the asset price peak in periods 3 and 4 of Figure 2.4,
immediately after which stock prices start declining. Therefore, the
P/D ratio negatively predicts future returns. Furthermore, forecast
errors are also predictable: By Equation (2.35), forecast errors are a
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Figure 2.5: Endogenous response of dividends.
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(a) Amplification.
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(b) Dampening.
linear function of µˆt − µˆt−1. Since a high P/D ratio implies declining
beliefs in the future, forecast errors are predictable in the same way
as future returns (as in the data).
The aforementioned asset pricing implications are present even
when dividends are completely exogenous, as in Adam et al. (2013).
But the model considered here also contains a link between asset
prices, output and dividends. The effective capital stock K˜t is directly
related to equity valuations P˜t through Equation (2.34). Thus, the
fluctuations in the stock market translate into corresponding fluctu-
ations in investment, the capital stock and hence output. Thus, the
presence of financial frictions in combination with learning leads
to amplification of the productivity shock, whereby under rational
expectations amplification was zero.
It is also possible that this amplification mechanism is further en-
hanced by positive feedback from capital to expected dividends. This
additional feedback, however, depends on the slope of the function D˜.
As demonstrated above, the expected dividend D˜
(
k˜t, K˜t
)
is increas-
ing in the firm’s capital choice k˜t, but decreasing in the aggregate
capital stock K˜t. In the equilibrium (k˜t = K˜t) it is increasing if financial
frictions are sufficiently severe. This case is depicted in Panel (a) of
Figure 2.5. When the degree of financial frictions is high, the credit
constraint line is steep. Assume that the initial equilibrium in period
0 is at P˜0 and µˆ0. Now consider the effect of a positive productivity
shock in period 1 as before. The immediate effect will be a proportion-
ate rise in stock prices and capital which leaves P˜1 and K˜1 unchanged,
but raises beliefs from µˆ0 to µˆ1. This leads to higher stock prices at
t = 2 and allows the firm to invest more and increase its expected
profits D˜
(
K˜2, K˜2
)
. But this adds further to the rise in realised stock
prices, further relaxing the borrowing constraint and increasing next
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period’s beliefs. Stock prices, beliefs, investment, and output all rise
by more compared to a situation in which D˜ is constant.14
However, this additional amplification channel only works when ξ
is sufficiently low. In Panel (b), ξ is large and the firm is operating
in the downward-sloping bit of the profit curve D˜. A relaxation of
the borrowing constraint due to a rise in µˆ still allows the firm to
invest and produce more, but dividends fall in equilibrium. This is
due to the general equilibrium forces mentioned earlier: The marginal
product of capital has to fall in equilibrium, which in practice derives
from an increase in real wages, effectively reducing the firm’s profits.
In this situation, the endogenous response of dividends dampens
rather than amplifies the dynamics of investment and asset prices.
This can also be seen algebraically. Under rational expectations,
the derivative of log stock prices with respect to the productivity
shock is simply d log Pt/dεt−s = 1 for all t, s ≥ 0. With learning, the
corresponding expression contains additional terms:
d log Pt
dεt−s
= 1+
1
1− eD
(
K˜t
) eµˆt−1
R− eµˆt−1
dµˆt
dεt−s
(2.36)
where eD
(
K˜t
)
= dD˜dK˜
K˜
D˜ is the elasticity of expected dividends with
respect to the capital stock. Learning adds a product of three terms.
The last term is the effect of the productivity shock on subjective
beliefs. The second term is the effect of beliefs on stock prices. Small
variations in beliefs µˆt cause large fluctuations in stock prices because
the denominator
(
R− eµˆt−1) is close to zero. The first term captures
the general equilibrium effects mentioned earlier: when dividends
rise after a relaxation of credit constraints, edk is positive and the
term is greater than one, leading to additional amplification, and to
dampening when edk is negative.
It can also be shown that the learning dynamics vanish as the
economy approaches the unconstrained first-best:
d log Pt
dεt−s
ξ→1−→ 1
In other words, amplification rests on the interaction between learn-
ing and financial frictions, not on either of them separately. Intuitively,
as financial frictions disappear, the economy moves into a region
where the general equilibrium effects become so strong that any po-
tential rise in beliefs or asset prices is countered by a fall in expected
dividends.
14 To my knowledge, this chapter is the first to establish a positive feedback from
fundamentals to beliefs under learning. Adam et al. (2012) also model economies
with endogenous fundamentals. Their learning specification is similar, but the “di-
vidend” in their asset pricing equation is simply the marginal utility of housing
which is strictly decreasing in the level of the housing stock. Their model dynamics
are therefore always as in case (b) described above.
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In sum, the learning equilibrium can qualitatively account for a
number of asset pricing facts and for the predictability of forecast
errors. At the same time, the larger endogenous asset price volatility
induces corresponding fluctuations in the slackness of the firm’s bor-
rowing constraint. The presence of financial frictions thus magnifies
productivity shocks, while there is no amplification under rational
expectations. When financial frictions are sufficiently severe, a two-
sided positive feedback loop emerges between beliefs, asset prices
and firm profits, which further amplifies the dynamics. The presence
of positive feedback from assets prices to profits depends on the
relative strength of general equilibrium forces, which in the model
in this section operate through the real wage.
I now turn to the development of a richer model that embeds
the same mechanism, but can also be taken to the data to study its
quantitative implications.
2.5 full model for quantitative analysis
This section embeds the mechanism discussed previously into a New-
Keynesian business cycle model with a financial accelerator. Com-
pared to the simple model in the previous section, there are a number
of new elements. First, capital no longer has to be financed entirely
out of debt. Instead, I allow for endogenous fluctuations in net worth.
To prevent firms from saving until they become unconstrained, I
impose exogenous entry and exit, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gil-
christ (1999). Second, I provide a microfoundation of the borrowing
constraint by means of a limited commitment problem. Third, I add
several standard business cycle frictions: nominal rigidities, which
enables me to introduce monetary policy and later on analyse its
effects on welfare under learning; and investment adjustment costs,
which allow for a better fit of the model.
2.5.1 Model setup
The economy is closed and operates in discrete time. There are a
number of different agents:
1. Intermediate goods producers (or simply firms) are at the heart of
the model. They combine capital and and differentiated labour
to produce a homogeneous intermediate good. They are finan-
cially constrained and borrow funds from households.
2. Firm owners only consume differentiated final goods. They trade
shares in intermediate goods producers and receive dividend
payments.
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3. Households consume differentiated final goods and supply ho-
mogeneous labour to labour agencies. They lend funds to inter-
mediate goods producers.
4. Labour agencies transform homogeneous household labour into
differentiated labour services, which they sell to intermediate
goods producers. They are owned by households.
5. Final good producers transform intermediate goods into differen-
tiated final goods. They are owned by households.
6. Capital goods producers produce new capital goods from final
consumption goods subject to an investment adjustment cost.
7. The fiscal authority sets certain tax rates to offset steady-state
distortions from monopolistic competition.
8. The central bank sets nominal interest rates.
Since most elements of the model are standard, I focus on the fin-
ancially constrained firms, firm owners, households and the central
bank. Additional details are provided in Appendix A.2.
2.5.1.1 Households
A representative household with time-separable preferences maxim-
ises utility as follows:
max
(Ct,Lt,Bjt,B
g
t )
∞
t=0
EP0
∞
∑
t=0
βtu (Ct, Lt)
s.t. Ct = w˜tLt + B
g
t − (1+ it−1)
pt−1
pt
Bgt−1
+
∫ 1
0
(
Bjt − Rjt−1Bjt−1
)
dj +Πt (2.37)
The utility function u satisfies standard concavity and Inada condi-
tions and β ∈ (0, 1). Further, w˜t is the real wage received by the house-
hold and Lt is the amount of labour supplied. B
g
t are real quantities of
nominal one-period government bonds (in zero net supply) that pay a
nominal interest rate it and pt is the price level, defined below. House-
holds also lend funds Bjt to intermediate goods producers indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1] at the real interest rate Rjt. These loans are the outcome of
a contracting problem described later on. Πt represents lump-sum
profits and taxes. Finally, consumption Ct is itself a composite utility
flow from of a variety of differentiated goods that takes the familiar
CES form:
Ct = max
Cit
(∫ 1
0
(Cit)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
s.t. ptCt =
∫ 1
0
pitCitdi
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As usual, the price index pt of composite consumption consistent
with utility maximisation and the demand function for good i is given
by
pt =
(∫ 1
0
(pit)
1−σ di
) 1
1−σ
; Cit =
(
pit
pt
)−σ
Ct. (2.38)
Consequently, the inflation rate is given by pit = pt/pt−1. The first
order conditions of the household are also standard and given by
w˜t = −uLtuCt (2.39)
1 = EPt β
uCt+1
uCt
1+ it
pit
. (2.40)
We can define the stochastic discount factor of the households as
Λt = βuCt+1/uCt.
2.5.1.2 Central bank
Like most of the New-Keynesian literature, the model is cashless,
with the central bank affecting allocations in the presence of nominal
rigidities by setting the nominal interest rate. In the baseline ver-
sion of the model, I assume that the central bank conducts monetary
policy through the use of a Taylor-type interest rate rule:
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi) (1/β+ pit + φpi (pit − pi∗t )) (2.41)
where pi∗t is the central bank’s (time-varying) inflation target, ρi is the
degree of interest rate smoothing and φpi > 1.
2.5.1.3 Intermediate good producers (firms)
The production of intermediate goods is carried out by a continuum
of firms, indexed j ∈ [0, 1]. Firm j enters period t with capital Kjt−1
and a stock of debt Bjt−1 which needs to be repaid at the gross real
interest rate Rjt−1. First, capital is combined with a labour index Ljt
to produce output
Yjt =
(
Kjt−1
)α (AtLjt)1−α , (2.42)
where At is aggregate productivity. The labour index is a CES com-
bination of differentiated labour services parallel to the differentiated
final goods bought by the household:
Ljt = max
Ljht
(∫ 1
0
(
Ljht
) σw−1
σw dh
) σw
σw−1
(2.43)
s.t. wt ptLjt =
∫ 1
0
WjhtLjhtdh (2.44)
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The firm’s problem can then be treated as if the labour index was
acquired in a competitive market at the real wage index wt.15 Out-
put is sold competitively to final good producers at price qt. During
production, the capital stock depreciates at rate δ. This depreciated
capital can be traded by the firm at the price Qt.
At this point, the net worth of the firm is the difference between
the value of its assets and its outstanding debt:
Njt = qtYjt − wtLjt + Qt (1− δ)Kjt−1 − Rjt−1Bjt−1 (2.45)
I assume that the firm exits with a probability γ. This probability is
exogenous and independent across time and firms. As in Bernanke
et al. (1999), exit prevents firms from becoming financially uncon-
strained. If a firm does not exit, it needs to pay out a fraction ζ of
its earnings as dividends, where earnings are given by Ejt = Njt −
QtKjt−1 + Bjt−1.16 If it exits, it must pay out its entire net worth as
dividends. It is subsequently replaced by a new firm which receives
the index j. I assume that this new firm gets endowed with a fixed
number of shares, normalised to one, and is able to raise an ini-
tial amount of net worth. This amount equals ω (Nt − ζEt) where
ω ∈ (0, 1) and Nt and Et are aggregate net worth and earnings,
respectively.
The net worth of firm j after equity changes, entry and exit is given
by
N˜jt =
Njt − ζEjt for continuing firms,
ω (Nt − ζEt) for new firms.
This firm then decides on the new stock of debt Bjt and the new
capital stock Kjt. Its balance sheet must satisfy:
QtKjt = B
j
t + N˜tj (2.46)
where the price of capital Qt can vary in the presence of adjustment
costs.
Firms maximise the present discounted value of their dividend
payments using the discount factor of their owners. In doing so, they
face financial constraints. Before describing these constraints though,
I first turn to the description of the firms’ owners.
15 This real wage index does not necessarily equal the wage w˜t received by households
due to wage dispersion.
16 The optimal dividend policy in this model would be to never pay dividends until
exit. In this case, aggregate dividends would be proportional to aggregate net worth.
This implies a dividend process that is not nearly as volatile as in the data, and thus
makes it impossible to obtain good asset pricing properties even under learning.
Imposing that firms need to pay out a fraction of their earnings greatly improves the
quantitative fit of the model.
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2.5.1.4 Firm owners
Firm owners differ from households in their capacity to own inter-
mediate firms. The representative firm owner is risk-neutral and dis-
counts future income at the rate β˜ = βG−θ < β, with G being the
growth rate of consumption in the non-stochastic steady state. He
can buy shares in firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. As described above,
when a firm exits it pays out its net worth Njt as dividends, and is
replaced by a new firm which raises equity ω (Nt − ζEt). Let the set
of exiting firms in each period t be denoted by Γt ⊂ [0, 1]. Then, the
firm owner’s utility maximisation problem is given by:
max(
C ft ,S
j
t
)∞
t=0
EP0
∞
∑
t=0
β˜tC ft
s.t. C ft = −
∫ 1
0
SjtPjtdj +
∫
j/∈Γt
Sjt−1
(
Pjt + Djt
)
dj
+
∫
j∈Γt
[
Sjt−1Djt −ω (Nt − ζEt) + Pjt
]
dj (2.47)
Sjt ∈ [0, S¯] (2.48)
for some S¯ > 1. Here, firm owners’ consumption C ft is the same
aggregator of differentiated final goods as for households.
The first term on the right hand side of the budget constraint
deals with continuing firms and is standard: Each share in firm j
pays dividends Djt and continues to trade, at price Pjt. The second
term deals with firm entry and exit. If the household owns a share
in the exiting firm j, he receives a terminal dividend. The firm is
then delisted in the stock market, and so Sjt−1Pjt does not appear. At
the same time, a new firm j appears which is able to raise a limited
amount of equity ω (Nt − ζEt) from the firm owner in exchange for
a unit amount of shares that can be traded at price Pjt. In addition,
upper and lower bounds on traded stock holdings are introduced to
make firm owners’ demand for stocks finite under arbitrary beliefs,
as in the stylised model of the previous section. In equilibrium, they
are never binding.
The first order conditions of the firm owner are
Sjt

= 0 if Pjt > β˜EPt
[
Djt+1 + Pjt+11{j/∈Γt+1}
]
∈ [0, S¯] if Pjt = β˜EPt
[
Djt+1 + Pjt+11{j/∈Γt+1}
]
= S¯ if Pjt < β˜EPt
[
Djt+1 + Pjt+11{j/∈Γt+1}
] (2.49)
2.5.1.5 Borrowing constraint
In choosing their debt holdings, firms are subject to a borrowing
constraint. The constraint is the solution to a particular limited com-
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mitment problem in which the outside option for the lender in the
event of default depends on equity valuations.
Each period, lenders (households) and borrowers (firms) meet to
decide on the lending of funds. Pairings are anonymous to rule out
repeated interactions. The incompleteness of contracts imposed is
that repayment of loans cannot be made contingent. Only the size
Bjt and the interest rate Rjt of the loan can be contracted in period t.
Both the lender (a household) and the firm have to agree on a contract(
Bjt, Rjt
)
. Moreover, there is limited commitment in the sense that
at the end of the period, but before the realisation of next period’s
shocks, firm j can always choose to enter a state of default. In this
case, the value of the debt repayment must be renegotiated. If the
negotiations are successful, then wealth is effectively shifted from
creditors to debtors. The outside option of this renegotiation process
is the seizure of the firm by the lender, in which case the current firm
owners receive zero.
The lender, a household, does not have the ability to run the firm
though. The usual assumption in the literature is that she has to
liquidate the firm’s asset in this case. In this model, the lender can
always liquidate as well. In this case, all debt and a fraction 1− ξ of
the firm’s capital is destroyed. The remaining capital can be sold in
the next period, resulting in a total recovery value of ξQt+1Kjt. On top
of this, with some probability x (independent across time and firms),
the lender gets the opportunity to “restructure” the firm. Restruc-
turing means that, similar to Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, the
firm gets partial debt relief but remains operational. I assume that the
lender has to sell the firm to another firm owner, retaining a fraction
ξ of the initial debt. It will turn out in equilibrium that the recovery
value in this case is just ξ
(
Pjt + Bjt
)
and that lenders always prefer
restructuring to liquidation. The debt contract then takes the form of
a leverage constraint in which total firm value is a weighted average
of liquidation and market value:
Bjt ≤ ξ
xEPt Λt+1Qt+1ξKjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidation value
+ (1− x) (Pjt + Bjt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
market value
 (2.50)
2.5.1.6 Further model elements and market clearing
Final good producers, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], combine the homogen-
eous intermediate good into a differentiated final good using a one-
for-one technology. Their revenue is subsidised by the government
at the rate τ.17 Per-period profits of producer i are given by ΠYit =
17 This assumption is standard in the New-Keynesian literature. It eliminates distor-
tions from monopolistic competition where firms price above marginal cost. The only
distortion is then due to sticky prices, which simplifies the solution by perturbation
methods.
68 asset prices , business cycles , and monetary policy
(1+ τ) (pit/pt)Yit − qtYit. They are subject to a Calvo price setting
friction: Every period, each final-good producer can change his price
only with probability 1− κ, independent across time and producers.
Similarly, labour agencies (indexed by h ∈ [0, 1]) combine the ho-
mogeneous labour provided by households into differentiated labour
goods which they sell on to intermediate good producers. labour
agencies’ revenue is subsidised at the rate τw, the per-period profit of
agency h is ΠLht = (1+ τ) (Wht/pt) Lht − w˜tLht and each agency can
change its nominal wage Wht only with probability 1− κw. The gov-
ernment collects subsidies as lump sum taxes from households and
runs a balanced budget each period. The government sets the subsidy
rates such that under flexible prices, the markup over marginal cost
is zero in both the labour and output markets.
Capital goods producers transform consumption into capital goods,
subject to standard investment adjustment costs and have profits ΠIt .
Thus, the total amount of lump-sum payments Πt received by the
household is the sum of the profits of all final good producers, labour
agencies and capital goods producers, minus the sum of all subsidies.
Finally, the exogenous stochastic processes are productivity and the
inflation target shock:
log At = (1− ρ) log A¯ + ρ log At−1 + log εAt (2.51)
pi∗t = ρpipi∗t−1 + log εpit (2.52)
εAt ∼ N
(
0, σ2A
)
(2.53)
εpit ∼ N
(
0, σ2pi
)
(2.54)
Market clearing needs to take into account the distortions from
price and wage dispersion. All market clearing conditions are listed
in Appendix A.2.
2.5.2 Rational expectations equilibrium
I first describe the equilibrium under rational expectations. An equi-
librium is a set of stochastic processes for prices and allocations, a
set of strategies in the limited commitment game, and an expectation
measure P such that the following holds for all states and time peri-
ods: Markets clear; allocations solve the optimisation programmes
of all agents given prices and expectations P ; the strategies in the
limited commitment game are a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
for all lender-borrower pairs; and the measure P coincides with the
actual probability measure induced by the equilibrium.
Under appropriate parameter restrictions, there exists a rational
expectations equilibrium characterised by the following properties
(proofs and characterisation of the restrictions are relegated to Ap-
pendix A.3):
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1. All firms choose the same capital-labour ratio Kjt/Ljt. This al-
lows one to define an aggregate production function and an
internal rate of return on capital:
Yt = αKαt−1
(
At L˜t
)1−α (2.55)
Rkt = qtα
Yt
Kt−1
+ Qt (1− δ)Kt−1 (2.56)
2. The expected return on capital is higher than the internal return
on debt: EtRkt+1 > Rjt.
3. At any time t, the stock market valuation Pjt of a firm j is pro-
portional to its net worth after entry and exit N˜jt. This permits
one to write an aggregate stock market index as
Pt =
∫ 1
0
Pjt = β˜Et
[
Dt+1 +
1− γ
1− γ+ γωPt+1
]
. (2.57)
The “correction” term in the continuation value Pt+1 can be
understood as follows. The stock market index Pt is the value
of all currently existing firms, not including firms that are not
yet born. In t + 1, a fraction γ of firms exit and pay dividends
γNt. The remaining firms are left with net worth (1− γ) Nt+1
and pay dividends (1− γ) ζEt and , but a mass γ of new firms
also enters, each endowed with initial net worth ω (Nt − ζEt).
4. Borrowers never default on the equilibrium path and borrow at
the risk-free rate
Rjt = Rt = (EtβuCt+1/uCt)
−1 . (2.58)
The lender only accepts debt payments up to a certain limit B¯jt.
The firm always exhausts this limit, Bjt = B¯jt, which is propor-
tional to the firm’s net worth N˜jt. If the firm defaulted and the
lender seized the firm, she would always prefer restructuring to
liquidation. Intuitively, this is because capital is more valuable
inside the firm than outside of it: Because acquiring capital is
difficult due to financial frictions, firm owners will always pay
the lender a higher price for a restructured, operational firm
than for its capital stock alone.
5. As a consequence of the previous properties of the equilibrium,
all firms can be aggregated. Aggregate debt, capital, and net
worth are sufficient to describe the intermediate goods sector
and evolve as
Nt = Rkt Kt−1 − Rt−1Bt−1 (2.59)
QtKt = (1− γ+ γω) ((1− ζ) Nt + ζ (Bt−1 −QtKt−1))
+ Bt (2.60)
Bt = xEtΛt+1Qt+1ξKt + (1− x) ξ (Pt + Bt) . (2.61)
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I compute a second-order approximation of this rational expectations
equilibrium around its non-stochastic steady state.
2.5.3 Learning equilibrium
I introduce learning about stock market valuations as in the simple
model of Section 2.4. One slight complication is now that there is a
continuum of firms to be priced in the market. In this respect, I retain
the belief that the stock price of an individual firm is proportional to
firm net worth, as is the case under rational expectations. As such,
under P ,
Pjt =
Njt
Nt
Pt. (2.62)
But while investors know how to price individual stocks by observing
the valuation of the market, they are uncertain about the evolution of
the market itself. As in the simple model of the previous section, I
impose the same beliefs about aggregate stock prices as in the last
section along with the other assumptions (equations (2.25)-(2.28)),
including conditionally model-consistent expectations: For any vari-
able xt other than the aggregate stock price, any future date t + τ,
and any sequence Pt+1, . . . , Pt+τ which is on the equilibrium path,
agents’ beliefs coincide with the best statistical prediction of xt con-
ditional on the realisation of stock prices: EPt [xt+τ | Pt+1, . . . , Pt+τ] =
Et [xt+τ | Pt, Pt+1, . . . , Pt+τ].
In practice, I solve the model using the two-stage procedure de-
scribed in Appendix A.1.
Some readers might object that the belief system about stock prices
is misspecified in the sense that agents are never able to learn the
true law of motion for Pt (where Pt is not a random walk and de-
pends on several state variables). However, this is a deliberate choice.
The chosen form of subjective beliefs captures several aspects of real-
ity: People think that stock prices are well approximated by random
walks; still, they try to identify predictability in prices; their subjective
expectations seem to ignore the degree of mean reversion in returns
observed in the data, instead overly extrapolating past observation;
and they think that the laws governing prices are changing over
time, so that observations from the distant past are only of limited
usefulness in predicting the future.
2.5.4 Frictionless benchmark
Because my aim is to gauge the importance of financial frictions for
business cycle analysis, I will also use a benchmark model without
financial frictions to which the model can be compared to. This bench-
mark model will be identical to the rational expectations model above,
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except that intermediate firms are now owned by households, and
face no frictions in accessing external finance.
2.5.5 Choice of parameters
I partition the set of parameters into two groups. The first set of para-
meters is calibrated to first moments, and the second set is estimated
by simulated method of moments.
2.5.5.1 Calibration
The capital share in production is set to α = .33, implying a la-
bour share in output of two thirds. The depreciation rate δ = .025
corresponds to 10% annual depreciation. The non-stochastic trend
productivity growth rate G is set to its post-war average of 1.64% an-
nually. The persistence of the temporary component of productivity
is set to .95.
The discount factor of the household is set such that the steady-
state interest rate matches the average annual real return on Treasury
bills of 2%, implying a discount factor β = .9991. The firm owners’
discount factor is set such that in the non-stochastic steady state,
bonds and stocks have the same return (β˜ = .995). The elasticity
of substitution between varieties of the final consumption good, as
well as that between varieties of labour used in production, is set to
σ = σw = 4. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is set to three,
implying φ = .33.
The strength of monetary policy reaction to inflation is set to φpi =
1.5, while the degree of nominal rate smoothing is set to ρi = 0.5. The
inflation target is set to pi∗ = 0. The persistence of the inflation target
is set to ρpi = .99.
Four parameters describe the structure of financial constraints: x,
the probability of restructuring after default; ξ, the tightness of the
borrowing constraint; ω, the equity received by new firms relative
to average equity; and γ, the rate of firm exit and entry. I calibrate
the restructuring rate x to equal 9.3%. This is the fraction of US
business bankruptcy filings in 2006 which filed for Chapter 11 instead
of Chapter 7, and which subsequently emerged from bankruptcy
with an approved restructuring plan. I have to restrict myself to 2006
because it is the only year for which this number can be constructed.
Public bankruptcy data shows that the fraction of Chapter 11 cases as
opposed to Chapter 7 cases fluctuates around 28%, and several papers
analysing sub-samples of Chapter 11 filings arrive at confirmation
rates between 29% and 64%, which suggests that the 2006 number
is reasonable (a sensitivity check is included in Section 2.6.5).18 The
18 Data on bankruptcies by chapter are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx. Data on Chapter 11 outcomes are ana-
72 asset prices , business cycles , and monetary policy
remaining three parameters are chosen such that the non-stochastic
steady state of the model jointly matches the US average investment
share in output of 20%, average debt-to-equity ratio of 1:1 (as recor-
ded in the Fed Flow of Funds), and average quarterly P/D ratio of 139
(taken from the S&P500). The parameter values thus are γ = 0.010,
ξ = 0.38, and ω = 0.55. Intuitively, a larger value of ξ relaxes the
borrowing constraint, leading to higher leverage. A larger value of ω
means that new firms enter with more equity, increasing aggregate
net worth and capital. Since returns on capital are diminishing, this
raises the investment share in output. A higher rate of exit γ makes
firms shorter-lived, reducing the firm’s value relative to its current
dividend payments, thereby lowering the P/D ratio.
2.5.5.2 Estimation
The remaining parameters are the standard deviations of the techno-
logy and monetary shocks (σA, σpi), the size of investment adjustment
costs (ψ), the degree of nominal price and wage rigidities (κ, κw), the
fraction of dividends paid out as earnings by continuing firms (ζ),
and the learning gain (g). Since my goal is to see how well the model
can do in terms of matching both business cycle and asset pricing
facts, I estimate these parameters to minimise the distance to a set
of second moments pertaining to both. I use the variances of the
nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, real output, consumption,
investment, employment, as well as real dividend payments and stock
prices in the data.19 The set of estimated parameters θ solves
min
ϑ∈A
(m (θ)− mˆ)′W (m (θ)− mˆ)′
where m (θ) are moments obtained from model simulation paths with
50,000 periods, mˆ are the estimated moments in the data, and W is
a weighting matrix.20 I also impose that θ has to lie in a subset A
of the parameter space which rules out deterministic oscillations of
impulse response functions.21 Parameters outside this region would
fit the moments well but can be ruled out from prior knowledge about
lysed in various samples by Flynn and Crewson (2009), Warren and Westbrook
(2009), Lawton (2012), and Altman (2014).
19 All variables are at quarterly frequency and HP-detrended. I use CPI inflation as the
inflation measure and the Federal Funds rate as the nominal interest rate. Employ-
ment is total non-farm payroll employment. Consumption is the sum of services and
non-durable private consumption. Investment is the sum of private non-residential
fixed investment and durable consumption. Output is the sum of consumption and
investment. Dividend payments are the four-quarter moving average of S&P 500
dividends and stock prices is the S&P500 index.
20 I choose W = diag
(
Σˆ
)−1 where Σˆ is the covariance matrix of the data moments,
estimated using a Newey-West kernel with optimal lag order. This choice of W
leads to a consistent (albeit not fully efficient) estimator that places more weight
on moments which are more precisely estimated in the data.
21 To be precise, θ /∈ A if there exists an impulse response of stock prices with positive
peak value also having a negative value of more than 20% of the peak value.
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Table 2.3: Estimated parameters.
param. σa σpi∗ ψ κ κw ζ g
learning .00705 8.53·10−4 8.51 .776 .946 .765 .0046
(.00157) (2.94·10−4) (2.05) (.165) (.025) (.027) (8.66·10−4)
RE .0114 .00117 .168 .914 0 .637 -
(.00201) (2.3·10−4) (.715) (.0216) (4.45) (.309) -
Parameters as estimated by simulated method of moments. Asymptotic standard
errors in parentheses.
the shape of impulse responses. Table 2.3 summarises the results of
the SMM estimation. The first row presents the results under learn-
ing. The SMM procedure selects a rather high degree of adjustment
costs (although imprecisely estimated) and of nominal rigidities. The
fraction of earnings paid out as dividends is fitted to more than 80%,
higher than the actual historical average for the S&P500 at about 50%.
This suggests that my assumption about the behaviour of dividends
is overly simplistic. This is a commonly encountered problem (Covas
and Den Haan, 2012) which I have to leave for future research. Finally,
a low estimate for the learning gain g implies that agents believe the
predictability of stock prices to be small.
The second column presents the parameters as estimated under
rational expectations (therefore not including the learning gain g). A
much smaller degree of investment adjustment costs and nominal
rigidities is needed here to fit the model. Nevertheless, the size of
the standard errors of the two shocks are more than 20% larger than
under learning. This indicates greatly increased amplification of busi-
ness cycle shocks in the model with learning.
2.6 results
2.6.1 Business cycle and asset price moments
To get a better understanding of the quantitative properties of the
model, Table 2.4 reviews key business cycle moments as well as the
statistics describing stock price volatility and return predictability
across model specifications. The moments for the estimated learning
model are in Column (1), while Columns (2) and (3) contain the
corresponding moments for the model under rational expectations
and the frictionless benchmark. Here, the parameters are held con-
stant at the same values as for the learning model. By nature of the
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Table 2.4: Comparing moments in the data and across model specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
moment data learning RE fric.less RE re-est.
output
volatility
σhp (Yt) 1.43% 1.41% .80% .55% 1.37%
relative
volatility
σhp (Ct) /σhp (Yt) 0.60 .63 1.09 1.43 .66
σhp (It) /σhp (Yt) 2.90 3.10 .65 .34 3.16
σhp (Lt) /σhp (Yt) 1.13 1.16 .98 1.02 1.24
σhp (pit) /σhp (Yt) .19 .22 .34 .47 .23
σhp (it) /σhp (Yt) .20 .20 .32 .43 .20
σhp (Dt) /σhp (Yt) 2.99 3.07 2.36 - 1.11
correlation
with output
ρhp (Ct, Yt) .94 .92 .99 .99 .94
ρhp (It, Yt) .95 .93 .99 .99 .94
ρhp (Lt, Yt) .88 .91 .64 .30 .92
excess
volatility
σhp (Pt) /σhp (Dt) 2.63 1.81 .21 - .15
σ
(
Pt
Dt
)
.408 .131 .037 - .069
σ
(
Rstockt,t+1
)
.335 .150 .011 - .019
return
predictability
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+4
)
-.218 -.240 -.002 - .002
ρ
(
Pt
Dt , R
stock
t,t+20
)
-.439 -.646 .015 - .027
ρ
(
Pt
Dt ,
Pt+4
Dt+4
)
.907 .432 .758 - .681
Quarterly US data 1962Q1-2012Q4. pit is quarterly CPI inflation. it is the Federal
Funds rate. Lt is total non-farm payroll employment. Consumption Ct consists of
of services and non-durable private consumption. Investment It consists of private
non-residential fixed investment and durable consumption. Output Yt is the sum
of consumption and investment. Dividends Dt are four-quarter moving averages of
S&P 500 dividends. The stock price index Pt is the S&P500.
estimation, the learning model has the best fit across Columns (1) to
(3). The comparison serves to single out the contribution of learning
and financial frictions to the fit. Column (4) presents the moments
from the re-estimated model under rational expectations.
The first row reports the standard deviation of detrended output.
By this measure, output fluctuations under learning are double the
size of those under rational expectations; in other words, learning
adds considerable endogenous amplification to the model. In fact,
the standard deviations of shocks in Column (4) needed to generate
the same amount of output volatility are much larger.
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The following rows report the relative volatilities of key macroeco-
nomic time series. The learning model matches all of them well. Shut-
ting down learning leads to a sharp drop in the volatility of invest-
ment and a corresponding increase in the volatility of consumption.
This is because the estimated learning model features a rather high
level of investment adjustment costs to match investment volatility.
Without high adjustment costs, the learning model would transform
the high degree of observed asset price volatility into a counterfactu-
ally high degree of investment volatility, i.e. the amplification mech-
anism would be too strong. When the amplification is shut down
in Columns (2) and (3), investment becomes very smooth and as a
flip side, consumption is prevented from being smoothed. Looking
at inflation and interest rates, shutting down learning increases their
volatility relative to output, although this is mostly due to the de-
crease in output volatility itself. The volatility of employment and
dividends is not much affected. Finally, the re-estimated model in
Column (4) is able to match all moments just as well as under learning
with the exception of dividends.
Big differences appear in the asset price statistics. The learning
model is able to approach the volatility of prices and returns to a
degree which is impossible to achieve even in the re-estimated RE
model.22 The ability to generate realistic stock price volatility is of
course at the heart of the amplification mechanism, since stock mar-
ket valuations enter firms’ borrowing constraints. Moreover, returns
are negatively predicted by the P/D ratio. At the one year horizon,
the predictability is very similar to that found in the data. At the
five-year horizon however, it is too high. This is also reflected in the
fact that the P/D ratio decays too fast, as documented in the last row.
In a sense, this is not really surprising: The learning model has only
one parameter (the learning gain g) to match all statistics pertaining
to stock prices. In particular, it can be shown that a higher gain
increases volatility, but reduces persistence of prices. A richer belief
specification could possibly achieve a better fit, but at the expense of
introducing additional parameters.
2.6.2 Impulse response functions
Looking at impulse response functions reveals some of the workings
of the amplification mechanism at play. Figure 2.6 plots the impulse
responses to a persistent productivity shock. Red solid lines represent
the learning equilibrium, blue dashed lines represent the rational
expectations version, and black thin lines represent the frictionless
benchmark. Looking at output Yt, one can see quite clearly how the
rational expectations version generates only a slightly amplified re-
22 In fact, it would be possible to obtain an even better fit of the asset pricing moments,
but at the expense of business cycle moments.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to a persistent productivity shock.
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sponse to the shock compared to the frictionless benchmark. With
learning, however, output rises by almost double the amount and
the response is hump-shaped. Consumption Ct, and investment It
also exhibit much stronger responses, and employment Lt also rises
considerably (without learning it contracts). This amplification is due
to the large rise in the stock prices Pt, even though the degree of
dependence of borrowing constraints on stock prices (measured by
x) is less than 10%. Under rational expectations, stock prices stay
virtually flat, thus producing almost no amplification through the
equity price channel. The behaviour of dividends Dt reveals that
initially dividends fall, partly offsetting the rise of beliefs, but then
overshoot their rational expectations counterpart.
The feedback loop is also present after an interest rate shock. Fig-
ure 2.7 plots the response to a temporary reduction in the nominal
interest rate. Again, all macroeconomic aggregates rise substantially
more under learning than under both rational expectations and the
frictionless benchmark. The monetary stimulus increases stock prices
and thus relaxes credit constraints. The consequent increase in invest-
ment demand further raises immediate inflationary pressure, which
in the model leads to the central bank undoing its interest rate re-
action, acting according to its interest rate rule. Here, asset prices
undershoot after the stimulus and remain depressed for a long period
of time, leading to lower output, inflation and employment with a
trough at about 16 quarters after the stimulus. This boom and bust
pattern is not present under rational expectations.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to a monetary shock.
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2.6.3 Does learning matter?
The discussion so far has mainly focused on how large swings in
asset prices lead to large swings in real activity through their effect
on credit constraints. This raises the question of whether learning is
necessary for the story at all - maybe any theory which replicates
the same asset price dynamics also replicates the same business cycle
outcomes? To answer it, I set up the following experiment. I replace
the stock market value Pt in the borrowing constraint (2.61) with an
exogenous process Vt that has the same law of motion as the stock
price under learning. More precisely, I fit an ARMA(10,5)-process for
Vt such that its impulse responses are as close as possible to those of
Pt under learning (the exogenous shock in the ARMA-process are the
productivity and monetary shocks). I then solve this model, but with
rational expectations. If learning only matters because it affects stock
price dynamics, then this hypothetical model should have identical
dynamics to the model under learning.
Figure 2.8 shows that this is not the case. The ARMA-process fits
stock prices well: The impulse response of Pt under learning and Vt
in the counterfactual experiment are indistinguishable. But after a
positive productivity shock, output, investment and consumption rise
much more under learning, even though the counterfactual model
has the same stock price dynamics by construction. The reason is
found in the fact that expectations matter beyond stock prices: For in-
terest rates equilibrating loan demand by firms and supply by house-
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Figure 2.8: Does learning matter?
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Solid red line: Impulse response to a one-standard deviation positive productivity
shock under learning. Black dash-dotted line: Impulse response to a hypothetical
rational expectations model with stock price dynamics identical to those under
learning (see text).
holds; for inflation and wages, set by forward-looking Calvo price
and wage setters; and for the borrowing constraint (2.61) itself, since
it depends on the expected liquidation value of capital EtQt+1. This
last channel is in fact crucial for the additional amplification. Under
learning, agents do not understand that the increase in stock prices is
temporary. By over-predicting the slackness of borrowing constraints,
they also over-predict the amount of investment taking place in the
future, and hence the future price of capital. Lenders, predicting a
high value of the firm’s capital stock, are then willing to lend more
to firms today. Thus, identical firm market value still leads to easier
access to credit under learning.
This illustrates how expectations in financial markets, over and
above their effect on asset prices, can have important effects on the
real economy.
2.6.4 Relation to survey evidence on expectations
Agents in the learning equilibrium make systematic, predictable fore-
cast errors. The patterns of predictability are testable model implic-
ations. As it turns out, they are surprisingly consistent with survey
data.
Importantly, agents in the model do make systematic forecast er-
rors not only about stock prices, but also about almost all other en-
dogenous model variables. This is despite the fact that, conditional
on stock prices, agents’ beliefs are model-consistent. A systematic
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Figure 2.9: Return expectations and expected returns in a model simulation.
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mistake in predicting stock prices will still translate into a corres-
ponding mistake in predicting the tightness of borrowing constraints,
and hence investment, output, and so forth. I can therefore compare
forecast errors on many model variables with the data. Predictability
in all variables arises from the introduction of only a single parameter
(the learning gain), so this is a potentially tough test for the model.
Figure 2.9 repeats the scatter plot of Section 2.3, contrasting ex-
pected and realised one-year ahead returns in a model simulation.
The same pattern as in the data emerges: When the P/D ratio is
high, return expectations are most optimistic. In the learning model,
this has a causal interpretation: high return expectations drive up
stock prices. At the same time, realised future returns are on average
low when the P/D ratio is high. This is because the P/D ratio is
mean-reverting (which agents do not realise, instead extrapolating
past price growth into the future): At the peak of investor optimism,
realised price growth is already reversing and expectations are due to
be revised downward, pushing down prices towards their long-run
mean.
Table 2.5 compares the correlation of forecast errors with the pre-
dictors discussed in Section 2.3, in the data and the model with
learning. Note that the correlations under rational expectations need
not be reported, as they are all zero by construction.
Column (1) reports predictability based on the P/D ratio. As already
discussed, the correlation is negative, and it is even stronger in the
data than in the model. The correlation is also negative for the other
macroeconomic aggregates, again with a higher magnitude in the
data. Column (2) repeats the exercise for the growth rate of the P/D
ratio. This measure positively predicts forecast errors: When the stock
market is rising, people are on average not optimistic enough about
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Table 2.5: Forecast errors under learning and in the data.
(1) (2) (3)
forecast variable log PDt ∆ log PDt forecast revision
model data model data model data
Rstockt,t+4 -.22 -.44 .30 .06 -.19 n/a
Yt,t+3 -.10 -.21 .22 .22 .21 .29
It,t+3 -.14 -.20 .36 .25 .36 .31
Ct,t+3 -.04 -.19 .02 .21 .02 .23
ut,t+3 .10 .05 -.25 -.27 .15 .43
Data as in Table 2.2. Model correlations are exact theoretical correlations. Stock
returns are nominal returns. Unemployment in the model is taken to be ut = 1− Lt.
returns and economic activity. This is because expectations about
asset prices (and hence lending conditions) adjust only slowly. Here,
the degree of correspondence with the data is striking. Only forecast
errors on consumption remain too weakly predictable in the model.
The model also does very well in terms of the Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2010) predictability statistic. As documented in Column (3),
forecast errors on macro aggregates are predictable by the direction
of the forecast revision, again reflecting slow belief adjustment. This
is also true in the model. For stock returns, the model predicts a
negative correlation of return forecast errors with the revision, but the
CFO survey does not allow for the construction of a corresponding
statistic.
Forecast error predictability is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.10.
The solid red line is a standard impulse response function to a tech-
Figure 2.10: Actual versus expected impulse response.
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nology shock in the learning model. Consider the following thought
experiment. Suppose that at the time of the shock, the economy is in
steady state and that no further shocks are realised. Under rational
expectations, the mean expectation about the future path of the eco-
nomy at any point in time is then equal to the impulse response itself.
Under learning however, subjective expectations do not coincide with
the impulse response. The green dashed line of Figure 2.5 depicts the
mean subjective forecast at the peak of the stock market. Agents do
not foresee the decline in the stock market, and instead extrapolate
high stock price growth into the future. Because stock market valu-
ations matter for access to credit, agents also forecast loose borrowing
conditions and are too optimistic about investment and output as
well.23 The green dashed line (expectations) is above the red solid line
(realisation) when the P/D ratio is high: It negatively predicts forecast
errors. Next, the change in the P/D ratio predicts forecast errors the
other way around, which is illustrated with the blue dotted line. This
is the forecast made at a time in which the P/D ratio is rising fast. In
this situation, agents under-predict the size of the coming boom in
the stock market and real activity. The blue dotted line is below the
red solid line: Forecast errors are positive when P/D ratio growth is
positive, too.
2.6.5 Sensitivity checks
The amount of endogenous amplification under learning relies on the
dynamics of stock prices, and also on general equilibrium effects (as
was already illustrated in the simplified model). To gain an idea of
the sensitivity of the results, Figure 2.11 plots the volatility of output
and stock prices as a function of a set of influential parameters.
Panel (a) shows the role of the restructuring rate x which paramet-
rises the dependency of borrowing constraints on firm market value
(as opposed to the liquidation value of its capital). Not surprisingly,
this parameter is key in driving amplification under learning. The
point x = 0 is a special case. At this point, stock prices have no alloc-
ative role for the economy. The model dynamics under learning and
rational expectations then coincide perfectly. Another special point
is x = 1, where borrowing constraints depend exclusively on stock
prices. This was the case analysed in the simple model of Section
2.4. In the full model, this degree of stock price dependency leads
to so much amplification that the belief dynamics become explosive,
and no stable equilibrium exists.24 Another remarkable fact is that
23 Note that the forecasts for output and investment are still downward-sloping as
agents are perfectly aware of the mean reversion of productivity. Their long-run
forecast has permanently higher stock prices, output and investment because of
easier access to credit, while productivity remains at the steady-state level.
24 To be precise, the equilibrium is not first-order stable, so that the perturbation
solution method is not feasible. Global stability could still hold in principle.
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Figure 2.11: Parameter sensitivity.
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Theoretical standard deviations, unfiltered. Dashed black line indicates parameter
value in the estimated learning model.
the rational expectations solution barely depends on the parameter
x. This might be one reason why the distinction between market
and liquidation value has not featured prominently in the existing
literature on firm credit frictions.
Panel (b) shows the dependency on the average tightness of credit
frictions ξ. Amplification is hump-shaped with respect to this para-
meter. At ξ = 0, no collateral is pledgeable and firms cannot borrow
at all. In this case, fluctuations in stock prices do not matter and
learning does not introduce any amplification. On the other hand,
as pledgeability increases to its maximum value (beyond which a
steady state with permanently binding borrowing constraint does
not exist), amplification also disappears. This mirrors the analysis
of the simplified model: when borrowing constraints relax, general
equilibrium effects in the form of wage and interest rate changes
offset amplification.
Panels (c) and (d) document the importance of wage rigidity and
investment adjustment costs, respectively. Wage rigidity helps to im-
prove the fit of the model, but at the same time it also helps amp-
lification. When credit constraints relax, a larger degree of rigidity
mitigates the negative general equilibrium effect on firm profits, rais-
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ing internal net worth and stock prices. In contrast, adjustment costs
dampen amplification since they make investment more costly. The
sensitivity to these parameters is much greater under learning than
under rational expectations.
2.7 implications for monetary policy
In the model with learning, changes in subjective expectations in
financial markets lead to large and inefficient asset price and business
cycle fluctuations. A natural question, therefore, is whether policy
should intervene in order to stabilise asset prices. The question is
not so much whether a monetary policy reaction to asset prices is
desirable at all in theory, but whether the benefits are predicted to be
sizeable enough to warrant the inclusion of such a volatile indicator
into a monetary policy framework in practice. This question has been
discussed for a long time by academics and policymakers alike, but
generally answered in the negative. However, the discussion has gen-
erally centred on models in which asset price fluctuations are either
efficient, or the inefficient (“bubble”) component cannot be reduced
by raising interest rates. However, when expectations in financial
markets are not rational, the potential benefits of reacting to asset
prices are much larger. There is a possibility that the central bank
can mitigate excessive fluctuations in subjective expectations, thereby
substantially stabilising the business cycle.
The model does not permit to solve analytically for optimal mon-
etary policy, but I can numerically evaluate the effect of a class of in-
terest rate rules, augmented with a reaction to asset prices. Consider
extending the interest rate rule (2.41) as follows:
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)
 1/β+ pi
∗ + φpi (pit − pi∗)
+φ∆Y (log Yt − log GYt−1)
+φ∆P (log Pt − log GPt−1)
 (2.63)
In addition to raising interest rates when inflation is above its tar-
get level, the central bank can raise interest rates by φ∆Y percentage
points when real GDP growth is above long-run TFP growth, and by
φ∆P percentage points when stock market growth is above long-run
TFP growth. It also rules out monetary policy shocks. I explicitly do
not include the levels of output or asset prices or output gap meas-
ures. From a theoretical perspective, this would imply that the central
bank has more knowledge than the private sector under learning,
since the long-run level of asset prices and output is believed to be
essentially a random walk. From a practical perspective, imposing a
level target for asset prices is an even more audacious measure than
a target for price growth.
I compute the parameters for which such a rule maximises condi-
tional welfare (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004) (evaluated as a second-
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Table 2.6: Optimal policy rules.
learning RE
(4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3)
baseline w/o ∆P w/ ∆P baseline w/o ∆P w/ ∆P
φpi 1.5 1.27 1.55 1.50 5.03 4.81
φ∆Y .13 .19 -.14 .21
φ∆P .40 .18
ρi .5 .12 .04 .50 .99 .99
σ (Y) 3.31 3.32 2.55 2.39 2.13 2.13
σ (P) 10.18 7.20 4.85 .215 .401 .401
σ (pi) .401 .292 .249 .393 .177 .178
σ (i) .434 .462 .225 .424 .050 .052
%c. loss .741 .309 .028 .134 .0246 .0246
Standard deviations of output, stock prices, inflation, and interest rates (unfiltered)
in percent. Welfare loss based on second order approximation to objective expected
conditional welfare.
order approximation around the non-stochastic steady-state). Under
learning, I use objective, i.e. statistical expected welfare, rather than
expected welfare under subjective beliefs P . This criterion is paternal-
istic in the sense that it does not coincide with the policy that agents
in the model would prefer the central bank to take. In this sense, I
assume that the central bank is able to commit to a rule that goes
against what markets think it should do.
Table 2.6 summarises the key findings. Column (1) reports the
baseline model under learning. The bottom row shows the welfare
criterion in terms of equivalent steady-state consumption loss. This
consumption loss is .74% under learning and an order of magnitude
larger than the usual Lucas cost of business cycles. This is partly
due to inflation fluctuations with Calvo price setting, but partly due
to the fact that under learning, agents make choices that are op-
timal under subjective beliefs but highly suboptimal when evaluated
under the objective probability measure. Column (2) calculates the
welfare-maximising rule that does not include a reaction to asset
prices (φ∆P = 0). This makes it possible to cut the welfare loss by
more than half, to .31%; however, output and stock price volatility
remain high. A reaction to stock price growth, however, is able to
deliver substantial additional stabilisation. The coefficient φ∆P is large
and positive: A quarter-over-quarter increase in stock prices by 1% is
met with an interest rate rise of almost 0.4%. This does not mean,
however, that the central bank interest rate is itself very volatile. In
fact, the standard deviations of output, stock prices, and interest rates
are considerably reduced. By raising interest rates in a stock price
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boom, the central bank lowers aggregate demand and raises the cost
of borrowing for firms, which both act to reduce corporate profits.
This curbs investor optimism in the stock market, thus dampening
the feedback loop between beliefs, prices, and profits.
This result is specific to the learning equilibrium and is not ob-
tained under rational expectations, as shown in Columns (4) to (6).
When learning is shut down, the welfare cost of business cycles for
the baseline parameterisation is already much lower to start with.
Optimising over the reaction to inflation and output growth alone,
the central bank can already effectively stabilise the economy and
reduce the welfare loss considerably. Column (6) shows that when
φ∆P is unconstrained, then the optimal rule is calculated to include
a positive reaction to asset price growth as well. However, the ad-
ded benefit of doing so is negligible, with the welfare cost virtually
unchanged. Hence, under rational expectations, a monetary policy
reaction to asset prices carries no benefits.
2.8 conclusion
This chapter has analysed the implications of a learning-based as-
set pricing theory in a business cycle model with financial frictions.
When firms borrow against the market value of their assets, learning
in the stock market interacts with credit frictions to form a two-sided
feedback loop between beliefs, stock prices and firm profits that amp-
lifies the asset price dynamics.
I have embedded the mechanism in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. Unlike most of the lit-
erature on adaptive learning, beliefs retained a high degree of ra-
tionality and internal consistency. In the baseline calibration of the
model, introducing learning was shown to considerably improve the
model’s asset price properties, notably volatility and return predict-
ability, while still matching standard business cycle statistics. At the
same time, it leads to a large amount of propagation and amplific-
ation of both supply and demand shocks, endogenising up to one
third of the volatility of the business cycle.
A natural criticism of a theory based on beliefs other than rational
expectations is that it has many degrees of freedom to adjust for
almost any fact of choice. Here, expectations were constructed such
that learning only adds one additional parameter, the learning gain
g, which is calibrated to the relative volatility of stock prices over di-
vidends. Moreover, the predictable biases in forecasts made by agents
in the model correspond surprisingly well to the patterns found in
actual data from surveys.
The model was also used to study normative implications of learn-
ing. In particular, I have revisited the question of whether monetary
policy should react systematically to asset prices. I found that a strong
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reaction to stock price growth is desirable from a welfare perspective
when investors in financial markets are learning. In contrast, under
rational expectations, such a reaction does not improve welfare, in
line with previous findings in the literature. This illustrates the im-
portance of asset pricing for macroeconomics. Assumptions about the
source of volatility in financial markets has profound consequences
for our policy recommendations.
While this chapter mainly argues that improving asset price dy-
namics in a macroeconomic model can lead to novel insights about
business cycles, future work should explore the other direction: Can
a model of learning in a production economy teach us something
new about asset pricing? I suspect that the endogenous feedback
between beliefs and real activity might provide for insights into the
joint predictability of dividend growth and returns. It could also be
worthwhile to explore extensions to the learning mechanism (such
as a different perceived law of motion for prices, or learning about
returns) that might further improve the asset price characteristics, a
greater persistence of the P/D ratio and possibly even account for the
equity premium.
But the analysis of this model need not be restricted to the role of
stock prices affecting investment. Prices of other assets, for example
housing, are also known to exhibit patterns that are difficult to re-
concile with the simple asset pricing models used commonly in the
macro literature. At the same time, they clearly play a crucial role
in affecting business cycle fluctuations through credit constraints. A
learning-based approach is likely to be fruitful in this context.
3
O P T I M A L U N E M P L O Y M E N T I N S U R A N C E A N D
I N T E R N AT I O N A L R I S K S H A R I N G
3.1 introduction
Europe has recently seen business cycle movements differ greatly
across countries. This development, together with the resulting strains
on public budgets, has renewed calls to introduce some form of pub-
lic cross-country risk sharing, sometimes under the name of a “fiscal
union”. Indeed, a widely held view is that a common currency ex-
acerbates the need for international risk sharing mechanisms, and
that fiscal transfers become desirable when the private sector lacks
such mechanisms (Mundell, 1961). Capital and labour markets are
not nearly as integrated across member countries in the European
Monetary Union as they are across states in the United States, so this
is a relevant concern for the Eurozone.
At the same time, high unemployment levels in many developed
countries have led to renewed interest in the design of unemployment
insurance. In the Eurozone in particular, policy makers have argued
that the unemployment insurance system is a good and politically
viable channel to share risk across countries.1
This chapter asks the question: If a group of countries were to in-
troduce a common unemployment insurance system, what should it
look like? We answer this question using a two-country business cycle
model with search frictions in labour markets. Financial markets are
incomplete and labour is immobile across countries, so that country-
specific risk and idiosyncratic unemployment risk can only be par-
tially insured privately. The government in each country maintains
a mandatory unemployment insurance system providing benefits to
unemployed workers and taxing employed workers. On top of this, a
supranational unemployment insurance agency is introduced which
is able to administer an additional component of the unemployment
insurance system. This component can vary across countries as a
function of country-specific shocks.
1 A harmonised unemployment insurance system within the Eurozone as a tool for
international risk sharing has been suggested by the President of the European
Council (van Rompuy, 2012), the International Monetary Fund (Blanchard et al.,
2014), the German Institute for Economic Research (Bernoth and Engler, 2013) and
the French Advisory Council (Artus et al., 2013). Brenke (2013) also discusses some
of the drawbacks.
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We derive two theoretical insights from our analysis. Our first res-
ult is that a supranational unemployment insurance system can in
principle be used to insure against country-level risk without affect-
ing unemployment levels. The intuition for this result is as follows.
Unemployment insurance affects unemployment levels by changing
the relative value of employment over unemployment, which determ-
ines incentives to search and wage bargaining outcomes. When a
country is to receive a fiscal transfer, this relative value can be kept
constant by simultaneously increasing the level of benefits and lower-
ing the rate of contributions to the unemployment insurance system.
The opposite can be done in the country which is to send the transfer.
Next, we are interested in how cross-country transfers interact with
optimal labour market policies. Our second result is that the pres-
ence of an international risk sharing motive introduces a counter-
cyclical element to the optimal unemployment insurance policy. The
intuition is as follows. The classic unemployment insurance tradeoff
for a social planner is between efficiency of employment and insur-
ance. Too much insurance reduces search effort and/or job creation,
while too little insurance harms risk-averse workers who cannot in-
sure privately against unemployment risk. When international risk
sharing is present, the planner is shielding local consumption from
fluctuations in local output. When output falls, its share in local con-
sumption falls as well. After a negative productivity shock in one
country, the planner can then afford to provide more generous in-
surance and shift employment towards countries where it is more
productive. Therefore, insurance becomes more countercyclical than
without cross-country transfers.
We calibrate our model to the Euro area and compute the Ramsey-
optimal policy. We then compare this with a policy of constant re-
placement rates and no international transfers (as they are currently
in place in most countries). Our baseline simulation suggests that
the optimal unemployment insurance policy is countercyclical, even
when nationally optimal policies would prescribe procyclicality. The
optimal policy is very far from the constant replacement rate bench-
mark and involves sizeable changes in replacement rates and trans-
fers over the business cycle. We also compare the optimal policy to
a recent proposal by Artus et al. (2013) to implement a EU-wide
unemployment insurance. We find that in contrast to their findings,
the proposal only has very small effects in our model. The main
reason is that their calculations do not take into account the surpluses
and deficits of their scheme which ultimately have to be financed by
national governments. When we take these fiscal effects into account
in our general equilibrium model, the effectiveness of the proposal is
greatly reduced.
Our results have several limitations. First, the only relevant sources
of employment fluctuations in our model are productivity shocks.
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The first-best outcome in this case, well known from the international
RBC literature, is to reduce employment in a country experiencing
a negative shock. In competitive equilibrium, this can be realised by
making unemployment insurance more generous. But it is not clear
that the same would be true for other types of shocks. In this sense,
our analysis is a first pass at the policy design problem. Second, we
abstract from sovereign debt and impose balanced budgets on na-
tional governments. When cyclical fluctuations are sufficiently short-
lived, governments can effectively implement risk-sharing by finan-
cing countercyclical fiscal policy with debt, and it is not clear that the
benefits of a supranational risk-sharing scheme are large. However,
recent events in the Eurozone have made it clear that there are limits
on the debt capacity of governments, especially at times when risk
sharing might be needed most. Our assumption of balanced budgets
can be interpreted as an extreme form of a sovereign debt constraint.
Third, we abstract from the political moral hazard induced by risk-
sharing (Persson and Tabellini, 1996). It is plausible that a fiscal trans-
fer mechanism reduces incentives for national governments to carry
out structural reforms and this is probably the main political reason
for its opposition in the Eurozone. But ultimately, such concerns need
to be weighed against the economic benefits of the mechanism. In this
chapter, we are focusing on the latter.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. We briefly
review the related literature in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we lay
out a simplified version of our model with only two periods. This
allows us to show our theoretical insights analytically and provide
intuition. In Section 3.4, we lay out the full dynamic model that we
use for quantitative analysis and calibrate it to the Euro area. Section
3.5 contains the numerical results from our calibrated model. Section
3.6 concludes.
3.2 related literature
Our analysis relates to the literature on international risk sharing and
fiscal union on one hand, and the literature on the design of optimal
unemployment insurance on the other hand.
It is well known that the search externality in frictional labour
markets can be corrected using unemployment insurance. Because
of costly search, employment – and the corresponding fluctuations –
may be too low or too high, depending mainly on the relation of the
workers’ bargaining power to the matching elasticity. In the steady
state, this can be resolved by changing the outside option of work-
ers through unemployment benefits (Hosios, 1990). When workers
are risk-averse, the correction of the search externality needs to be
weighed against the provision of insurance (Baily, 1978). Fredriksson
and Holmlund (2006) provide surveys of the literature on optimal
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unemployment insurance in static and steady-state situations. More
recently, interest has emerged in unemployment insurance policies
that depend on the state of the business cycle. Here, a central point
of debate is whether benefits should become more generous in a
recession in order to increase insurance (countercyclical policy), or
less generous in order to mitigate the fall in employment (procyc-
lical policy). Earlier contributions such as Kiley (2003) and Sanchez
(2008) suggest that there is room for countercyclical unemployment
benefit policy. A more recent contribution is Landais et al. (2015).
They analyse a model with sticky wages and job rationing and find
that a countercyclical policy is optimal as the effects of insurance
on equilibrium unemployment is smaller in recessions. On the other
side, Mitman and Rabinovich (2015) numerically compute optimal
dynamic policies and show that the cyclical stance of the unemploy-
ment insurance is procyclical, in a setting when workers’ outside
option leads to inefficiently high wages. Moyen and Stähler (2014)
analyse the optimal cyclicality holding its average level fixed. They
show that there are situations in which unemployment insurance
should be countercyclical even when wages are directly affected and
the bargaining power of workers is too high relative to the Hosios
condition.2 Jung and Kuester (2015) analyse first-best policy with
sufficiently many fiscal instruments. They find that, in recessions,
benefits should rise if, at the same time, hiring subsidies and layoff
taxes also rise. The latter two instruments increase the incentives to
hire and decrease those to fire workers, which may compensate partly
for increased wage costs. However, if the other two instruments are
not available, they also find procyclical benefits to be optimal.
The literature exclusively analyses closed economies. This chapter
analyses optimal policy in a context in which unemployment insur-
ance operates across multiple countries and faces the additional ob-
jective of sharing cross-country risk.
Turning to the literature on fiscal unions, Leduc et al. (2009) have
shown that, when asset markets are incomplete, country-specific pro-
ductivity disturbances can have large uninsurable effects on wealth
and consumption paths. In a prominent recent paper, Farhi and Wern-
ing (2012) find that such uninsurable effects may be especially large
in a currency union with nominal rigidities. They suggest forming
a transfer union to insure against this risk. Many economists fol-
low their view that, in federal unions, a (fiscal) transfer mechanism
2 Moyen and Stähler (2014) compare optimal benefit duration policy in Europe and
the US. In their European calibration, the bargaining power of workers is larger than
the matching efficiency, implying the optimal benefit to be negative in light of the
Hosios condition. However, it is restricted to be positive. Additionally, rule-of-thumb
households make average marginal utility of consumption fluctuate relatively much.
It can be shown that steady-state benefits above optimum and relatively volatile
marginal utility of consumption makes optimal benefit policy countercyclical even
when bargaining power of workers is high already.
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to at least compensate for the uninsurable effects due to nominal
rigidities may be desirable. However, there is still some debate on
how to ideally establish such a transfer mechanism or a fiscal union
(see Bargain et al., 2013 and Bordo et al., 2011 for a discussion). In
this chapter, we show that a transfer mechanism is even desirable
in a model without nominal rigidities. Including them should only
strengthen our results.
3.3 simplified model
The intuition for our results can best be seen in a simple two-period
model which allows us to analytically prove our results and provide
a graphical representation. The quantitative analysis is carried out in
the next section.
3.3.1 Model setup
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. The Home country is
inhabited by a mass ω ∈ (0, 1) of workers, while the Foreign coun-
try is inhabited by a mass 1− ω of workers. In each country, firms
transform labour into consumption goods. Firms are owned by risk-
neutral entrepreneurs. While consumption goods can be traded across
countries in competitive markets, labour is immobile across countries
and labour markets are subject to search frictions.
In the first period, all workers start out as unemployed and no
production takes place. Agents can, however, trade assets with each
other. Asset markets are incomplete, and we will spell out the precise
market structure later on. In any event, the utility function of a worker
in Period 1 is as follows:
U = E [nu (ce) + (1− n) u (cu)] (3.1)
where ce is his consumption level if he turns out to be employed
in Period 2, and cu his consumption level when he turns out to
be unemployed. n is the employment level in Period 2. We assume
logarithmic utility, u (c) = log (c).
In the second period, firms post vacancies, workers are matched
with firms and production takes place. In the Home country, the
initial unemployment rate is u = 1 and the number of vacancies is v.3
The number of matches follows a Cobb-Douglas production function
m (u, v) = κmuµv1−µ. (3.2)
Since the past stock of employment is zero, employment at the end
of the period is
n = m (1, θ) (3.3)
3 Throughout the chapter, quantities will be expressed in per capita terms unless
otherwise indicated.
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where θ = v/u is labour market tightness.
A firm that posts a vacancy incurs a cost κv. The probability that
the vacancy is filled is q (θ) = κmθ−µ. In that case, the match produces
output a and the worker gets paid a wage w. This wage is determined
using Nash bargaining, where the bargaining power of workers is
denoted ξ (the bargaining solution is described further below). A
zero-profit condition for vacancy creation prescribes
κv = q (θ) (a− w) (3.4)
We denote by y aggregate output in the Home country net of vacancy
costs:
y = an− κvv (3.5)
The productivity a is a random variable which is only revealed in the
second period.
Employed workers receive wages w which are taxed at the rate τ,
while unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits b. Each
worker might also receive income Wi from assets traded in the first
period, where i = e, u denotes his status as employed or unemployed.
The individual and aggregate consumption levels are:
ce = (1− τ)w +We (3.6)
cu = b +Wu (3.7)
c = nce + (1− n) cu (3.8)
The Foreign country has a similar structure to the Home country,
but with possibly different parameters. We denote Foreign variables
with an asterisk, e.g. b∗ for foreign unemployment benefits. Home
and foreign productivity (a, a∗) are the only sources of aggregate
uncertainty.
Payroll taxes τ and benefits b are administered by an unemploy-
ment insurance agency. We assume that the two countries are part
of an insurance union, such that the agency operates across both
countries. It has to run a balanced budget with the constraint:
ω [(1− n) b− nτw] + (1−ω) [(1− n∗) b∗ − n∗τ∗w∗] = 0. (3.9)
In order to close the model, we have to specify the assets that agents
can use in the first period to insure themselves against risk, and the
unemployment insurance policies.
3.3.2 Social planner solution
Before looking at the competitive equilibrium, we first look at a bench-
mark social planner solution. A utilitarian social planner maximises
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the sum of worker utilities subject only to the resource constraint and
the search friction by solving the following problem:
max n, θ, ce, cu
n∗, θ∗, ce∗, cu∗

ω˜ E [nu (ce) + (1− n) u (cu)]
+ (1− ω˜) E [n∗U (c∗u) + (1− n∗)U (c∗u)]
s.t. n = κvθ1−µ (3.10)
n∗ = κ∗v (θ∗)
1−µ∗ (3.11)
ω (nce + (1− n) cu)
+ (1−ω) (n∗c∗e + (1− n∗) c∗u) = ω (an− κvθ)
+ (1−ω) (a∗n∗ − κ∗vθ∗) (3.12)
Here, ω˜ is the relative weight the planner puts on workers in the
Home country, which might be more or less than the size of its
population ω. Within a country, all workers are ex-ante homogenous
and so weighting of individual workers is inconsequential.4 The first
order conditions of the planner problem are standard:
κv = κmθ
−µ (1− µ) a (3.13)
κ∗v = κ∗m (θ∗)
−µ∗ (1− µ∗) a∗ (3.14)
cu = ce (3.15)
c∗u = c∗e (3.16)
ω
ω˜
ce =
1−ω
1− ω˜ c
∗
e (3.17)
The first two conditions are the Hosios conditions in each country,
which determine the number of vacancies that maximise aggregate
output net of vacancy costs. The remaining conditions prescribe full
risk sharing within and across countries. The consumption levels of
employed and unemployed workers within each country should be
identical, and each country should consume a constant fraction of
union output.
3.3.3 Optimal policy with private insurance
We now come back to the competitive equilibrium. Even when mar-
kets are complete, the competitive equilibrium generally doesn’t im-
plement the social planner solution because of search externalities.
Throughout this chapter, we assume some form of market incomplete-
ness, since our focus is on how unemployment insurance can be used
to overcome insufficient international risk sharing. In this section,
4 The entrepreneurs owning firms make zero profits in the decentralised equilibrium
in all states of the world. Following the logic of Landais et al. (2015), we constrain
the planner to keep entrepreneurial consumption at zero as well.
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we allow workers to only insure domestically against idiosyncratic
unemployment risk. In Period 1, each worker i ∈ [0,ω] at Home can
issue a claim on his future income. These claims can be traded in a
competitive market within the country but not across countries. Since
all workers are ex-ante identical, it is optimal for a Home worker to
fully diversify his risk by selling his entire future income in exchange
for a diversified portfolio of the income of all other Home workers’
income. In this case, the consumption levels in Period 2 are
ce = cu = c (3.18)
This allows us to solve for the Nash-bargained wage. The worker
surplus from a match is
W −U = u′ (c) ∂c
∂n
(3.19)
and the firm surplus is
J = a− w. (3.20)
When workers have bargaining power ξ, the bargained wage is simply:
w (a, ρ) =
ξa
ξ + (1− ξ) (1− ρ) (3.21)
where ρ is the net replacement rate, defined as
ρ =
b
(1− τ)w . (3.22)
A higher replacement rate improves workers’ outside option and
drives up wages. It thereby lowers the incentives for job creation and
reduces employment.
We want to know what the optimal unemployment insurance scheme
looks like in this situation. With privately insured unemployment
risk, the insurance agency has to mitigate three inefficiencies: search
externalities in the Home and Foreign country and lack of interna-
tional risk sharing. It also has three policy instruments: the Home and
Foreign replacement rates and a cross-country transfer. This already
suggests that there exists a policy that eliminates all inefficiencies.
We first note that the budget constraint of the unemployment in-
surance agency can be rewritten as
0 = ω [(1− n) b− nτw] + (1−ω) [(1− n∗) b∗ − n∗τ∗w∗]
= ω (c− y) + (1−ω) (c∗ − y∗) (3.23)
in which the replacement rates do not appear. We can therefore choose
replacement rates ρ, ρ∗ and a cross-country transfer ω (c− y) as a
policy, and back out the necessary benefits b, b∗, τ, τ∗ from the budget
constraint and replacement rate definition.
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Unemployment rates only depend on policy through the replace-
ment rate. Therefore, a transfer of resources from one country to another
can be implemented through the unemployment insurance system without af-
fecting unemployment levels. A positive transfer from Foreign to Home
would be implemented by increasing benefits b to unemployed work-
ers, and at the same time lowering payroll taxes τ on employed
workers. This way, all workers get to consume more, but the net
replacement rate ρ stays constant and the relative bargaining position
of workers is unchanged.5
The replacement rates satisfying the Hosios condition are
ρ =
µ− ξ
µ (1− ξ) , ρ
∗ =
µ∗ − ξ∗
µ∗ (1− ξ∗) (3.24)
and the optimal consumption with a social planner weight ω˜ on the
Home country is
c =
ω˜
ω
(ωy + (1−ω) y∗) . (3.25)
The planner weight ω˜ can be chosen freely. Here, we determine it
by the condition that transfers are zero in expectation, so that in
Period 1, neither country expects to be subsidising the other country
on average through the unemployment insurance system. Imposing
E [c− y] = 0 leads to a planner weight that is simply the expected
share of Home output in union output
ω˜ =
E [ωy]
E [ωy + (1−ω) y∗] (3.26)
and a transfer policy
c− y = E [y]E [y
∗]
E
[
ω
1−ωy + y∗
] ( y
E [y∗]
− y
E [y]
)
. (3.27)
The Home country receives a transfer when its output is below av-
erage, but has to pay a transfer when output in the Foreign country
is below average. This policy perfectly replicates the social planner
solution.
3.3.4 Optimal policy without private insurance
The previous case has illustrated how the unemployment insurance
system can implement cross-country transfers orthogonally to unem-
ployment levels. However, we have so far abstracted from the most
important objective of unemployment insurance, namely to insure
5 This is a general result: An unemployment insurance scheme which can vary benefits
and contributions in both countries has four policy instruments and one budget
constraint, which means that it is possible to achieve three objectives, in particular
leaving employment levels unchanged while implementing a cross-country fiscal
transfer.
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against unemployment. In the presence of privately uninsurable un-
employment risk, the optimal policy becomes genuinely second-best
and tradeoffs emerge between all three policy objectives: maximising
net output, providing insurance between employed and unemployed,
and providing insurance across countries.
We now eliminate all asset trade in Period 1, which means that
workers cannot insure any risk. The consumption levels in Period 2
are simply:
ce = (1− τ)w (3.28)
cu = b = ρcu (3.29)
We solve again for the Nash-bargained wage, which now takes into
account the curvature in the worker’s utility function. The worker
surplus from a match is
W −U = u (ce)− u (cu) (3.30)
and the firm surplus is unchanged. When workers have bargaining
power ξ, the bargained wage is now:
w (a, ρ) =
ξa
ξ − (1− ξ) log ρ . (3.31)
In this situation, the social planner allocation is no longer feas-
ible. Providing full insurance against idiosyncratic unemployment
risk clearly calls for ρ = 1, but in this case the worker gets to capture
the whole surplus (w = a) and job creation completely collapses.
Therefore, we have to solve for the Ramsey-optimal policy here.
The Ramsey planner solves:
max
n, θ, ce, ρ,
n∗, θ∗, ce∗, ρ∗
ω˜ E [nu (ce) + (1− n) u (ρce)]
+ (1− ω˜) E [n∗u (c∗e ) + (1− n∗) u (ρ∗c∗e )]
s.t. n = κmθ1−µ (3.32)
n∗ = κ∗m (θ∗)
1−µ∗ (3.33)
κv = κmθ
−µ (a− w (a, ρ)) (3.34)
κ∗v = κ∗mθ∗−µ
∗
(a∗ − w∗ (a∗, ρ∗))(3.35)
ω (n + (1− n) ρ) ce +
(1−ω) (n∗ + (1− n∗) ρ∗) c∗e = ωw (a, ρ) n
+ (1−ω)w∗ (a∗, ρ∗) n∗ (3.36)
Here, we have substituted out many of the equilibrium conditions
of the competitive equilibrium. In particular, choosing an unemploy-
ment insurance policy (b, b∗, τ, τ∗) subject to the insurance agency’s
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budget constraint is equivalent to choosing Home and Foreign re-
placement rates and consumption levels (ρ, ρ∗, ce, c∗e ) subject to the
aggregate resource constraint. As before, we choose the social planner
ω˜ such that any transfers made across countries net out in expecta-
tion: E [c− y] = 0.
As we have written it, the problem has eight choice variables and
five constraints, leaving three degrees of freedom. These correspond
of course to the three policy instruments ρ, ρ∗ and the cross-country
transfer c− y. The first order condition determining the optimal trans-
fer is as follows:
c− y = E [y]E [y
∗]
E
[
ω
1−ωy + y∗
] ( y∗
E [y∗]
− y
E [y]
)
. (3.37)
This is the exact same condition as in the previous case: Each country
at optimum consumes a constant share of union output. The Home
country receives a transfer when its output is below average, but
has to pay a transfer when output in the Foreign country is below
average.6 However, this now only holds for average consumption in a
country. The consumption of each worker need not be proportional
to union output.
The central equation in this section is the first order condition with
respect to the replacement rate. For the Home country, it reads as
follows:
(1− n) (1− ρ)
n + (1− n) ρ − e
n
ρ
(
log ρ+
1− ρ
n + (1− n) ρ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:I(ρ)
= −eyρ 1n
y
c︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:H(ρ)
(3.38)
where enρ =
dn
dρ
ρ
n is the elasticity of Home employment with respect
to the Home replacement rate, and eyρ =
dy
dρ
ρ
y is the elasticity of net
Home output with respect to the Home replacement rate. A symmet-
ric condition is obtained for the Foreign country.
This condition has an intuitive interpretation. The left-hand side,
which we call I (ρ), is the marginal benefit of insurance when raising
the replacement rate, at a fixed quantity of output available to the
country. By raising ρ, the unemployed’s marginal utility increases
relative to average marginal utility. This is the first term on the left-
hand side of Equation (3.38). At the same time, a higher ρ reduces
employment (through higher wages and lower job creation) which
shifts the composition of the workforce towards the unemployed. This
means that one marginal worker suffers a utility loss, which is the
“log ρ” term in the left-hand side of Equation (3.38). It also implies a
composition effect on the insurance budget, captured by the remain-
ing term on the left-hand side. The right-hand side, which we call
6 This result is due to our assumption of logarithmic utility.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal replacement rate for constant a and y/c.
ρ
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H (ρ), is the marginal cost of raising the replacement rate in terms of
net output lost (output minus vacancy costs).
The determination of the optimal replacement rate is graphically
depicted in Figure 3.1, which plots the functions H (ρ) and I (ρ).7
We can see that the insurance term I (ρ) is positive and only equals
zero at ρ = 1. Intuitively, holding output constant it is always desir-
able to increase the replacement rate until full insurance is achieved.
The efficiency term H (ρ) is first negative and then turns positive,
approaching plus infinity at ρ → 1. Intuitively, when ρ is too high,
there is too little job creation and the amount of resources available for
consumption can be increased by lowering replacement rates, thereby
lowering bargained wages and increasing job creation. In this case,
e
y
ρ < 0 and therefore H (ρ) is also positive. As ρ→ 1, output collapses
to zero and the marginal utility from lowering the replacement rate
becomes infinite. Conversely, when ρ is too low, there is too much
vacancy posting and the amount of resources available for consump-
tion can be increased by raising replacement rates. In this case, H (ρ)
is negative.
The optimal replacement rate lies at the intersection between the
two curves. We can already see that under the optimal policy, em-
ployment is always lower than in the social planner solution. Since
the benefit of insurance is positive, the optimal ρ is always higher
than what the Hosios condition H (ρ) = 0 would call for.
What happens to the optimal replacement rate when shocks to a
or a∗ hit the economy? We first keep the ratio y/c constant (one can
imagine a closed-economy situation in which y/c = 1) and look at
the effect of a reduction in productivity a. The effects are depicted in
in Panel (a) of Figure 3.2.
A reduction in a increases the insurance term I (ρ) and scales up
the efficiency term H (ρ). The intuition is as follows. In this model, a
reduction in a has a negative effect on employment because vacancy
creation costs κv are fixed. Holding total resources constant, the de-
7 Proposition A.2 in the appendix proves that the shape of the I and H curves are
indeed as depicted.
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Figure 3.2: Change of the optimal replacement rate in a recession.
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(a) Reduction in a.
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(b) Reduction in y/c.
crease in employment translates into an increase in unemployment
risk for workers, raising the social benefit to insure. Therefore, I (ρ)
shifts up for any value of ρ. At the same time, lower productivity
directly reduces net output for any level of employment. Therefore,
the average marginal utility of increasing output towards its efficient
level increases and H (ρ) is scaled up for any value of ρ. These two
forces work in opposite directions on the replacement rate, so that the
overall effect is ambiguous.
So far, we have kept the ratio y/c constant, but at optimum it is
jointly determined with the replacement rate. The risk-sharing condi-
tion (3.37) prescribes that average consumption c of the Home coun-
try is proportional to union output. If Home produces more, then
consumption rises less than one-for-one: y/c is increasing in y and
decreasing in y∗. It is this risk-sharing aspect which is novel to the
literature on optimal unemployment insurance.
The presence of international risk-sharing makes the replacement rate
more countercyclical. This can be seen easily from the optimality condi-
tion (3.38). When a falls, Home’s output will relatively low compared
to union output, and y/c will drop. Panel (b) of Figure 3.2 shows
that the optimal replacement rate rises as a response, introducing
a countercyclical element to the optimal policy. When y/c falls, the
efficiency term H (ρ) gets compressed towards zero, which can be
seen directly from Equation (3.38). Intuitively, Home’s output is now
relatively less important compared to union output. Therefore, it be-
comes less important to ensure that this output is at its efficient level.
The tradeoff between efficiency and insurance shifts towards the latter
and the replacement rate becomes more generous.8
We can show (see Proposition A.5 in the appendix) that in the limit
as ω → 0, the Home replacement rate when y/c is varied optimally is
decreasing in Home productivity a (countercyclical). The smaller ω, the
better Home country risk can be hedged and as the country’s size
8 Proposition A.4 in the appendix provides a formal proof.
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approaches zero relative to the entire risk-sharing union, average
consumption can be completely shielded from output fluctuations.
In this case, a fall in a unambiguously raises the replacement rate.
Nevertheless, the Ramsey planner’s tradeoff between efficiency and
insurance does not disappear – the optimal replacement rate always
remains below one.
Also, the Home replacement rate is increasing in Foreign productivity
a∗, as this variable affects Equation (3.38) only through a lower ratio
y/c. When the Foreign country experiences a drop in productivity,
maximising Home output now matters relatively more for the Ram-
sey planner, and the tradeoff between efficiency and insurance shifts
towards the former. The Home replacement rate therefore becomes
less generous.
3.4 model for quantitative analysis
While the stylised model of the previous section illustrated the rel-
evant tradeoffs of supranational unemployment insurance, we would
like to know whether our results survive in a more general setting. We
therefore set up a dynamic model in the spirit of the simple model
above, and include several additional features such as search effort
and imperfect substitutability between Home and Foreign goods. We
calibrate the model to Eurozone data and numerically solve for the
Ramsey-optimal policies.
3.4.1 Model setup
Time is discrete at t = 0, 1, 2, .... As before, a unit mass of workers and
firms populates the economy, where ω ∈ (0, 1) workers live in the
Home country and (1− ω) workers live in the Foreign country. We
describe the model setup in the Home country. The structure of the
Foreign economy is identical to the Home country, but its parameter
values (productivity levels, matching efficiency etc.) can be different.
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3.4.1.1 Workers
A worker in the Home country can be employed or unemployed
(indexed by j = e, u). It maximises expected lifetime utility
Uj = E
[
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
u
(
cjt
)− k (ejt))
]
cjt, ejt ≥ 0
u
(
cjt
)
=
(
cjt
)1−γ
1− γ , γ ≥ 0
k
(
ejt
)
=
(
ejt
)1+φ
1+ φ
, φ > 0
E [·] is the expectations operator, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ejt is
effort spent on job search (which is zero when j = e) and k
(
ejt
)
is the
convex cost of job search. γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
and Cjt denotes expenditure on a consumption basket. This basket
consists of goods produced in the Home and Foreign country and is
given by
cjt =
(
ψ
(
cjt,H
)σ
+ (1− ψ) (cjt,F)σ)1/σ (3.39)
where cjt,H is the amount of goods consumed and produced at Home,
while cjt,F is the amount of goods consumed at Home and produced
in Foreign. The parameter σ ∈ (−∞, 1) governs the elasticity of sub-
stitution between foreign and domestic goods, which is constant at
1/ (1− σ), and the parameter ψ represents the relative valuation of
Home goods.9
We assume that there are no international trade costs, so the law of
one price holds for both goods. We normalise the price of the Home
good to one and denote with pt be the price of Foreign goods. Thus,
pt equals the terms of trade of the Home country. Next, we define the
consumer price index (CPI) at Home by Pt =
(
cjt,H + ptcjt,F
)
/cjt. Utility
maximisation implies that
cjt,H
cjt,F
=
(
pt
ψ
1− ψ
) 1
1−σ
(3.40)
Pt =
(
ψ
1
1−σ + (1− ψ) 11−σ p−
σ
1−σ
t
)− 1−σσ
(3.41)
We still need to specify workers’ budget constraints and the fin-
ancial assets they have access to. We want to capture an incomplete
market setting in which workers can neither obtain perfect insurance
9 In the case of unitary elasticity of substitution (σ = 0), the consumption basket is of
the Cobb-Douglas form cjt =
(
cjt,H
)ψ (
cjt,F
)1−ψ
, so that the expenditure share on
Home goods is exactly ψ. A situation where φ > ω then corresponds to home bias
in consumption.
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of their idiosyncratic unemployment risk, nor perfect insurance of
country-specific risk. As before, we will consider an extreme case
in which workers do not have access to savings at all and simply
consume their income each period. Intermediate forms of market
incompleteness would certainly add realism, but at the cost of tract-
ability of the model in the presence of heterogenous agents.
Employed workers receive the real wage wt, of which an amount τt
of payroll taxes is deducted. The unemployed receive unemployment
insurance benefits bt. Also, workers receive the profits from firms
(described further below). We have to take a stance on how firm
profits are distributed in the presence of heterogeneity, and assume
that all agents own equal shares of the firms in their country which
pay an aggregate profit pit.10 Thus, in each period the real value of an
employed worker’s consumption basket is simply his after-tax real
wage plus profits, while the unemployed consume their unemploy-
ment benefit plus profits:
cet = (wt − τt + pit) /Pt (3.42)
cut = (bt + pit) /Pt. (3.43)
We are now ready to solve the agents’ optimisation problem. Define
the worker value functions as follows:
Wt = u (cet) +βEt [Wt+1 + s (Ut+1 −Wt+1)] (3.44)
Ut = u (cut) +βEt [Ut+1 + ft+1et+1 (Wt+1 −Ut+1)]
−βEt [k (et+1)] . (3.45)
Then maximising the utility of the unemployed with respect to effort
leads to the following optimality condition:
k′ (et) = ft (Wt −Ut) . (3.46)
3.4.1.2 Firms
Each country produces a distinct good. In the Home country, a repres-
entative firm produces the Home good using a production technology
which is linear in labour:
yt = atnt. (3.47)
Employment is subject to search frictions. The firm needs to post a
number of vacancies vt, each of which leads to successful matching
with a worker with probability qt. The vacancy filling rate is taken
as given by the firm. Successful matches start production in the next
period. At the same time, existing matches are destroyed at the exo-
genous rate s.
10 Firms will discount profits at a rate related to workers’ marginal rates of substitution,
as described below. Holding the firm portfolio therefore gives agents a limited form
of savings through firms’ intertemporal decisions, although they cannot save to
insure their unemployment risk.
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The firm needs to pay its workers a wage wt (expressed in units of
domestic goods), and it needs to pay a cost for each vacancy, which
takes the form of a constant quantity of domestically produced goods
κv. Its profits are given by
pit = (at − wt) nt − κvvt. (3.48)
The firm maximises the discounted sum of profits
E
∞
∑
t=0
Q0,tpit
where Qs,t is the discount factor between times s and t. Since the firm
is owned in parts by employed and unemployed workers, it is not
obvious what discount factor the firm should use. As in Jung and
Kuester (2015), we set the firm discount factor to a weighted average
of the worker discount factors:
Qs,t = βt−s
ntu′ (cet) + (1− nt) u′ (cut)
nsu′ (ces) + (1− ns) u′ (cus)
Ps
Pt
. (3.49)
We denote by Jt the value of a filled job:
Jt = at − wt + (1− s)EtQt,t+1 [Jt+1] . (3.50)
The optimality condition of the firm with respect to vacancy creation
then takes the familiar form:
κv = qtJt. (3.51)
3.4.1.3 Matching and wage determination
At the beginning of period t, a fraction ut of workers at Home are
unemployed. We assume that labour is immobile across countries, so
that workers can only search for jobs domestically. The number of
total new hires is determined by the number of searching workers
ut, the search effort et of these workers, and the number of vacancies
vt. Workers and vacancies are then randomly matched according to a
standard Cobb-Douglas matching function
mt = κe (etut)
µ v1−µt (3.52)
where κe is a matching efficiency parameter and µ is the elasticity
of matches with respect to unemployment. Defining labour market
tightness as θt = vt/etut, the probability that a vacancy gets filled,
and the probability that a worker putting in one unit of search effort
finds a job, are given by:
qt = mt/vt = κeθ
−µ
t (3.53)
ft = mt/ut = κeθ
1−µ
t . (3.54)
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Unemployed workers who separate have to wait one period before
they can start searching again. Accordingly, the law of motion for
employment and unemployment are given as follows:
nt = (1− s)nt−1 + qtvt (3.55)
ut = 1− nt−1. (3.56)
The wage paid to workers is determined by Nash bargaining in which
workers and firms share the surplus from matching according to
max
wt
(Wt −Ut)ξ J 1−ξt
where ξ is the bargaining power of workers. Due to the curvature
of the utility function, a closed-form solution for the wage does not
exist, but is implicitly given by the first-order condition:
Wt −Ut = ξ1− ξ
u′ (cet)
Pt
Jt. (3.57)
3.4.1.4 Government
Unlike in the simple model of the previous section, we explicitly spell
out national governments as well as a supranational unemployment
insurance agency, each independently managing its finances.
The government in the Home country gains revenue exclusively
from payroll taxes τgt. These taxes are used to fund benefits for un-
employed workers bgt as well as government expenditure gt. Govern-
ment expenditure is spent entirely on domestically produced goods.11
The government has to balance its budget every period. Its budget
constraint writes
gt + utbgt = τgtnt. (3.58)
The supranational agency can likewise administer a component of
unemployment insurance. This agency also has to balance its budget
every period. It collects payroll taxes τxt and disburses unemploy-
ment benefits bxt in the Home country, payroll taxes τ∗xt and disburses
unemployment benefits b∗xt in the Foreign country. The agency’s budget
constraint writes
ω (1− nt) bxt + (1−ω) (1− n∗t ) ptb∗t = ωntτxt + (1−ω) n∗t ptτ∗xt.
(3.59)
Total taxes on employed workers and total benefits received by unem-
ployed workers, and the net replacement rate are then given by:
τt = τgt + τxt (3.60)
bt = bgt + bxt (3.61)
11 Our setup implicitly assumes that any utility workers receive from government
expenditure is separable from market consumption, so that we can ignore it in the
utility function.
3.4 model for quantitative analysis 105
In our benchmark calibration, the supranational agency is inactive
(bxt = b∗xt = τxt = τ∗xt = 0) and national governments target a constant
replacement rate ρt = ρ¯ and ρ∗t = ρ¯∗. Since this situation is close to
the current system in place in the Eurozone, we refer to this as the
“status quo”.
3.4.1.5 Market clearing and shocks
The market clearing conditions for consumption goods produced in
each country take the form:
ω (yt − κvvt − gt) = ω (ntcet,H + (1− nt) cut,H)
+ (1−ω) (n∗t c∗et,H + (1− n∗t ) c∗ut,H) (3.62)
(1−ω) (y∗t − κ∗vv∗t − g∗t ) = ω (ntcet,F + (1− nt) cut,F)
+ (1−ω) (n∗t c∗et,F + (1− n∗t ) c∗ut,F) . (3.63)
The exogenous shocks in our model are persistent shocks to pro-
ductivity and government spending:
log gt = ρg log gt−1 +
(
1− ρg
)
log g¯ + εgt (3.64)
log at = ρa log at−1 + (1− ρa) log a¯ + εat. (3.65)
In particular, we rule out permanent shocks. This choice is not
innocuous in our model, because it has implications for optimal risk
sharing. The first best allocation in our model would completely shield
domestic consumption from domestic employment and instead tie it
to union output. In the presence of permanent shocks that differen-
tially affect the long-run level of GDP in each country, this would
effectively prescribe permanent fiscal transfers from the country with
higher per capita income to the one with lower per capita income. We
do not see much practical relevance and policital viability in such an
extreme form of risk sharing. We therefore focus exclusively on mean-
reverting shocks, so that cross-country transfers under the Ramsey
planner will fall back to zero.
3.4.2 Optimal policy
Our goal is to characterise the optimal unemployment insurance policy
of the government sector. We can consolidate the two national gov-
ernments and the supranational agency by aggregating the budget
constraints as in the simplified model:
ω ((1− n) b− nτ) + (1−ω) ((1− n∗) pb∗ − n∗pτ∗−) = 0 (3.66)
Effectively, the government sector has control over Home and Foreign
benefits and taxes and faces one budget constraint, which implies
three degrees of freedom. We express these degrees of freedom in
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terms of the Home and Foreign replacement rates (ρ, ρ∗)and the trans-
fer from Foreign to Home as a fraction of Home GDP:
Tt =
((1− n) b− nτ)
yt
(3.67)
A social planner who only faces the economy’s resource constraints
and search frictions in labour markets would simply equate marginal
utilities of all workers in both countries (up to constant multiplying
factors) and implement the efficient level of job creation as prescribed
by the Hosios condition. But in our setup, there are not enough
policy instruments to neutralise all three sources of inefficiency (un-
diversified idiosyncratic unemployment risk, search externalities and
undiversified cross-country risk).
We therefore solve for the Ramsey-optimal policy where the plan-
ner maximises the objective function:
E
[
∞
∑
t=0
βt
(
ω˜ (ntu (cet) + (1− nt) u (cut))
+ (1− ω˜) (n∗t u (c∗et) + (1− n∗t ) u (c∗ut))
)]
(3.68)
subject to all the equilibrium conditions of the economy. As in the
simple model, we choose the planner weight on the Home country ω˜
to rule out permanent transfers from one country to another:
E [Tt] = 0. (3.69)
3.4.3 Calibration and model-data comparison
We set the discount factor β to the standard value of 0.99 which yields
an annual interest rate of 4 percent. The parameter σ is set to 0.736,
implying an elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign
goods of 3.9 matching the European average of estimates reported
in Corbo and Osbat (2013). Given that value, we calculate a value
for the home good preference ψ of 0.56 to meet the corresponding
average estimates of trade openness from Balta and Delgado (2009).
The curvature of consumption γ is set to 1.5 as reported in Smets
and Wouters (2003) and the search effort parameter is set to φ = 1,
corresponding to a unitary search effort elasticity. The effort scaling
parameter κe is set to 0.692 to normalise steady state effort to unity.
We set the matching elasticity µ to the conventional value 0.5 ac-
cording to estimates by Burda and Wyplosz (1994). The bargaining
power of workers ξ is set lower, to 0.3. We target a steady-state un-
employment rate of 9% and a quarterly vacancy-filling probability of
70% following Christoffel et al. (2009). A quarterly job finding rate of
30% is targeted in line with evidence provided by Elsby et al. (2013)
for a number of European countries. The quarterly separation rate is
then deduced from the implied steady state restrictions as s = 0.030.
We also know that, in the steady state, the number of matches must
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Table 3.1: Baseline calibration.
Parameter Symbol Value
Country size ω 0.5
Preferences
Discount factor β 0.99
Risk aversion γ 1.5
Preference Home/Foreign goods σ 0.736
Relative valuation of Home goods ψ 0.56
Inverse elasticity of search effort φ 1
Effort cost scaling κe 0.692
Labour market
Matching elasticity η 0.5
Matching efficiency κe 0.692
Bargaining power ξ 0.3
Separation rate s 0.03
Vacancy costs κv 0.711
Technology
Steady-state level a¯ 1
Autocorrelation ρA 0.95
Std. dev. σA 0.0069
Government spending
Steady-state level g¯ 0.182
Autocorrelation ρG 0.79
Std. dev. σG 0.0047
Policy
Net replacement rate ρ 0.65
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be equal to the number of separations. This allows us to calculate the
matching efficiency κm = 0.458 and vacancy posting costs κv = 0.711.
We set the technology shock persistence to ρa = 0.95 and its stand-
ard deviation such that the output’s standard deviations obtained
from our model matches the standard deviation of output in the data
(σa = 0.0069). The government spending process is parameterised to
match detrended government expenditure data as in Christoffel et al.
(ρg = 0.79, σg = 0.0047).
Finally, the net replacement rate is set at ρ = 65% that is the average
across EMU countries taking into account short and long run benefits,
again following Christoffel et al.. The calibration is summarised in
Table 3.1.
3.5 results
3.5.1 Moments
Table 3.2 reports several second moments of the calibrated model at
the status quo policy and compares them to the data. Only the stand-
ard deviation of output is calibrated to match the data. While the
persistence of fluctuations in the model matches the data relatively
well, the model suffers from a counterfactually low unemployment
volatility. This is of course a well-known problem (Shimer, 2005): With
Nash bargaining, wages track movements in productivity too closely
and the job creation rate is almost acyclical. Indeed, the real wage
in the model is more volatile than in the data and almost perfectly
correlated with output. We present an alternative specification with
rigid wages further below.
Table 3.2: Second order moments in benchmark calibration.
Variable std. dev. rel. to real GDP corr. with real GDP 1st autocorr.
Real GDP 0.87 [0.87] 1.00 [1.00] 1.00 [1.00] 0.72 [0.88]
Real wage 0.86 [0.57] 1.01 [0.66] 0.99 [0.36] 0.72 [0.80]
Unemployment 0.04 [0.40] 0.05 [0.47] -0.49 [-0.86] 0.92 [0.95]
Second moments as obtained from simulating a linear approximation of the model at
benchmark calibration. Real GDP is yt/Pt, the real wage is wt/Pt and unemployment
is ut. Corresponding moments in the data in parenthesis (from the ECB AWM
database, 1984Q1-2008Q1). The second column reports the standard deviation, the
third column reports the standard deviation relative to real GDP, the fourth column
reports the cross-correlation with real GDP, and the last column reports the first
order autocorrelation. Real GDP and real wage are in logarithms. All series are HP-
filtered with smoothing parameter 1600.
We numerically calculate the Ramsey-optimal policy and report its
cyclical stance in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Cyclicality of the optimal unemployment insurance policy.
corr. with yt/Pt corr. with y∗t /P∗t
Optimal transfer/GDP Tt -0.61 0.61
Optimal replacement rate ρt -0.13 0.88
Optimal replacement rate ρt (no transfers) 0.91 0.15
Correlation coefficients of simulated model data, unfiltered.
The first row of the table shows the correlation of transfers Tt to
the Home country (as a percentage of GDP) with Home and Foreign
GDP, respectively. As expected, transfers correlate negatively with
Home and positively with Foreign GDP, in order to insure local con-
sumption from changes in local output. The second row reports the
cyclicality of the replacement rate, which goes in the same direction:
The replacement rate becomes more generous in a recession in which
Home output falls relative to Foreign. When Home productivity is
relatively low, the local benefit from efficient production is lower
compared to that of increased insurance. However, when Foreign
GDP falls, the replacement rate at Home drops. This increases Home
output which is then transferred to Foreign.
In the third row, we constrain the Ramsey planner to not transfer
any resources between countries, i.e. we impose Tt = 0. This corres-
ponds to the optimal policy carried out by national unemployment
insurance policies only, and effectively shuts down the international
risk sharing dimension of policy design. Consistent with the intuition
of the simple model, the replacement rate becomes less countercyc-
lical in the absence of cross-country transfers. Here, this effect is so
strong that the correlation with Home GDP actually turns positive:
Nationally optimal policies feature a procyclical replacement rate,
while the optimal supranational policy has countercyclical replace-
ment rates.
3.5.2 Impulse responses
The effects of the Ramsey policy can be illustrated further by look-
ing at impulse response functions. Figure 3.3 depicts a negative pro-
ductivity shock.
Panel (a) shows the response of the policy instruments which re-
flects the correlations presented above. Under the status quo (solid
black line), replacement rates are constant and transfers between coun-
tries are zero. Under the Ramsey-optimal policy (red dashed line),
the Home country receives a transfer from Foreign which amounts to
more than 0.2% of Home GDP on impact. At the same time, the Home
replacement rate becomes more generous while the Foreign rate be-
comes less generous as Home productivity falls. By contrast, when
we shut down international risk sharing by imposing zero transfers
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses, negative Home productivity shock.
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(a) Policy instruments.
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(b) Aggregate outcomes.
Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation negative Home productivity shock
εAt = −σA = −0.69%. Replacement rates ρt, Foreign replacement rate ρ∗t , Home
transfer Tt , unemployment ut and Foreign unemployment u∗t are in percentage
point deviation from steady-state. GDP yt/Pt, Foreign GDP y∗t /P∗t , consumption ct
and foreign consumption c∗t are in 100*log deviation from steady state.
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(blue dotted line), the Home replacement rate falls instead (thereby
becoming procyclical) while the Foreign rate barely reacts.
Panel (b) shows the effects of the shock on Home and Foreign out-
put, consumption and the unemployment rate. The planner achieves
a smaller rise in unemployment than under the status quo. This is
not surprising since low bargaining power ξ < µ with Nash bargain-
ing is known to lead to inefficiently volatile unemployment relative
to the first-best. But the comparison to the Ramsey policy without
transfers is revealing. Without transfers, the rise in unemployment is
even lower. This is a reflection of the much lower replacement rate
which increases search effort and reduces bargained wages. Foreign
unemployment falls in all cases as the Foreign country experiences
a positive terms of trade shock. Under the optimal policy, this fall
is amplified by a lower replacement rate. In all cases however, the
Foreign unemployment rate reacts very little.
The response of output is dominated by the fall in productivity and
does not change much across policies. This also holds for consump-
tion in the absence of transfers. But the optimal policy with transfers
achieves a smaller reduction in consumption at Home but a sharper
reduction in Foreign.
Figure 3.4 shows impulse responses to a positive shock to Home
government spending. Under the status quo, the increase in govern-
ment spending crowds out consumption and investment in vacan-
cies, leading to a rise in unemployment and a fall in output under
the status quo policy, as can be seen from Panel (b) of the figure.
Consumption falls at Home and to a lesser extent in Foreign (since
Foreign consumers also demand Home goods). The Ramsey-optimal
policy reduces the replacement rate to mitigate the rise in unemploy-
ment, and effects a transfer from Foreign to Home to shield con-
sumption from the crowding-out effect. For this shock, transfers are
actually procyclical since real GDP rises at Home and falls in Foreign.
This goes against our general finding of countercyclical transfers, but
is a natural consequence of assuming that utility from government
expenditure is separable from utility of market consumption, so that
the social planner treats an increase in Home government spending
like a pure loss of resources.
We end this section with a discussion of a policy proposal by Artus
et al. (2013). They advocate a European unemployment insurance that
pays unemployed workers a 20% net replacement rate, with national
benefits reduced by the same amount so that the overall benefits are
unaffected. This is financed by a contribution by the employed that
is “set to 20% of the aggregate payroll multiplied by the structural
unemployment rate in the country”. The first thing to note about
this proposal is that it does not run a balanced budget, and does not
even take into account an intertemporal budget constraint. If we were
to reproduce this policy in our model, even with perfectly known
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses, positive Home government spending shock.
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(a) Policy instruments.
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(b) Aggregate outcomes.
Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation positive Home government spending
shock εGt = σG = 0.47%. Replacement rates ρt, Foreign replacement rate ρ∗t , Home
transfer Tt , unemployment ut and Foreign unemployment u∗t are in percentage
point deviation from steady-state. GDP yt/Pt, Foreign GDP y∗t /P∗t , consumption ct
and foreign consumption c∗t are in 100*log deviation from steady state.
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structural (steady-state) unemployment rates the financial position of
the European unemployment scheme would have a unit root. It is
not to us how Artus et al. conclude that the scheme would “avoid
any permanent transfer” unless additional rules are put in place
that determine how the deficits and surpluses are shared among
member countries. In our model, we computed the effects of their
proposal under the assumption that a constant fraction of the surplus
or deficit of the scheme is born by each country, with a country’s
weight proportional to its steady-state share in union-wide GDP. We
found that the effects were extremely small. However, this result is
certainly due to the fact that the fluctuations in unemployment rates
are counterfactually small. The Artus et al. proposal effectively bases
the size of transfers on the difference between actual and structural
unemployment rates, which is too small in our calibrated model to
produce any appreciable effects. To address this problem, we now
move on to a specification with rigid wages.
3.5.3 Alternative specification with rigid wages
One weakness of our benchmark calibration is the very low volatility
of unemployment. In this section, we report results from an alternat-
ive specification of the model in which we make wages (measured in
units of domestically produced goods) completely rigid by assuming
wt = w¯. (3.70)
We keep the parameter values of our benchmark calibration as repor-
ted in Table 3.1, and choose the value of w¯ such that the standard
deviation of the unemployment rate matches exactly that in the data.
We also adjust the standard deviation of the productivity shock σA
to match the volatility of output in the data. This leads to a value of
σA = 0.0041.
Table 3.4 compares the second moments to the data for our altern-
ative specification. Unsurprisingly, the improvement in the behaviour
Table 3.4: Second order moments, rigid wage specification.
Variable std. dev. rel. to real GDP corr. with real GDP 1st autocorr.
Real GDP 0.87 [0.87] 1.00 [1.00] 1.00 [1.00] 0.82 [0.88]
Real wage 0.07 [0.57] 0.09 [0.66] -0.63 [0.36] 0.90 [0.80]
Unemployment 0.40 [0.40] 0.47 [0.47] -0.71 [-0.86] 0.93 [0.95]
Second moments as obtained from simulating a linear approximation of the model
at rigid wage specification. Corresponding moments in the data in parenthesis (from
the ECB AWM database, 1984Q1-2008Q1). Notes from Figure 3.2 apply.
of the unemployment rate now comes at the expense of a counterfac-
tually smooth wage rate.
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Table 3.5: Cyclicality of the optimal unemployment insurance policy, rigid
wage specification.
corr. with yt/Pt corr. with y∗t /P∗t
Optimal replacement rate ρt -0.45 -0.13
Optimal replacement rate ρt (no transfers) -0.38 -0.01
Optimal transfer/GDP Tt -0.46 0.46
Transfer/GDP Tt (Artus et al. proposal) -0.66 0.64
Correlation coefficients of simulated model data, unfiltered.
Table 3.5 reports the cyclicalities of the optimal policy. One can
see from the first row that our main result is unchanged: The Home
replacement rate is countercyclical with respect to Home GDP. How-
ever, here it is also slightly negatively correlated with Foreign GDP.
The optimal transfer (third row) also remains countercyclical. When
we recalculate the optimal policy without transfers (second row), we
find again that the Home replacement rate is less strongly correlated
with output.
We then report the properties of the Artus et al. (2013) proposal as
described above in the last row of Table 3.5. With realistic fluctuations
in the unemployment rate, this policy proposal can in principle have
sizeable effects. As expected, the transfer is countercyclical.
Here, we only report impulse response functions for a productivity
shock, as this shock is the main driver of output fluctuations in the
model. Figure 3.5 depicts the impulse responses to a negative Home
productivity shock. As before, the solid black line is the response
under the status quo policy (constant replacement rate, no transfers)
and the dashed red line is the response under the Ramsey-optimal
policy. We compare this policy to the Artus et al. proposal (green
dotted line).
Panel (a) shows the optimal response of the policy instruments. As
with flexible wages, the optimal Home replacement rate rises when
Home productivity falls, and the Home country receives a transfer
from Foreign. The magnitudes of the responses are much larger than
with flexible wages: The Home replacement rate rises by 5 percentage
points on impact, and remains 0.5 percentage point above its steady
state for more than two years. The optimal transfer is also very large
and amounts to more than 0.6% of Home GDP on impact with a slow
decay.
Panel (b) reveals that the higher replacement rate only initially
leads to a higher rise in unemployment, with the unemployment rate
being lower than under the status quo after one year. The fall in real
GDP is also mitigated. Foreign unemployment also rises, albeit by
a much smaller amount, reflected in a small drop in Foreign GDP.
The transfer of resources from Home to Foreign makes that Home
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses with rigid wages, negative Home productiv-
ity shock.
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(b) Aggregate outcomes.
Impulse responses to a one-standard deviation negative Home productivity shock
εAt = −σA = −0.69%. Replacement rates ρt, Foreign replacement rate ρ∗t , Home
transfer Tt , unemployment ut and Foreign unemployment u∗t are in percentage
point deviation from steady-state. GDP yt/Pt, Foreign GDP y∗t /P∗t , consumption ct
and foreign consumption c∗t are in 100*log deviation from steady state.
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consumption does not drop as much and even rises on impact, while
Foreign consumption falls significantly.
The impact of the Artus et al. (2013) proposal (green dashed line
in the figure) remains very limited even with unemployment fluctu-
ations as large as in the data. The reduction in Home consumption,
for example, is somewhat smaller than under the status quo policy,
but the difference is very small. In light of this result, the benefit of
this proposal seems questionable.
3.6 conclusion
In this chapter, we used an international business cycle model aug-
mented by frictional labour markets and incomplete financial markets
to discuss optimal unemployment insurance policy operating across
multiple countries. This adds international risk sharing to the classic
policy tradeoff between efficient employment and insurance of unem-
ployment risk. We have shown that cross-country insurance through
the unemployment insurance system can in principle be achieved
without affecting unemployment levels; and that the desirability of
international risk-sharing introduces a countercyclical element to the
optimal unemployment insurance policy. Calibrated to Eurozone data,
our model implied that the international risk-sharing component dom-
inates in the design of optimal policy, making it countercyclical over-
all. The optimal policy prescribes significant transfers between coun-
tries as well as countercyclical replacement rates. By contrast, recent
policy proposals seem to have only a limited impact on business cycle
dynamics and international risk sharing.
There are several directions in which our findings could be exten-
ded. First, we currently employ a very stylised model of the Eurozone
economy, with symmetrical countries, no private or public savings
possibilities and no nominal rigidities, thereby abstracting from many
potentially relevant factors for the optimal policy design. In these
dimensions, our analysis can be refined further. Second, the optimal
policy we compute here is one in which the planner has perfect
knowledge of the structure of the economy. One of the most difficult
issues in implementing a policy such as the one in this chapter is that
the structural rate of unemployment can only be reliably estimated
in hindsight, if at all. It would be useful to see whether simple policy
rules that are more easily implementable under imperfect informa-
tion can reasonably approximate the optimal policy.
A
A P P E N D I X
a.1 second-order perturbation method for chapter 1
It is straightforward to apply perturbation techniques (see for ex-
ample Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2004) to solve for an internally ra-
tional equilibrium with conditionally model-consistent expectations.
To summarise the equilibrium conditions, the actual policy function
g is
g (y, u, σ) = h (y, u, r (y, u, σ) , σ) (A.1)
where the subjective policy function h solves
0 = Ψ (y, u, z, σ) =
(
ψ (yt, yt−1, ut, zt)
EPt
[
f−j0 (yt+1, yt, yt−1, ut)
] )
=
∫
Rp
∫
R
(
ψ (h (y, u, z, σ) , y, u, z)
f−j0 (h (h (y, u, z, σ) , u
′, z′, σ) , h (y, u, z, σ) , y, u)
)
G
(
dz′
)
F
(
du′
)
(A.2)
and the equilibrium subjective forecast error function r solves
0 = EPt φ (yt+1, yt, yt−1, ut)
=
∫
Rp
∫
R
φ
(
h
(
h (y, u, r (y, u, σ) , σ) , u′, z′, σ
)
, h (y, u, r (y, u, σ) , σ) , y, u
)
G
(
dz′
)
F
(
du′
)
= Φ (y, u, σ) (A.3)
The goal is to derive an accurate second-order approximation of
the objective policy function g around the non-stochastic steady state
y¯:
g (y, u, σ) ≈ g (y¯, 0, 0)
+ gy (y− y¯) + guu + gσσ
+
1
2
gyy [(y− y¯)⊗ (y− y¯)] + 12 gyu [(y− y¯)⊗ u] +
1
2
guu [u⊗ u]
+
1
2
gσσσ2 (A.4)
The first step in deriving the approximation consists in calculating
this approximation for the subjective policy function h. This can be
done using standard methods. The second step consists in finding the
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derivatives of the function r. Total differentiation at the non-stochastic
steady state leads to the following first-order derivatives:
0 =
dΦ
dy
(y¯, 0, 0) =
(
φyt+1 hy + φyt
) (
hy + hzry
)
+ φyt−1 (A.5)
0 =
dΦ
du
(y¯, 0, 0) =
(
φyt+1 hy + φyt
)
(hu + hzru) + φut (A.6)
0 =
dΦ
dσ
(y¯, 0, 0) =
(
φyt+1 hy + φyt
)
(hσ + hzrσ) (A.7)
I assume that the equilibrium conditions imply that z¯ = 0 at the
steady-state. This means that in the absence of shocks, agents make
no forecast errors under learning.
Define the matrix A =
(
φyt+1 hy + φyt
)
hz. Then the first-order deriv-
atives of r are given by:
ry = −A−1
((
φyt+1 hy + φyt
)
hx + φyt−1
)
(A.8)
ru = −A−1
((
φyt+1 hy + φyt
)
hu + φut
)
(A.9)
rσ = 0 (A.10)
Up to first order, the existence and uniqueness of the function r is
attained as long as A is invertible. The first-order derivatives of the
actual policy function g can be obtained by applying the chain rule.
The certainty-equivalence property holds for the subjective policy
function h, hence hσ = 0. This implies that gσ = 0 as well.
The second-order calculations are similar. The second-order deriv-
ative of Φ with respect to y is:
0 =
d2Φ
dy2
(y¯, 0, 0) =
(
φyt+1 gy + φyt
) (
hyy + 2hyz
[
In ⊗ ry
]
+ hzz
[
ry ⊗ ry
])
+ φyt+1 hyy
[
gy ⊗ gy
]
+ Byy + Aryy (A.11)
This is a system of n2 linear equations in ryy, and thus can be solved
easily. Again, only invertibility of the matrix A is required for a
unique solution. The cross-derivatives of φ are collected in the matrix
Byy (of size nz× n2), which contains only first-order derivatives of the
policy functions:
Byy = φyt+1yt+1
[
hygy ⊗ hygy
]
+ φytyt
[
gy ⊗ gy
]
+ φyt−1yt−1 + φztzt
[
ry ⊗ ry
]
+ 2φyt+1yt
[
hygy ⊗ gy
]
+ 2φyt+1yt−1
[
hygy ⊗ In
]
+ 2φyt+1zt
[
hygy ⊗ ry
]
+ 2φytyt−1
[
gy ⊗ In
]
+ 2φytzt
[
gy ⊗ ry
]
+ 2φyt−1zt
[
In ⊗ ry
]
(A.12)
The formulae to solve for ryu and ruu are analogous. It remains to look
at the derivatives involving σ. This simplifies considerably because
the first derivatives of the policy functions g and h with respect to σ
are zero. The cross-derivative of Φ with respect to y and σ then reads:
0 =
d2Φ
dydσ
(y¯, 0, 0) =
(
φyt+1 gy + φyt
) (
hyσ + hzryσ
)
+ φzt ryσ (A.13)
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But because hyσ = 0, ryσ = 0 holds as well. The same applies to
ruσ = 0. Finally, the second derivative with respect to σ involves the
variance of the disturbances:
0 =
d2Φ
dσ2
(y¯, 0, 0) = φyt+1yt+1 (hσσ + huuvec (Σu) + +hzzvec (Σz))
+ φyt+1yt+1
(
vec
(
h′uΣuhu
)
+ vec
(
h′zΣzhz
))
+
(
φyt+1 gy + φyt
)
(hσσ) + Arσσ (A.14)
Again, this can be solved for rσσ when A is invertible. Note that the
perceived variance Σz appears in the calculation because it matters
for expectations for the future (unless φyt+1yt+1 = 0).
The second-order derivatives of the actual policy function g are
calculated easily once those of r are known using the Chain rule. In
particular, the cross-derivatives guσ and gyσ are zero, just as under
rational expectations.
a.2 further details on the full model in chapter 2
Here, I provide further details on the model presented in Section 2.5
of Chapter 2.
Retailers
Retailers transform a homogeneous intermediate good into differen-
tiated final consumption goods using a one-for-one technology. The
intermediate good trades in a competitive market at the real price qt
(expressed in units of the composite final good). Each retailer enjoys
market power in her output market though, and sets a nominal price
Pit for her production. A standard price adjustment friction à la Calvo
means that a retailer cannot adjust her price with probability κ, which
is independent across retailers and across time. Hence, the retailer
solves the following optimisation:
max
Pit
∞
∑
s=0
(
s
∏
τ=1
κΛt+τ
)
((1+ τ) Pit − qt+sPt+s)Yit+s
s.t. Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−σ
Y˜t
where Qt,t+s is the nominal discount factor of households between
time t and t + s and Y˜t is aggregate demand for the composite final
good. Since all retailers that can re-optimise at t are identical, they
all choose the same price Pit = P∗t . Since I want to evaluate wel-
fare in the model, I cannot log-linearise the first-order conditions of
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this problem. Their derivation is nevertheless standard (for example
Maussner, 2010) and I only report the final equations here:
P∗t
Pt
=
1
1+ τ
σ
σ− 1
Γ1t
Γ2t
(A.15)
Γ1t = qt + κEPt Λt+1
Y˜t+1
Y˜t
piσt+1 (A.16)
Γ2t = 1+ κEPt Λt+1
Y˜t+1
Y˜t
piσ−1t+1 (A.17)
I assume that the government sets subsidies such that τ = 1/(σ− 1)
so that the steady-state markup over marginal cost is zero. Inflation
and the reset price are linked through the price aggregation equation
which can be written as:
1 = (1− κ)
(
P∗t
Pt
)1−σ
+ κpiσ−1t (A.18)
and the Tak-Yun distortion term is
∆t = (1− κ)
(
Γ1t
Γ2t
)−σ
+ κpiσt ∆t−1. (A.19)
This term ∆t ≥ 1 is the wedge due to price distortions between the
amount of intermediate goods produced and the amount of the final
good consumed.
Labour agencies
Similarly to retailers, labour agencies transform the homogeneous
household labour input into differentiated labour goods at the nom-
inal price w˜tPt and sell them to intermediate firms at the price Wht,
which cannot be adjusted with probability κw. Labour agency h solves
the following optimisation:
max
Wht
EPt
∞
∑
s=0
(
s
∏
τ=1
κwΛt+τ
)
((1+ τw)Wht − w˜t+sPt+s) Lht+s
s.t. Lht =
(
Wht
Wt
)−σw
L˜t
Since all labour agencies that can re-optimise at t are identical, they
all choose the same price Wht = W∗t . The first-order conditions are
analogous to those for retailers. Again, I assume that the government
sets taxes such that τ = 1/(σw − 1) so that the steady-state markup
over marginal cost is zero. Wage inflation piwt and the Tak-Yun distor-
tion ∆wt are defined in the same way as for retailers. Finally, the real
wage that intermediate producers effectively pay is
wt =
Wt
Pt
= wt−1
piwt
pit
. (A.20)
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Capital good producers
Capital good producers operate competitively in input and output
markets, producing new capital goods using old final consumption
goods. For the latter, they have a CES aggregator just like households.
Their maximisation programme is entirely intratemporal:
max
It
Qt It −
(
It +
ψ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
In particular, they take past investment levels It−1 as given when
choosing current investment output. Their first-order condition defines
the price for capital goods:
Qt = 1+ ψ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
(A.21)
Market clearing
The market clearing conditions are summarised below. Supply stands
on the left-hand side, demand on the right-hand side.
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yjtdj =
∫ 1
0
Yitdi (A.22)
Y˜t =
Yt
∆t
= Ct + It +−ψ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
+ Cet (A.23)
Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lhtdh (A.24)
L˜t =
Lt
∆wt
=
∫ 1
0
Ljtdj (A.25)
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kjtdj = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It (A.26)
1 = Sjt, j ∈ [0, 1] (A.27)
0 = Bgt (A.28)
a.3 properties of the rational expectations equilibrium
in chapter 2
The rational expectations equilibrium considered in Section 2.5 has
the following properties that need to be verified. All statements are
local in the sense that for each of them, there exists a neighbourhood
of the non-stochastic steady-state in which the statement holds.
1. All firms choose the same capital-labour ratio Kjt/Ljt .
2. The expected return on capital is higher than the internal return
on debt: EtRkt+1 > Rt.
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3. At any time t, the stock market valuation Pjt of a firm j is
proportional to its net worth after entry and exit N˜jt with a
slope that is strictly greater than one.
4. Borrowers never default on the equilibrium path and borrow at
the risk-free rate, and the lender only accepts debt payments up
to a certain limit.
5. If the firm defaults and the lender seizes the firm, she always
prefers restructuring to liquidation.
6. The firm always exhausts the borrowing limit.
7. All firms can be aggregated. Aggregate debt, capital and net
worth are sufficient to describe the intermediate goods sector.
I take the following steps to prove existence of this equilibrium. After
setting up the firm value functions, Property 1 just follows from
constant returns to scale. I then take Properties 2 and 3 as given and
prove 4 to 6. I verify that 3 holds. The aggregation property 7 is then
easily verified. I conclude by establishing the parameter restrictions
for which 2 holds.
Value functions
An operating firm j enters period t with a predetermined stock of
capital and debt. It is convenient to decompose its value function into
two stages. The first stage is given by:
Υ1 (K, B) = max
N,L,D
γN + (1− γ) (D +Υ2 (N − D))
s.t. N = qY− wL + (1− δ)QK− RB
Y = Kα (AL)1−α
D = ζ (N −QK + B)
(I suppress the time and firm indices for the sake of notation.) After
production, the firm exits with probability γ and pays out all net
worth as dividends. The second stage of the value function consists
in choosing debt and capital levels as well as a strategy in the default
game:
Υ2
(
N˜
)
= max
K′,B′,strategy in default game
β˜E
[
Υ1
(
K′, B′
)
, no default
]
+ β˜E
[
Υ1
(
K′, B∗
)
, debt renegotiated
]
+ β˜E [0, lender seizes firm]
s.t. K′ = N + B′
A firm which only enters in the current period starts directly starts
with an exogenous net worth endowment and the value function Υ2.
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Characterising the first stage
The first order conditions for the first stage with respect to L equal-
ises the wage with the marginal revenue: w = q (1− α) (K/L)α A1−α.
Since there is no firm heterogeneity apart from capital K and debt B,
this already implies Property 1 that all firms choose the same capital-
labour ratio. Hence the internal rate of return on capital is common
across firms:
Rk = αq
(
(1− α) qA
w
) 1−α
α
+ (1− δ)Q (A.29)
Now taking Property 3 as given for now, Υ2 is a linear function
with slope strictly greater than one. Then the following holds for the
first-stage value function Υ1:
Υ1 (K, B) = N + (1− γ) (D− N +Υ2 (N − D))
= N + (1− γ) (Υ′2 − 1) ((1− ζ) N + ζ (QK− B))
> N
= RkK− RB (A.30)
This property will be used repeatedly in the next step of the proof.
Characterising the second stage
The second stage involves solving for the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of the default game between borrower and lender. Pairings are
anonymous, so repeated interactions are ruled out. Also, only the size
B and the interest rate R˜ of the loan can be contracted (I omit primes
for ease of notation and separate R˜ from the risk-free rate R). The
game is played sequentially:
1. The firm (F) proposes a borrowing contract
(
B, R˜
)
.
2. The lender (L) can accept or reject the contract.
• A rejection corresponds to setting the contract
(
B, R˜
)
=
(0, 0).
Payoff for L: 0. Payoff for F: β˜E
[
Υ1
(
N˜, 0
)]
.
3. F acquires capital and can then choose to default or not.
• If F does not default, it has to repay in the next period.
Payoff for L: EQt,t+1R˜B− B. Payoff for F: β˜E
[
Υ1
(
K, R˜R B
)]
.
4. If F defaults, the debt needs to be renegotiated. F makes an offer
for a new debt level B∗.1
5. L can accept or reject the offer.
1 That the interest rate on the repayment is fixed is without loss of generality.
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• If L accepts, the new debt level replaces the old one.
Payoff for L: EΛR˜B∗ − B. Payoff for F: β˜E
[
Υ1
(
K, R˜R B
∗
)]
.
6. If L rejects, then she seizes the firm. A fraction 1− ξ of the firm’s
capital is lost in the process. Nature decides randomly whether
the firm can be “restructured”.
• If the firm cannot be restructured, or it can but the lender
chooses not to do so, then the lender has to liquidate the
firm.
Payoff for L: EΛξQK− B. Payoff for F: 0.
• If the firm can be restructured and the lender chooses to
do so, she retains a debt claim of present value ξB and sells
the residual equity claim in the firm to another investor.
Payoff for L: ξB + β˜E [Υ1 (ξK, ξB)]− B. Payoff for F: 0.
Backward induction leads to the (unique) subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of this game. Start with the possibility of restructuring. L prefers
this to liquidation if
ξB + β˜E [Υ1 (ξK, ξB)] ≥ EΛξQK. (A.31)
This holds true at the steady state because Rk > R (Property 2), Q = 1,
β˜ = Λ and
ξB + β˜E [Υ1 (ξK, ξB)] > ξB + β˜E
[
RkξK− RξB
]
= β˜E
[
RkξK
]
> ξK (A.32)
Since the inequality is strict, the statement holds in a neighbour-
hood around the steady-state as well. This establishes Property 5.
Next, L will accept an offer B∗ if it gives her a better expected
payoff (assuming that lenders can diversify among borrowers so that
their discount factor is invariant to the outcome of the game). The
probability of restructuring is given by x. The condition for accepting
B∗ is therefore that
EΛR˜B∗ ≥ x (ξB + β˜E [Υ1 (ξK, ξB)])+ (1− x)EΛξQK. (A.33)
Now turn to the firm F. Among the set of offers B∗ that are accepted
by L, the firm will prefer the lowest one, i.e. that which satisfies (A.33)
with equality. This follows from Υ1 being a decreasing function of
debt. This lowest offer will be made if it leads to a higher payoff than
expropriation: β˜E
[
Υ1
(
K, R˜R B
∗
)]
≥ 0. Otherwise, F offers zero and L
seizes the firm.
Going one more step backwards, F has to decide whether to declare
default or not. It is preferable to do so if the B∗ that L will just accept
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is strictly smaller than B or if expropriation is better than repaying,
β˜E
[
Υ1
(
K, R˜R B
)]
≥ 0.
What is then the set of contracts which L accepts in the first place?
From the perspective of L, there are two types of contracts: those that
will not be defaulted on and those that will. If F does not default
(B∗ ≥ B), L will accept the contract simply if it pays at least the risk-
free rate, R˜ ≥ R. If F does default (B∗ < B), then L accepts if the
expected discounted recovery value exceeds the size of the loan, i.e.
EΛR˜B∗ ≥ B.
Finally, let’s consider the contract offer. F can offer a contract on
which it will not default. In this case, it is optimal to offer just the
risk-free rate R˜ = R. Also note that the payoff from this strategy is
strictly positive since
β˜E [Υ1 (K, B)] > β˜E
[
RkK− RB
]
= β˜E
[
RkN˜ +
(
Rk − R
)
B
]
> 0. (A.34)
The payoff is also increasing in the size of the loan B. So conditional
on not defaulting, it is optimal for F to take out the maximum loan
size B = B∗, and this is preferable to default with expropriation.
However, it might also be possible for F to offer a contract that only
leads to a default with debt renegotiation. The optimal contract of
this type is the solution to the following problem:
max
R˜,B,B∗
β˜E
[
Υ1
(
N˜ + B,
R˜
R
B∗
)]
s.t. EΛR˜B∗ ≥ B
EΛR˜B∗ = x
(
ξB + β˜E
[
Υ1
(
ξ
(
N˜ + B
)
, ξB
)])
+ (1− x)EΛQξ (N˜ + B)
The first thing to note is that only the product R˜B∗ appears, so the
choice of the interest rate R˜ is redundant. Further, B = B∗ and R˜ = R
solve this problem, and this amounts to the same as not declaring
default. This choice solves the maximisation problem above if the
following condition is satisfied at the steady state:
ξ
R
(
1− x + xR + xΥ′1
[
Rk
R
− 1
])
< 1 (A.35)
For the degree of stock price dependence x sufficiently small, this
condition is satisfied. This establishes Properties 4 and 6.
126 appendix
Linearity of firm value
Since firms do not default and exhaust the borrowing limit B∗, the
second-stage firm value can be written as follows:
Υ2
(
N˜
)
= β˜E
[
Υ1
(
N˜ + B, B
)]
(A.36)
where B = x
(
ξB + β˜E
[
Υ1
(
ξ
(
N˜ + B
)
, ξB
)])
+ (1− x)Qtξ
(
N˜ + B
)
(A.37)
We already know that if Υ2 is a linear function, then Υ1 is also linear.
The converse also holds: The constraint above together with linearity
of Υ1 imply that B is linear in N˜, and thus Υ2 is linear, too.
To establish Property 3, it remains to show that the slope of Υ2 is
greater than one. This is easy to see in steady state:
Υ′2 = β˜
Υ1 (K, B)
N˜
= β˜
γ
(
RkK− RB)+ (1− γ)Υ2 (RkK− RB)
N˜
= β˜
(
γ+ (1− γ)Υ′2
) (
Rk
K
N˜
− R B
N˜
)
=
(
γ+ (1− γ)Υ′2
) Rk + (Rk − R) BN˜
R︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:c0>1
=
γc0
1− (1− γ) c0
> 1 (A.38)
Finally, the aggregated law of motion for capital and net worth need
to be established (Property 7). Denoting again by Γt ⊂ [0, 1] the
indices of firms that exit and are replaced in period t, we have:
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Kjtdj =
∫
j/∈Γt
(
Njt − ζEjt + Bjt
)
dj +
∫
j∈Γt
(
ω (Nt − ζEt) + Bjt
)
dj
= (1− γ+ γω) (Nt − ζEt) + Bt (A.39)
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Njtdj = Rkt Kt−1 − Rt−1Bt−1 (A.40)
Bt =
∫ 1
0
Bjtdj = xξ (Bt + Pt) + (1− x) ξEtΛt+1Qt+1Kt (A.41)
So far then, all model properties are established except for Rk > R.
Return on capital
It can now be shown under which conditions the internal rate of
return is indeed greater than the return on debt. From the steady-
state versions of equations (A.39) and (A.40), it follows that
Rk = R + (G− R (1− γ+ γω)) N¯
K¯
+ Rc (1− γ+ γω) E¯
K¯
. (A.42)
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Sufficient conditions for Rk > R are therefore that N¯/K¯ and E¯/K¯ are
strictly positive and that the following holds:
γ >
R− G
G (1−ω) . (A.43)
a.4 propositions for chapter 3
Here, we provide the mathematical results for Section 3.3.
The optimal replacement rate in the absence of private risk sharing
satisfies Equation (3.37) in the main text:
(1− n) (1− ρ)
n + (1− n) ρ − e
n
ρ
(
log ρ+
1− ρ
n + (1− n) ρ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:I(ρ)
= −eyρ 1n x︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:H(ρ)
where x = y/c. Throughout, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A.1. I (ρ) is strictly concave, H (ρ) and (H · y) (ρ) are strictly
convex in ρ on [0, 1].
We numerically verified Assumption 3 for a wide range of para-
meters, and conjecture that Assumption (A.1) always holds true. The
limit behaviour of the functions at the corners is easy to prove and
together with our assumption determines the shape of the curves in
the main text.
Proposition A.2. I (0) = 1−n¯n¯ where n¯ = κm
(
κm
κv
a
)(1−µ)/µ
and I (1) = 0.
Also, holding y/c constant, H (0) = H
(
exp
(
− 1−µµ ξ1−ξ
))
= 0, limρ→1 =
+∞, and H′ (ρ) is strongly convex in [0, 1].
Proof. We start with the insurance term I (ρ). At the limit when ρ→ 0,
we have w→ 0 and n = κm
(
κm
κv
(a− w)
)(1−µ)/µ → n¯. Therefore:
(1− n) (1− ρ)
n + (1− n) ρ
ρ→0−→ 1− n¯
n¯
. (A.44)
The remaining term of I (ρ) must therefore go to zero. Indeed,
enρ =
dn
dρ
ρ
n
=− a
a− w
1− µ
µ
w2
a2
1− ξ
ξ
=
1
log ρ
1− µ
µ
ξ
ξ − (1− ξ) log ρ (A.45)
and therefore
enρ
(
log ρ+
1− ρ
n + (1− n) ρ
)
=
1− µ
µ
ξ
ξ − (1− ξ) log ρ
(
1+
1− ρ
n + (1− n) ρ
1
log ρ
)
ρ→0−→ 0. (A.46)
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For the case ρ→ 1, the first term clearly disappears:
(1− n) (1− ρ)
n + (1− n) ρ
ρ→1−→ 0 (A.47)
and for the second term, we have:
1− µ
µ
ξ
ξ − (1− ξ) log ρ
(
1+
1− ρ
n + (1− n) ρ
1
log ρ
)
ρ→0−→ 1− µ
µ
(
1+ lim
ρ→1
1− ρ
log ρ
)
= 0. (A.48)
Next, we turn to the H (ρ) function. As ρ→ 0, n→ n¯ > 0 and and
w→ 0. Therefore
−eyρ 1n = −
1
n
w
a
(
1− ξ
ξ
+
1− µ
µ
1
log ρ
)
ρ→0−→ 0. (A.49)
And as ρ→ 1, w→ 1 and n→ 0+, so that
− 1
n
w
a
(
1− ξ
ξ
+
1− µ
µ
1
log ρ
)
ρ→1−→ +∞. (A.50)
Proposition A.3. The optimal replacement rate is unique and strictly between
exp
(
µ
1−µ
1−ξ
ξ
)
and one.
Proof. Since f (ρ) = H (ρ)− I (ρ) is continuous on [0, 1] and a strictly
concave by Assumption (A.1), it crosses zero at most twice. But f (0) >
0 and limρ→−∞ , so there is a unique interior solution ρ∗ to f (ρ) = 0.
Since I (0) > I (1) = 0 and I is strictly concave, I (ρ) > 0∀ρ ∈ (0, 1)
and the optimum has H (ρ∗) > 0. Since H is a strictly convex function,
H (0) = 0 and limρ→1 H (ρ) = +∞ and , H (ρ0) = 0 for exactly one
ρ0 ∈ (0, 1) and ρ∗ > ρ0. Finally, H
(
exp
(
µ
1−µ
1−ξ
ξ
))
= 0.
Proposition A.4. The optimal replacement rate is strictly decreasing in
y/c.
Proof. Define x = y/c. Taking the total derivative of the optimality
condition with respect to x, we have
0 =
∂I
∂x
− ∂H
∂x
+
∂I
∂ρ
dρ
dx
− ∂H
∂ρ
dρ
dx
⇔ dρ
dx
= −
∂I
∂x − ∂H∂x
∂I
∂ρ − ∂H∂ρ
. (A.51)
Clearly, dI/dx = 0 and at the optimal ρ, we have dH/dx = H (ρ) /x >
0. Furthermore, we know that I (0) > H (0) and I (ρ) = H (ρ) only
once, so it must be the case that dH/dρ > dI/dρ at the optimal ρ.
Therefore dρ/dx < 0.
A.4 propositions for chapter 3 129
Proposition A.5. In the limit as ω → 0, the optimal replacement rate
is unique, strictly below one and strictly decreasing in a as y/c is chosen
optimally.
Proof. As ρ→ 0, the risk-sharing condition (3.37) becomes
c =
E [y]
E [y∗]
y∗. (A.52)
The optimal choice of ρ when y/c is chosen optimally can now be
described as
I (ρ) = H˜ (ρ) (A.53)
where H˜ (ρ) = H (ρ)
E [y∗]
E [y]
y
y∗
.
By Assumption (A.1), H˜ is a strictly convex function. The behaviour
of H˜ at zero is
H˜ (0) = H (0)
E [y∗]
E [y]
limρ→0 wn
y∗
= H (0) · 0 = 0. (A.54)
For the limit at one, we note
H˜ (ρ)
E [y]
E [y∗]
y∗ = −w
2
a
(
1− ξ
ξ
+
1− µ
µ
1
log ρ
)
ρ→1−→ +∞ (A.55)
since w → a as ρ → 1. Therefore, the optimal ρ when y/c is chosen
optimally has the same properties that we used before holding y/c
constant. In particular, the optimal replacement rate is unique and
strictly below one. Also, we have dH˜/dρ > dI/dρ at the optimal ρ as
in Proposition (A.4). Taking the total derivative again, we have
dρ
da
= −
∂I
∂a − ∂H˜∂a
∂I
∂ρ − ∂H˜∂ρ
(A.56)
where the denominator of the fraction is negative, so dρ/da has the
same sign as its enumerator. The derivatives of I and H˜ with respect
to productivity a are:
∂I
∂a
=
∂I
∂n
∂n
∂a
=
∂n
∂a
(
1− ρ
n + (1− n) ρ
)2 (w
a
1− µ
µ
1
log ρ
− 1
1− ρ
)
< 0 (A.57)
and
∂H˜
∂a
=
H˜
a
> 0. (A.58)
Therefore dρ/da < 0.
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